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Abstract  
This thesis studies the phenomenon of how companies respond to climate change. I use 
business responses to climate change as an example to examine the process through which 
managers assess and address externally generated pressures. Previous research on how 
companies respond to climate change is commonly limited by the assumption that 
companies function as isolated units independent of their wider network of business 
relationships. In this study, I proceed from the perspective that companies are, in fact, 
influenced by the interactions occurring as a result of continuous give-and-take exchange 
relationships. It is this move from the atomistic level of analysis and explanation to that 
of the business network that constitutes the theoretical lens to examine the empirical 
evidence that derives from five case studies of British energy supply companies. Driven 
by an iterative process of working with the senior leadership teams of these companies, 
this study offers some original insights in relation to how companies respond to climate 
change. Indeed, in each of the empirical cases, the senior leadership teams initiated 
activities in order to access the necessary resources, which were not available in 
concentrated form, but rather located within the company’s business network. These 
successive interactions resulted in companies 1) discharging their responsibility by 
passing the impact to others, 2) protecting their resources and rationalising activities 
rather than bearing risks of change, and 3) acting akin, or have the propensity to adopt a 
herd mentality, to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than 
operating in isolation. Hereby, this study not only provides a more comprehensive 
explanation of how companies respond to climate change but also offers new evidence as 
to how companies interact and behave in business relationships and networks. 
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List of abbreviations and acronyms 
Climate change and the energy supply sector as the empirical setting of this study require 
the discussion of a number of technical and often abbreviated terms. For the purpose of 
convenience, I briefly explain the abbreviations that I have used most frequently in this 
thesis. A more comprehensive list can be found on the United Nations Climate Change 




BIG 6 Big Six Energy Suppliers: A reference used to describe the six oldest and 
market-dominating energy supply companies operating in the UK. 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage: A technological process that captures, 
transports and stores waste carbon dioxide. 
CO2 Carbon dioxide: A naturally occurring gas. Scientists have identified its 
rapid increase in the Earth’s atmosphere as a cause of climate change. 
DSR Demand-side response: A technological process to reduce energy 
consumption at peak times. 
ECO Energy Company Obligation: An energy efficiency policy introduced by 
the UK government. 
EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading System: The first and largest carbon 
emission trading scheme covering more than 11,000 companies in 31 
countries (including the UK). 
GHG Greenhouse Gases: A mixture of gases (e.g., water vapour and carbon 
dioxide) with the capability of absorbing and emitting radiant energy. 
GW Gigawatt: A unit of energy often used when generating energy (1 GW = 
1000 megawatts). 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: A body of the United 
Nations tasked with providing scientific insights into climate change as 
well as its economic and political impact. 
MWh Megawatt-hour: A unit of energy often used when consuming energy (1 
MWh = 1000 kilowatt-hours). 
PPM Parts per million: The unit used to measure carbon in the atmosphere. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the research 
Responding to external pressures poses a growing challenge for companies. In fact, as a 
result of the increasing transparency of business behaviour, “any information on incidents 
are globally available within shorter and shorter time frames” (Amann et al., 2007, p.33). 
Amplified by global media outlets, inaction on external pressures emanating from 
governments, industry groups and customers create substantial risks to companies 
(Amann et al., 2007; Aaltonen and Sivonen, 2009). Examples of external pressures 
include 1) the asbestos industry facing several thousand lawsuits as asbestos was proven 
to be deadly (Formuzis, 2017), 2) Nestlè causing infant illness and death as a result of 
selling bottle feeding products in third world countries (Muller, 2013) and more recently 
3) Monsanto being sued as their Roundup herbicide was deemed as a cause of cancer 
(Zaveri, 2019). 
In this study, I focus on an external pressure that has emerged over the past two decades, 
namely climate change. Climate change has started to develop as an external pressure as 
governments, industry groups and customers have demanded businesses to reduce their 
carbon emissions. The growing scientific consensus on the range and magnitude of 
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adverse consequences of carbon emissions in the atmosphere has made it almost 
impossible for companies to ignore climate change (Bazerman, 2006; Ihlen, 2009; Chan 
et al., 2016). 
Responding to climate change, however, requires governments, companies, industry 
groups and consumers alike to reconsider and change current patterns of production and 
consumption (Wittneben et al., 2012). While the 2016 Paris Agreement represents a step 
forward in global cooperation aimed at combating climate change, enabling a climate-
resilient and low-carbon future may only be feasible when businesses, who have been 
responsible for “nearly two-thirds of historic carbon dioxide and methane emissions” 
(Heede, 2014, p.238), limit the ways in which their operations generate carbon emissions 
(Chan et al., 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, over the past decade or so, business responses to climate change have 
moved to the forefront of organisation and management scholarship (e.g., Levy and Kolk, 
2002; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Hoffman, 2005; Jones and Levy, 2007; Ihlen, 2009; 
Wittneben and Kiyar, 2009; Okereke and Russel, 2010; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; 
Shevchenko et al., 2016; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). Early research on business responses 
to climate change commonly employed Carroll’s (1979) continuum of corporate social 
responsiveness to classify responses as defensive, accommodative or proactive (e.g., Kolk 
and Levy, 2001; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Margolick and Russell, 2004; Jones and Levy, 
2007). 
In this context, Kolk and Pinkse (2004) found that companies lobby against any attempt 
to develop legally binding intergovernmental climate change treaties or national policies 
by questioning the scientific evidence, denying any responsibility and highlighting the 
high short-term costs relative to the low individual gains. As a result of growing socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures, however, companies appear to have 
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readjusted their stance towards climate change (Banerjee et al., 2003; Kolk and Pinkse, 
2004). For example, research by Okereke (2007) suggested that business inaction on 
climate change may negatively impact a company’s value and/or market share, and this 
may explain why companies have started to: 
“[…] develop climate strategies that provide market advantages while minimizing risks, based on 
factors such as levels of exposure to legal and regulatory risks, environmental reputation, cost 
advantages and technological innovation.” (Wittneben et al., 2012, p.1434) 
What follows in this thesis is an explanation of how companies respond to climate change. 
Interestingly, companies are both the source of the problem and part of a potential solution 
to the global challenge of climatic changes. They are the source of the problem because 
they are historically responsible for nearly two-thirds of all carbon emissions (Heede, 
2014). Yet, companies also possess the financial, technological and organisational 
resources to address the causes of climate change in powerful and innovative ways 
(Howard-Grenville et al., 2014). 
Previous organisation and management research on business responses to climate change 
suffers from a common limitation: a tendency to view companies “as isolated units 
divorced from their prevailing social and political context” (Wittneben et al., 2012, 
p.1435). In other words, business responses to climate change are seen as a task completed 
by an individual company rather than viewing companies as embedded within wider 
networks of continuous business and non-business exchange relationships (Easton and 
Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter et 
al., 2004). As a result, organisation and management scholars have hitherto 
predominantly focused on individual business responses to climate change. 
Even in the most recent Special Issue on managerial responses to climate change 
published in the British Journal of Management, scholars do not adequately address this 
gap in our understanding (see Goworek et al., 2018 for an introduction to the special 
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issue). This lacuna in the literature means that there has been no real attempt to articulate 
or explore the interaction within and across business relationships and networks that may 
help to explain how companies respond to climate change. 
These theoretically derived doubts about organisation and management research on 
climate change were empirically confirmed when examining the business responses of 
five British energy supply companies. Driven by an iterative process of working with the 
senior leadership teams of these companies, it became evident that a significant factor 
explaining how these companies responded to climate change was a result of the 
interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks.  
This study, therefore, proceeds from the basis of a network approach. It is through this 
move from the atomistic, individual level analysis and explanation to that of the network 
approach that will constitute the core of this theoretical and practical form of explanatory 
work. Thereby, presenting the network approach as a theoretical perspective that seems 
to be a promising alternative to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how 
companies respond to climate change. 
The current business marketing literature and home of the network approach, however, is 
characterised by a significant deficiency of discussion on how companies behave and 
interact with other actors in response to climate change. In an attempt to rectify this 
situation, this thesis examines the interaction and behaviour within and across business 
relationships and networks in response to climate change. To do so, I supplement the 
network approach with insights drawn from the behavioural science literature, which was 
central to enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the behaviour in business 
relationships and networks. By adopting this novel perspective, the present study seeks 
to challenge the organisation and management theories that are commonly employed to 
define and explain how companies respond to climate change. 
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Besides the importance of advancing the understanding of how companies respond to 
climate change, my personal motivation to embark on this intellectual journey was to 
make a contribution to addressing climate change. My interest in climate change can be 
traced back to watching Al Gore’s movie ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ in 2006. I was surprised 
that despite the increasing number of storms, droughts and other natural disasters that 
climate change had – at least partially – caused around the world, companies, 
governments and individuals alike continued to emit carbon emissions as usual. As a 
result of watching Al Gore’s movie, I wanted to understand how individuals and 
companies, in particular, behave when responding to climate change. 
Al Gore did not answer this question in his movie. He referred, however, to Pacala and 
Socolow’s (2004, p.968) who suggested that “humanity already possesses the 
fundamental scientific, technical, and industrial know-how to solve the carbon and 
climate problem”. Pacala and Socolow (2004) present 15 different responses available to 
reduce carbon emissions simply by scaling up existing technologies (e.g., more energy-
efficient technologies). What caught my attention at the time was that 13 out of these 15 
options were related to the generation, supply and consumption of energy. This nurtured 
my interest in the energy sector. 
Over the following years, I became increasingly interested in the global low-carbon 
energy transition. This interest is rooted in the fact that not only is the energy sector the 
single most emitting industry in Europe (Eurostat, 2017) and worldwide (IPCC, 2014), 
but also because the global demand for energy has risen tremendously over the past 
decade and is likely to continue to grow by an additional 28% by 2040 as a widening pool 
of developing countries prosper (EIA, 2017), let alone the electrification of other sectors 
such as transportation (European Commission, 2017). As part of this study, therefore, I 
negotiated access and engaged with the senior leadership teams of some of the UK’s most 
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prominent energy supply companies. As a result of having this rare high-level access, I 
was able to collect rich high-end access data on companies’ responses to climate change 
driven by the CEO and senior leadership teams. 
By setting the early empirical findings alongside the organisation and management 
literature on business responses to climate change, as well as the interactional and 
behavioural insights stemming from the network approach and the behavioural science 
literature, I developed an initial theoretical structure for the analysis of the empirical 
cases. This structure was driven not just from the theoretical understanding of the 
previous literature but also from the case studies. This systematic, iterative and logical 
research process (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 for more details about the methodology 
and empirical findings) allowed me to establish an initial theoretical structure that consists 
of three pillars: 1) Network tensions, 2) Network interactions, and 3) Network outcomes. 
Indeed, when analysing each of the empirical cases, it appeared that the socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures in response to climate change had triggered 
efforts to mitigate carbon emissions. It seemed that these efforts were largely driven by 
discontinuities between the new business requirements (emanating from contextual socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic developments) and the current operations of the 
focal companies. As a result of this empirical observation, I termed the first pillar of the 
initial theoretical structure as Network tensions in respect of the flux inherent within the 
sector outlined above. 
Interestingly, in each of the empirical cases, the companies began to interact within and 
across their business relationships and networks in order to overcome these network 
tensions. To do so, companies initiated activities in order to access the necessary 
resources, which were not available in concentrated form, but rather located within the 
companies’ business relationships and networks. In an attempt to account for these 
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interactions I included Network interactions as the second pillar of the initial theoretical 
structure. 
These successive interactions commonly resulted in a set of business behaviours. Such 
observable manifestations of the network interactions are covered in the third pillar of the 
initial theoretical structure, which I termed Network outcomes. 
By following this chronological process in each of the cases, I derived an empirically 
driven and theoretically grounded structure for the study of business responses to climate 
change (see Chapter 2 for more details). Through this initial structure of Network tensions, 
Network interactions and Network outcomes, I was able to explain how companies 
respond to climate change. In fact, throughout this thesis I provide clear evidence that 
companies’ successive interactions in response to climate change resulted in companies 
1) discharging their responsibility by passing the impact to others, 2) protecting their 
resources and rationalising activities rather than bearing risks of change, and 3) acting 
akin, or have the propensity to adopt a herd mentality, to other actors with similar intrinsic 
values and beliefs rather than operating in isolation. 
These findings contain several important implications for managers and policymakers, 
and could potentially contribute to the development of measures that will be more 
effective at mitigating climate change. Most importantly, however, I seek to make a 
substantial theoretical contribution by 1) raising doubts about the organisation and 
management theories that are commonly employed to define and explain how companies 
respond to climate change, 2) advancing the business marketing literature by developing 
a more comprehensive understanding of how companies interact and behave in business 
relationships and networks, and 3) counteracting the lack of empirical evidence that 
characterises much of the behavioural science literature. 
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In an attempt to further illuminate and specify how I seek to make these theoretical 
contributions, I now outline the specific research objectives and questions that will guide 
this thesis. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
In this thesis, I aim to explain how companies respond to climate change. In doing so, I 
establish an empirically derived and theoretically grounded conceptual framework of 
business responses to climate change. This conceptual framework emerged from 
investigating and answering the following two research questions: 
1. How do companies respond to climate change? 
2. How do companies interact and behave within and across their business 
relationships and networks when responding to climate change? 
The first research question focuses on identifying the causal mechanisms that explain how 
companies respond to climate change. The second research question ensures that a full 
view of the interaction and behaviour within and across business relationships and 
networks is established. As outlined in the previous section, one of the key arguments put 
forward in this thesis is that the sources that explain how companies respond to climate 
change may be located within the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and 
networks. Collectively, answering these two research questions permits the development 
of a more comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to climate change. 
By confronting these research questions with the five empirical cases of business 
responses to climate change, the present research challenges the conceptualisation of such 
business responses as atomistic and isolated activities of individual companies. In doing 
so, this study provides novel insights into the interaction and behaviour in business 
relationships and networks. 
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The first theoretical contribution of this study is to challenge the organisation and 
management theories that are commonly employed to explain business responses to 
climate change. By adopting a network approach and supplementing it with insights 
drawn from the behavioural science literature, the present research seeks to raise doubts 
about the organisation and management conceptualisation of such business responses as 
atomistic and isolated activities of individual companies (e.g., Kolk and Levy, 2001; 
Banerjee et al., 2003; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Margolick and Russell, 2004; Jones and 
Levy, 2007; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; Shevchenko et al., 2016; Wright and Nyberg, 
2017). Although significant progress into enabling a wider theoretical acknowledgement 
in developing a theoretical understanding of business responses to climate change has 
been developed in the extant literature, it is my hope to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to climate change. 
Comprehensive, in this case, means moving beyond the individual company as the unit 
of analysis and examining the behaviour within and across business relationships and 
networks of actors affected by the focal company’s response to climate change. I argue 
that this shift in the analytical focus is required urgently if we are to develop a more 
complete understanding of business responses to climate change. 
The second theoretical contribution of this study is to advance the business marketing 
literature on interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks. The 
present research contributes to the business marketing literature by opening the network 
interaction and behaviour ‘black box’ and, thereby, providing a systematic explanation of 
the micro-level processes of interaction and behaviour within business relationships and 
networks. Interestingly, although individual actors lie at the heart of business interaction 
(Ford and Håkansson, 2006; Medlin and Törnroos, 2007), only a few studies explore the 
associated behaviours within and across business networks (La Rocca et al., 2017). In 
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fact, the business marketing literature tends to ‘black box’ the role of actors and, as such, 
the relevant individual behaviours (Guercini et al., 2014). There is a striking lack of 
understanding of how actors interact and behave in business relationships and networks 
(Ford and Håkansson, 2006; Guercini et al., 2014; La Rocca et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, a core component that has not been investigated empirically is how the 
interaction and behaviour within business relationships and networks may translate into 
specific network outcomes (Håkansson and Snehota, 2017). I address this issue by 
examining the interactions and behaviours in and around business responses to climate 
change; an empirical context that is equally seldom considered by business marketing 
scholars. Despite the growing concerns over global climatic changes, there are few 
business marketing-oriented studies on the subject (e.g., Veal and Mouzas, 2010, 2011, 
2012; Finke et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, based on these insights, I make a secondary theoretical contribution to the 
behavioural science literature. To date, behavioural scientists tend to focus on individual 
behaviours on the consumer side. Little is known, however, about how such individuals 
behave when they act in a business situation, embedded in a company (Ferraro, 2016). 
The few studies that have examined behavioural aspects in business situations commonly 
rely on partially hypothesised explanations and are usually based on experimental 
approaches in laboratory conditions (Kelman, 2011). There is a lack of empirical evidence 
that could contribute to explaining how behavioural biases play out ‘in the real world’ 
business situation (Marewski et al., 2010). This research seeks to close this gap in the 
literature. Next, I outline the structure of this thesis. 
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1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter serves as an introduction to 
the study. In doing so, I have tried to convey not just the background to the research, but 
my personal motivation for conducting this study, the research objectives, research 
question and structure of this thesis. 
In the second chapter, I lay out the theoretical lens that the research adopts and propose a 
novel, initial theoretical structure for the study of business responses to climate change. I 
begin by introducing the business responses to externally generated pressures in general 
and to climate change specifically, I then review the business tensions that climate change 
has engendered and scrutinise the outcomes stemming from business responses to climate 
change. Next, I problematise the previous research on business responses to climate 
change by introducing the network approach as an alternative theoretical lens. To do this, 
I examine the previous literature in and around business relationships and networks, and 
depict the extant research on interaction and behaviour; particularly in and around 
business responses to climate change. In the final section of the literature review, I utilise 
this theoretical understanding to propose the three pillars of Network tensions, Network 
interactions and Network outcomes that together comprise the initial theoretical structure 
for the study of business responses to climate change. 
Moving on to the third chapter, I provide a detailed justification of the methodological 
procedures underpinning this study. In doing so, I explain the research paradigm by 
introducing my axiology, the critical realist epistemology and the network approach as 
the ontological stance. Furthermore, I justify the case study research method and explain 
why the chosen modes of data collection, data sources, data reporting and data analysis 
are the best fit for answering the research question at hand. I close the third chapter by 
showing that research ethics have been upheld at all stages of this study. 
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In the fourth chapter, I provide detailed information on the context and industry-specific 
aspects relevant to setting the empirical boundaries of this study. I begin by introducing 
the externally generated pressures emanating from climate change that build the context 
of this study. Then, I review how and why climate change arose as a global pressure on 
companies by explaining how the imbalance between nature and society emerged. 
Furthermore, I provide an outline of the contextual change (socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic) that have resulted from climate change and posed specific 
pressures on companies. Next, I highlight the relevance and fundamental role of the global 
energy supply sector in addressing climate change and turn my attention to the UK 
national energy supply sector. This includes establishing the specific characteristics of 
the UK energy supply sector, outlining the relevant energy and climate change regulation 
in the UK, as well as describing the UK’s progress towards decarbonising its energy 
supply system. 
In chapter five, I present five empirical cases of how companies respond to climate 
change. The first case examines the interaction and behaviour in and around one of the 
UK’s largest energy supply companies’ response to a new regulation, namely the ECO 
scheme. In the second case, I examine the interaction and behaviour of a large energy 
supply company when responding to climate change by attempting to decarbonise its gas-
fired energy generation assets. To do so, the company intended to retrofit an existing gas-
fired power plant with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology. The third case 
examines the interaction and behaviour when another large multinational energy supply 
company decided to restructure its energy generation portfolio in response to climate 
change. The fourth case provides insights into how an energy supply company responded 
to climate change by establishing itself as a provider of demand-side response technology. 
The fifth and final case examines the interaction and behaviour when a large energy 
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supply company sought to realign its business towards carbon reduction technologies in 
response to climate change. What the cases have in common and what is of interest here, 
is that these were all interventions driven across differing business networks in order to 
respond to the global climate change issue. 
In the sixth chapter, my attention turns towards analysing and discussing the five case 
studies introduced in chapter five. Here, I analyse the empirical findings stemming from 
each case by means of the three pillars of the initial theoretical structure (network 
tensions, network interactions and network outcomes). In doing this, I provide an 
overview of the five business efforts to respond to climate change. This includes 
scrutinising the actors involved and highlighting the observed network outcomes 
stemming from the business responses to climate change. Subsequently, I explain the 
observed networks outcomes by using theory. Hereby, I elucidate how companies 
respond to climate change. 
In the seventh and final chapter, I draw conclusions and outline the implications drawn 
from the analysis and discussion in chapter six and the thesis as a whole. This chapter 
provides an overview of the findings as well as the theoretical, managerial and policy 
implications. I close this chapter by acknowledging the limitations of my study and by 
suggesting promising paths for future research in this area. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter serves as the introduction to my thesis. I started by establishing the 
background to the research and identified the two prevailing gaps in the existing literature: 
On the one hand, the assumption in the organisation and management literature that 
companies function as isolated units independent of their wider network of business 
relationships; on the other hand, the limited understanding of interaction and behaviour 
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in business relationships and networks. Besides formulating these two gaps in the 
literature, I have provided insights into my personal motivations for conducting this study. 
Thereafter, I described the research objectives and questions and outlined how my thesis 
contributes to knowledge. I closed this chapter by delineating the structure of this thesis. 
In the following chapter, I review and problematise the previous organisation and 
management literature on business responses to climate change in light of the insights 
established from the business marketing and behavioural science literature. At the end of 
the next chapter, I propose an initial theoretical structure for the study of business 
responses to climate change. 
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2 Literature review 
This chapter lays out the theoretical basis of this study by outlining how the existing 
organisation and management research has approached the study of business responses to 
externally generated pressures in general and to climate change specifically, why these 
approaches are limited in establishing a comprehensive understanding of how companies 
respond to climate change, how a network approach overcomes the shortcomings of 
previous research, and lastly why it is important to supplement the network approach with 
insights stemming from the behavioural science literature. 
As such, I start with an introduction to business responses to externally generated 
pressures in general and to climate change specifically. Next, I review the business 
tensions that climate change has brought about and scrutinise the consequences stemming 
from business responses to climate change. Then, I problematise the current organisation 
and management approaches employed to explain business responses to climate change. 
Then, building on the business marketing literature in and around business relationships 
and networks, I introduce the network approach as an alternative theoretical lens. Lastly, 
I draw upon the behavioural science literature to dig deeper into the interactions and 
behaviours when companies respond to climate change. 
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Towards the end of this chapter, and largely as a result of an iterative process between 
the three distinct kinds of literature introduced above and the empirical findings presented 
in this study, I propose a novel, initial theoretical structure for the study of business 
responses to climate change. I close this chapter with a brief conclusion. 
2.1 Business responses to external pressures 
External pressures emanating from governments, industry groups, competitors and 
customers, increasingly require business attention (Christmann, 2004). Governments 
commonly establish a regulatory framework that demands companies to change their 
current pattern of behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Empirical studies of 
regulatory pressures have suggested that they may encourage companies to act more 
environmentally friendly (e.g., Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Dasgupta et al., 2000). In 
addition, companies face external pressures from industry groups as industry standards 
and social norms are being set (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Furthermore, competitors 
may implement novel strategies that are addressing, for example, environmental concerns 
of customers, calling other companies to respond by adjusting their own strategy 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Lastly, customers themselves may mount an 
external pressure on companies by making purchasing decision based on social, ethical 
and environmentally-responsible business conduct (e.g., Arora and Cason, 1995; 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Christmann and Taylor, 2001). 
Within this plethora of complex external pressures, companies have adopted response 
strategies, such as “adaptation strategy, compromising strategy, avoidance strategy, 
dismissal strategy, and influence strategy” (Aaltonen and Sivonen, 2009, p.131). 
Unsurprisingly, the topic of external pressures is touched upon in several kinds of 
literature: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Organisation Theory, Marketing, 
Strategic Management as well as many more. In the business ethics and CSR literature, 
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Amann and colleagues (2007) have brought together insights from the literature 
introduced above to define business responses to external pressures as: 
“The attempt to manage the business environment systematically and professionally, to ensure that 
business is done smoothly, with an unquestioned license to operate and an interaction that leads to 
mutual adaptation between corporations and society in a sense of coevolution.” (Amann et al., 2007, 
p.34) 
Over the last two decades, the emergence of global climate change has led to additional 
external pressures emanating from government, industry groups, competitors and 
customers. As a result, business responses to climate change have shifted from defensive 
approaches (lobbying against legally binding climate change treaties and/or national 
policies, questioning the scientific evidence and denying any responsibility) to proactive 
approaches (encouraging a strong regulatory framework, mitigating the company’s 
carbon footprint and seeking new market opportunities) (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004). At the 
same time, however, carbon emissions in the atmosphere have continued to rise (NASA, 
2019). As climate change has brought about a range of external pressures from differing 
stakeholders, it represents a rare possibility to further enhance the understanding of 
business responses to external pressures in general and to climate change specifically. 
Understanding how companies respond to climate change requires dismantling the 
dichotomy between businesses and the natural environment, reviewing the tensions that 
climate change has created for companies and establishing the consequences of business 
efforts to overcome these emerging tensions. 
2.1.1 Businesses and the natural environment 
Following Adam Smith’s (1776) logic, famously manifested in The Wealth of Nations, it 
is often taken for granted that companies possess the right to maximise their profits. 
Despite the associated social and economic well-being, in many cases, the desire to 
maximise profits comes at the expense of harmful effects on the natural environment (e.g., 
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air, water and soil pollution). Hardin (1968) vividly illustrates such a so-called tragedy of 
the commons by referring to the story of rational herdsmen sharing a common field. 
Driven by the desire to maximise personal gains, a sensible action for each individual 
herdsman is to add more and more animals to their herd without any limit. This is because 
the positive component remains with the individual herdsman (such as the proceeds 
stemming from one additional animal) and this significantly outweighs the negative 
component (such as the effects of overgrazing) which is shared by all herdsmen that have 
animals on the field. This behaviour of each individual herdsman, however, will 
inevitably lead to the degradation of the common field; meaning eventual ruin for all 
herdsmen (ibid, 1968). In that lies the tragedy: “Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited” (Hardin, 1968, 
p.1244). 
Following a similar rationale, companies conclude that it is in their own best interest to 
add more and more units of output (e.g., by building a new production plant) as the 
harmful effects (such as the additional carbon emissions) are suffered by the society as a 
whole. In a finite world, however, this means that if all companies add additional 
production plants, then the harmful effects will eventually deplete the natural 
environment. In fact, over decades, companies have neglected any responsibility for these 
negative effects; misuse, underinvestment and free-riding have been the status quo 
(Ansari et al., 2013). Hereby, companies vastly benefitted from clean air and a stable 
climate without bearing any of the costs related to maintaining it (e.g., Hardin 1968; 
Stigler, 1974; Ostrom, 1991). With this in mind, it seems rather unsurprising that climatic 
changes have emerged. 
With the emergence of climate change, however, the socio-cultural values and norms 
have started to shift towards more sustainable forms of living, working and consuming 
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(Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). Simultaneously, governments have initiated 
legal/regulatory changes to promote business responses to climate change. This is 
frequently based on the idea that introducing property rights, i.e. assigning rights to 
perform certain actions, helps to account for the social costs associated with doing 
business (e.g., Coase, 1960). Hereby, at least theoretically, the degradation of a common 
resource can be limited (Hardin, 1968, 1998; Ostrom, 1999). Interestingly, Ostrom (1999) 
found that such top-down approaches are the most promising strategy as companies “will 
not do this themselves” (Ostrom, 1999, p.494). Hereby, governments can mobilise 
companies who ”possess the organizational, technological, and financial resources to 
address environmental problems” (Jones and Levy, 2007, p.428). 
The emerging socio-cultural and legal/regulatory changes have implications for the global 
economic system (Goodall, 2008; Wright and Nyberg, 2015). The socio-cultural and 
legal/regulatory changes have mounted externally generated pressures on companies 
(Nyberg et al., 2018); leading to implications for competitiveness and business survival 
(Lubin and Esty, 2010; Chatzidakis and Shaw, 2018). This, therefore, creates a tension 
between “meaningful engagement with the grand challenge of climate change and an 
organizational focus on short-term profitability” (Wright and Nyberg, 2017, p.1655). In 
the next section, I attempt to illuminate this tension more fully. 
2.1.2 Business tensions in response to climate change 
The increased attention on carbon emissions as a result of the socio-cultural and political 
changes worldwide have started to demand “dramatic changes in how [companies] create 
value to eliminate their unethical negative impacts on the environment and society” 
(Shevchenko et al., 2016, p.911). From the perspective of an individual company, these 
demands for a drastic action to reduce carbon emissions create tensions because the initial 
costs overweigh the perceived potential benefits (e.g., Moffatt, 2004). In other words, the 
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business tensions brought about by climate change are between responding to climate 
change and short-term profitability (Okereke et al., 2012; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). 
In fact, several national governments (including the UK) have started to establish a 
legal/regulatory framework that encourages measures in response to climate change. 
Typically this includes “voluntary agreements, tradable permits, regulation and 
taxation” (Hansford et al., 2004, p.197). In many cases, it is these emerging 
legal/regulatory frameworks designed to address network tensions that trigger business 
responses to climate change (Banerjee et al., 2003). This is largely because legitimacy, 
i.e. operating as a lawful entity, is a major concern for companies since governmentally 
imposed “penalties, fines, and legal costs have punctuated the importance of complying 
with legislation” (Bansal and Roth, 2000, p.718). Although companies have increasingly 
adopted more constructive approaches when responding to climate change, it is 
understood that they continue to “look to governments to take the lead, as they argue the 
need for legislation to force their hand before they can justify action to their 
shareholders” (Veal and Mouzas, 2010, p.426). 
At the same time, climate change has created new economic opportunities such as markets 
for innovative low-carbon energy generation technologies. In fact, a well-conceived 
response to climate change may enhance business performance by ensuring long-term 
profitability by gaining a sustained competitive advantage (Bansal and Roth, 2000). 
Frequently stemming from a cost-benefit analysis of the potential measures to respond to 
climate change, companies driven by economic opportunities, or in other words 
competitiveness, focus on innovative processes that reduce both environmental impact 
and costs while increasing revenues as a result of marketing those activities (Cordano, 
1993; Kolk and Levy, 2001). Furthermore, such responses contribute to minimising the 
risks associated with unexpected costs emerging from new “regulations, fines, taxes, and 
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caps on products and processes that produce greenhouse gases” (Hoffman, 2005, p.32); 
particularly pressuring for companies with vested interests in fossil fuels (Wittneben et 
al., 2012). 
Collectively, the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures have acted as 
trigger points for business responses to climate change. This is largely because the socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic developments have brought about discontinuities 
in the business environment that demand companies to respond to climate change. 
Business responses to climate change have emerged from these tensions, and it is these 
responses that I explore in the next section. 
2.1.3 Business responses to climate change 
Over the past two decades, business responses to climate change have grown in number 
and scale. Indeed, several research groups focused on climate change (e.g., The Climate 
Group; The Pew Center) have confirmed that companies have increasingly responded to 
climate change (Margolick and Russell, 2004; The Climate Group, 2005). This commonly 
includes internal measures focused on changes in technologies and processes that permit 
reducing the company’s emissions (Kolk and Pinske, 2004). For example, taking 
advantage of cost savings stemming from energy efficiency (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). A 
full list of business responses to climate change has been established by Kolk and Pinkse 
(2004) as well as Slawinski and Bansal (2012). In an earlier piece of work, Bansal and 
Roth (2000) have broadly defined such business responses to climate change as: 
“A set of […] initiatives aimed at mitigating a firm's impact on the natural environment. These 
initiatives can include changes to the firm's products, processes, and policies, such as reducing energy 
consumption and waste generation, using ecologically sustainable resources, and implementing an 
environmental management system.” (Bansal and Roth, 2000, p.718) 
Interestingly, what seems to characterise most of the organisation and management 
literature on business responses to climate change is the assumption that business 
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responses to climate change are atomistic and isolated activities of individual companies 
(e.g., Kolk and Levy, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2003; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Margolick and 
Russell, 2004; Jones and Levy, 2007; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; Shevchenko et al., 
2016; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). An alternative view is that the resources that a company 
requires to respond to climate change are not available in concentrated form but rather 
are located within a company’s business relationships and networks (Veal and Mouzas, 
2010; Ferraro et al., 2015; Finke et al., 2016). Unilever’s CEO Paul Polman elucidates 
this: 
“The issues we face are so big and the targets are so challenging that we cannot do it alone, so there 
is a certain humility and a recognition that we need to invite other people in. […] It is very clear that 
no individual institution, government or company can provide the solution.” (as quoted in Confino, 
2012) 
Indeed, the scale and magnitude of emission reductions required to mitigate global 
climate change inherently require a combination and application of resources that go far 
beyond the capacity of what an individual company can achieve with its resources 
(Hoffman, 2005; Ferraro et al., 2015). The development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of business responses to climate change, therefore, requires moving 
beyond the individual company and take a network of companies as the unit of analysis. 
In fact, it is only through this shift in analytical approach that it will be possible to capture 
how businesses behave within and across business relationships and networks in order to 
access the resources required to respond to climate change. 
Furthermore, the network as a unit of analysis permits unveiling the interactional and 
behavioural aspects at play when companies respond to climate change (e.g., Veal and 
Mouzas, 2010; Finke et al., 2016). These simply cannot be uncovered when limiting the 
study of business responses to climate change by focusing on individual companies 
separated from their wider networks of continuous business and non-business exchange 
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relationships (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson 
and Ford, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004). 
Surprisingly, previous organisation and management research has largely neglected to 
incorporate the ways in which companies behave within and across business relationships 
and networks when examining business responses to climate change. This suggests that 
the established literature only explains a part of the story while disregarding the parts that 
are potentially most relevant. 
In an attempt to rectify this prevailing gap in the literature on business responses to 
climate change, I adopt a network approach as an alternative theoretical lens, 
supplementing this with insights drawn from the behavioural science literature. In doing 
so, I position this piece of work in and around business behaviour in business relationships 
and networks. In fact, I argue that it is this alternative theoretical lens, and the associated 
analytical shift from an individual company to a network, that permits the development 
of a more comprehensive understanding and robust explanation of how companies 
respond to climate change. 
In the next section, I, therefore, turn my attention to introducing a network approach to 
business responses to climate change. 
2.2 A network approach to business responses to climate 
change 
The network approach is grounded in the embeddedness of firms in webs of 
interconnected business and non-business give-and-take exchange relationships (Easton 
and Håkansson, 1996; Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; 
Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004). This perspective rejects an atomistic view 
of businesses by assuming that competitive advantage stems from systems of exchange 
 24 
in which companies are deeply ingrained (Uzzi, 1996). More specifically, this approach 
emphasises that the social and economic networks of companies (Granovetter, 1985) 
explain the formation of alliances (Gulati, 1995), inter-organisational exchange (Uzzi, 
1997) and business survival (Baum and Oliver, 1992). This view of firms as embedded 
in business relationships and networks has allowed scholars to unearth performance-
enhancing processes such as “interfirm resource pooling, cooperation, and coordinated 
adaptation” (Uzzi, 1996, p.675). 
In an attempt to illuminate the network approach further, in the next section I outline the 
relevance of business relationships and networks in general, I elucidate the behaviour of 
companies within and across their business relationships and networks, and depict the 
interactional as well as behavioural aspects of responding to climate change. 
2.2.1 Business relationships and networks 
“No business is an island” (Håkansson and Snehota, 1989, p.187). This metaphor is 
commonly used in the business marketing literature and particularly by scholars 
associated with the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group to illustrate the 
interconnectedness between a company and its wider networks of relationships (e.g., 
Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Ritter, 2000; Araujo et al., 2003; Möller et al., 2005; Ford 
and Mouzas, 2013; Ford and Håkansson, 2013; Freytag et al., 2016; Mouzas, 2016; 
Törnroos et al., 2017; Lowe and Rod, 2018; Mouzas and Ford, 2018). Indeed, IMP 
scholarship sees companies as embedded in wider networks of continuous business and 
non-business give-and-take exchange relationships (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; 
Halinen and Törnroos, 1998; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; 
Ritter et al., 2004). Businesses engage in these exchange relationships when they perceive 
that value can be created, either directly or indirectly (Ritter et al., 2004; Mouzas and 
Ford, 2009). The IMP literature challenges the conventional view of island-like 
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businesses that are operating in isolation and thus raises the issue of managing internal 
and external relationships. 
In fact, IMP scholars fundamentally challenge the assumption that firms are acting 
independently, proactively and are able to exist by themselves (Ford and Mouzas, 2008). 
Consequently, business activities are seen as being guided by a process of managing and 
integrating complex ongoing business and non-business relationships that are themselves 
controlled and influenced by other internal and external relationships. Ritter et al. (2004, 
p.175) add that “firms are seldom in total control of all these relationships and are subject 
to the control and influence of others within and around the relationship”. As a result 
business networks are to be seen as “self-organizing systems” (ibid). 
This view of reality stands in stark contrast to the network understanding developed from 
an organisation and management studies perspective (e.g., Madhavan et al., 1998; Gulati 
et al., 2000); especially, that individual businesses choose, develop, manage and control 
networks with the purpose of enhancing their own performance. From the organisation 
and management studies perspectives, network characteristics are akin to the features of 
a market as the freedom of choice and the ability to develop, manage, control and change 
counterparts prevails (Ford and Mouzas, 2008). In the IMP literature, however, the idea 
of business interaction lies at the heart of the network approach. Business interaction 
refers to: 
”The substantive process that occurs between business actors through which all of the aspects of 
business: material, financial and human and all of the elements of business: actors, activities and 
resources take their form, are changed and are transformed.” (Ford et al., 2008, p.12) 
Through this process, actors transform themselves as well as the counterparts embedded 
in their business networks. From an analytical perspective, this requires viewing the 
process of interaction as distinct from the actors themselves. This separation is inherent 
in the assumption that “interaction is a process that occurs between actors over time […] 
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but which develops in a way that is not fully controlled” (ibid, p.10). Business 
relationships and networks, therefore, emerge through business interaction over time 
(Ford and Mouzas, 2013). Such evolving business relationships and networks are: 
“[…] manifested in many forms, such as the ’quality’ of a service delivery; the effort (or lack of it) that 
is devoted to a product adaptation; the stance taken in a negotiation; the timing of a payment or the 
commitment to a joint development.” (Ford et al., 2008, p.10) 
While an actor might approach interactions based on an intent consistent with the overall 
strategy of its company, in some cases, if not all, the chosen approach to interaction is 
“unconsidered, inconsistent, or be the result of inertia and simply continue the status 
quo” (Ford et al., 2008, p.10). This is due to the difficulty of identifying and controlling 
the process of interaction and its outcome. In fact, although actors may approach 
interaction with the intention of achieving a pre-defined outcome, the actual outcome of 
interaction is beyond the control of actors as it is constituted through the behaviour of 
actors and evolves over time. Unsurprisingly, Ford et al. (2008, p.12) conclude that “no 
single actor is or could ever be in control of what emerges from its interactions or be 
independent in the world of business”. Regardless of the sheer uncontrollability of 
outcomes stemming from interaction, Ford et al. (2008) suggest that successive 
interactions can over time transform actors, activities and resources and it is in this that 
the outcome of business interaction is manifested. 
IMP research discusses such network changes by examining the development of networks 
over time (e.g., Mattson, 1987; Håkansson, 1992; Harrison, 1999; Harrison and Easton, 
2002; Mouzas and Ford, 2009). A common theme of this stream of research are the 
dynamics between network stability and radical change (Axelsson and Easton, 1992). 
While network stability is often stated as the default (Gadde and Håkansson, 1992), 
changes in networks may “originate from and are mobilised by actors within that 
network” (Harrison and Easton, 2002, p.546). Particularly relevant for this study is, 
 27 
however, that business networks seem to be comparably stable and resistant to externally 
generated pressures. 
Indeed, Harrison and Easton (2002) suggest that within business networks a deep 
process/pattern exists “that drives actors to minimise the impact of externally imposed 
changes” (Harrison and Easton, 2002, p.551). As a result of network structuration over 
time, network actors repeat previous activities that have proven to successfully operate 
and survive (Håkansson, 1992), or as Harrison and Easton (2002, p.551) put it: 
“Repetition of the ways of doing things has created an embedded pattern that represents 
the perceived best way of operating at the current time.”. Externally generated pressures 
emanating from global climatic changes threaten this deep process/pattern. As a result, 
network actors are required to adjust existing and develop new patterns of interaction and 
behaviour in response to climate change. Since the success of new ways of working 
remains unknown, business networks tend to behave conservatively in such situations 
(Harrison and Easton, 2002). 
In the process of adjusting existing and developing new patterns, the interaction and 
behaviour of network actors appear to be driven by attempts to systematically control and 
influence other actors (Gadde et al., 2003). This ambition is the inherent driving force of 
business interaction. Although actors may strive for central control of a network, the 
limited understanding of the network as a whole leads to the argument that ‘pluralistic’ 
networks are “better able to respond to changing conditions” (Gadde et al., 2003, p.360). 
This becomes particularly apparent when considering that the activities between two 
actors may spread across the entire network. In fact, actors may intend to utilise the 
emerging interdependencies by relating their own activities to the activities of 
counterparts. The unpredictability of the outcomes, however, leads to the conclusion that 
 28 
the problem-solving process in networks is beyond the ownership of an individual actor 
(Gadde et al., 2003). 
Interestingly, a significant proportion of the resources necessary for addressing climate 
change are located within a companies’ business relationships and networks (Veal and 
Mouzas, 2010). Since such resources are unevenly distributed across relationships and 
networks, actors engage in give-and-take exchange in order to obtain the resources of 
counterparts (Mouzas and Ford, 2009). This inevitably ingrains companies into a “larger 
collective entity” (Gadde et al., 2003, p.359). It is the behaviour in networks that enables 
actors to initiate activities leading to the exchange of resources (e.g., D’Antone et al., 
2017). 
The existing IMP literature suggests that the network behaviour required to obtain 
resources varies significantly since each actor has “its own specific pattern of 
interdependencies in terms of how it relates to its most important counterparts and how 
they relate to others” (Gadde et al., 2003, p.360). Since the behaviour in networks is a 
process that evolves over time, no actor is the natural centre which implies that networks 
are to be understood as “loosely connected systems of actors and relationships in which 
no firm can dominate” (Gadde et al., 2003, p.360). This underlying logic of networks, 
however, does not suggest that networks develop randomly. The contrary is the case; 
loosely connected systems of actors may follow patterns without an individual actor 
creating and orchestrating them (Resnick, 1998). Networks, therefore, represent a fuzzy 
context to which actors are exposed (Johanson and Mattsson, 1992). 
In an attempt to dismantle the fuzzy network context within which actors need to interact 
in order to access resources, Ford and Håkansson (2013) have identified four principal 
network structures, stretching on a continuum from three relationships to no relationship, 
as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: The four principal structures of business networks 
While the solid lines in Figure 1 indicate a direct relationship between actors, the dotted 
lines show indirect relationships. Direct relationships are important resources for 
companies, connect a company to the rest of the network and allows obtaining the 
resources of counterparts (Gadde et al., 2003). Indirect relationships are 
interdependencies between companies who do not interact directly, but influence one 
another through network structures (Easton and Håkansson, 1996). Indeed, it is the study 
of triadic networks that recognises and allows investigating how companies interact with 
one another beyond direct relationships (Smith and Laage-Hellman, 1992). As actors are 
never interacting in just one relationship, actors are required to prioritise: 
“[…] which relationship to use to address a particular problem as well as whether to develop 
relationships with new counterparts and whether to seek to abandon existing ones.” (Ford and Mouzas, 
2010, p.958) 
In other words, actors need to decide whether to create new relationships in order to 
address a problem or to consolidate within existing relationships structures. As the 
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resources of companies are limited, actors need to allocate them effectively, for example, 
between “intensifying sales and development interaction with existing counterparts or 
prospecting for new customers or suppliers” (Ford and Mouzas, 2010, p.958). Therefore, 
over time, the behaviour in networks is driven by acting, reacting and re-reacting. This 
implies that actors face “choices about how particular problems […] should be 
addressed” (Ford and Mouzas, 2010, p.958). These non-exclusive choices embedded in 
business relationships and networks: 
“[…] are likely to be taken simultaneously by a number of individuals in both of the companies in a 
relationship as they address a number of their own problems and those raised by counterparts.” (Ford 
and Mouzas, 2010, p.958) 
Since actors rely on to a large extent on resources located within their business 
relationships and networks, actors interact to access the resources necessary to address 
their own short- and long-term problems as well as those of counterparts. In fact, such 
network resources relate to complementary resources of other companies and may be 
utilised as a multiplier of internal resources (Ford and Håkansson, 2006). 
In order to shed further light on the fundamental role of resources for the examination of 
network behaviour in general and this study in particular, I now draw on the resource-
based view of the firm (RBV). This theory has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of the role that resources play for companies and enables a more in-depth 
understanding of internal and network resources. 
Predominately developed by Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991, 2001), the RBV was 
conceptualised as a theory of competitive advantage that focuses on the link between the 
internal (strengths and weaknesses) characteristics and business performance. The RBV 
is built on the assumption that businesses “within an industry (or group) may be 
heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources they control.” (Barney, 1991, 
p.101). Moreover, it views resources as being characterised by a degree of immobility 
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(Barney, 1991). Indeed, this focus on internal characteristics seems important to this study 
since it recognises that: 
“A bundle of assets, rather than the particular product market combination chosen for its deployment, 
lies at the heart of their firm’s competitive position.” (Dierickx and Cool, 1989, p.1504) 
This logic permits scholars and managers alike to identify how business resources need 
to be combined and applied in order to get a competitive advantage (Barney, 2001). Most 
pertinent to this study, however, are the two basic assumptions underpinning the RBV: 
resource heterogeneity and immobility. 
The RBV is based on the assumption that business strategies emerge when conceiving of, 
and implementing, heterogenic and immobile business resources. In other words, 
businesses combine and apply a set of differing physical, human and organisational 
resources in order to take business action (Barney, 1991). If this heterogeneity and 
immobility of business resources did not exist, then no business would ever be able to 
gain a sustained competitive advantage as any other business would simply be able to 
implement the exact same strategy (Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) reiterates: 
“Firms, in general, cannot expect to obtain sustained competitive advantages when strategic resources 
are evenly distributed across all competing firms and highly mobile.” (Barney, 1991, p.103) 
Implicitly, this suggests that the behaviour of companies can only be understood when 
considering the network resources of individual actors. The RBV, however, remains 
limited in its ability to explain the impact of such exogenous factors (Priem and Butler, 
2001). Paradoxically, despite the RBV aiming to unveil an advantageous combination 
and application of business resources based on the “differences between firms” 
(Wernerfelt, 1995, p.173), network resources receive little attention. 
Notwithstanding the rich contribution of the RBV to our understanding of business 
resources, its assumption that companies are independent of exogenous factors seems 
flawed. Indeed, empirical observations stemming from the IMP literature show that 
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companies are “enmeshed in networks of complex interlocking interdependencies with 
each other” (Ford and Mouzas, 2008, p.64). The RBV, however, does not take into 
consideration how network actors behave in order to enlarge their resource pool. This 
reconfirms the fundamental importance of employing the IMP literature to explain how 
companies mobilise network actors and access network resources when responding to 
climate change. 
Having established the relevance of business relationships and networks in general, I now 
turn my attention specifically to examine the interaction in and around responding to 
climate change. 
2.2.2 Interactional aspects of responding to climate change 
Studies on the interactional aspects of responding to climate change are rare. Although 
some of the existing organisation and management literature on business responses to 
climate change implicitly acknowledges degrees of interaction (e.g., Kolk and Pinkse, 
2005), this stream of research is characterised by a tendency to view business responses 
to climate change as isolated activities of individual actors. Unsurprisingly, this 
conceptualisation has been criticised on the basis that it: 
“[…] obscures several important connections and relationships relevant for climate strategy. These 
include connections between the firm and industry groups, the relationship between market and non-
market forces, and the role of a variety of societal and institutional factors.” (Wittneben et al., 2012, 
p.1435) 
By adopting the IMP’s network approach as the theoretical lens of this study, I attempt to 
close this gap. 
Similar to organisation and management research, IMP scholars have been relatively 
quiet on the subject of business responses to climate change. The scarce IMP literature 
on business responses to climate change includes Veal and Mouzas (2010, 2011, 2012) 
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and Finke et al. (2016). The latter have examined a case where efforts to respond to 
climate change broke down due to a set of barriers entrenched in the network interactions. 
Based on an in-depth case study of a network of actors in Germany, Finke et al. (2016) 
concluded that the multiplicity of interests held by actors involved in mounting a response 
to climate change acted as a primary barrier. In other words, the diverging underlying 
reasons that drove actors to participate in interaction in response to climate change 
“hinder[ed] the process of interaction” (Finke et al., 2016, p.100). 
Furthermore, Finke et al. (2016) argued that this multiplicity of interests was aggravated 
by the sub-barriers economic reasoning, weak actor bonds and differing perceptions of 
the rules of the game. Economic reasoning refers to the economically egoistic behaviour 
of companies when interacting in response to climate change. In other words: 
“Companies only invest finances, resources and time to interact within the network, when they expect 
that these interactions are financially or otherwise beneficial” (Finke et al., 2016, p.100) 
Weak actor bonds, on the other hand, relates to concerns about the intrinsic motivations 
when counterparts initiate business responses to climate change. Finke et al. (2016, p.100) 
add that “this is amplified by a feeling of independency among actors when developing 
climate protection measures”. Lastly, Finke et al. (2016) suggest that differing 
perceptions of the rules of the game may aggravate the multiplicity of interests when 
companies interact in response to climate change. Particularly, a diverging understanding 
of “the structure and design of rules of the game can influence the way that actors interact 
with each other” (Finke et al., 2016, p.100). 
Interestingly, and most pertinent to this thesis, Finke et al.’s (2016) study suggests that 
the explanation of how companies react to climate change may, in fact, be an outcome of 
interactions within and across the business relationships and networks. This conclusion 
is strengthened through several studies conducted by Veal and Mouzas (2010, 2011, 
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2012). Their research has also examined the network interactions in the context of 
business responses to climate change. Interestingly, alongside the interactional aspects, 
their studies have unveiled a set of behaviours that seem to prevail when companies 
respond to climate change. This includes the recognition of risk, frames and reference 
points, as well as the abundance of conflicts and disputes (Veal and Mouzas, 2010). 
The recognition of risks of actors relates to the interaction in business relationships and 
networks because of the perception that a company is exposed to externally generated 
pressures stemming from climate change (Veal and Mouzas, 2010). This recognition of 
risks occurs through either ‘risk as feeling’ or ‘risk as thinking’ (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Bazerman and Malhorta, 2006; Weber, 2006). While ‘risk as feeling’ refers to the actual 
experience of risks, ‘risk as thinking’ captures the recognition of risks at a distance. The 
proximity of ‘risk as feeling’ frequently leads to more immediate action (Bazerman and 
Malhorta, 2006; Weber, 2006). Responding to climate change is an example of ‘risk as 
thinking’ because most actors struggle to visualise or recall harm stemming from climate 
change (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Frames and reference points, on the other hand, refers to the way in which businesses 
base their interaction on existing frames and reference points (Veal and Mouzas, 2010). 
Interestingly, Veal and Mouzas (2010) suggest that companies take the emerging 
legal/regulatory changes as a frame for thinking about their action in response to climate 
change. Although such legal/regulatory demands may act as a driver for business 
responses to climate change:  
“It is important to recognise that in basing a decision upon a standard, there is a fundamental shift in 
the decision type, from one based upon absolute effectiveness towards one based upon effectiveness 
relative to a reference point.” (Veal and Mouzas, 2010, p.421; based on Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tenbrunsel et al., 2000) 
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According to Veal and Mouzas (2010), the third behaviour that seems to prevail when 
companies respond to climate change relates to the abundance of conflicts and disputes. 
In fact, Veal and Mouzas (2010) argue that business responses to climate change represent 
a case where self-interests of individual companies (egoism) frequently collides with the 
common interests in business relationships and networks (Markovits, 2004). Conflicts 
and disputes emerge when actors possess differing views of what such common interests 
are (egocentrism) (Markovits, 2004; Veal and Mouzas, 2010). In line with Hardin (1968), 
Veal and Mouzas (2010, p.422) conclude that these disagreements originate in the 
dysfunctionality of “individual incentives for preservation of the resource […], resulting 
in damaging behaviour by the collective group of users”. In fact, Hardin (1968) ultimately 
sees no technical solution to such behaviours and describes safeguarding global commons 
(such as a stable climate) as being a fundamentally human problem. 
The behavioural aspects introduced above have highlighted some of the inherent 
behaviours that appear to occur when companies interact in response to climate change. 
Veal and Mouzas (2010, p.431) have provided an excellent starting point to further our 
understanding of how such behaviours go hand-in-hand with interactions “among 
interdependent actors in complex and global networks dealing with technical and 
subjective issues” such as climate change. Veal and Mouzas (2010) themselves, however, 
highlight the need to examine these behaviours at a finer resolution. 
To do so, however, requires moving beyond the IMP literature on interaction in business 
relationships and networks. While the IMP work allows establishing an understanding of 
the connectivity across a company’s business network, it remains limited in its 
explanatory value with regard to understanding the behavioural aspects. A robust answer 
to how companies respond to climate change, therefore, calls for the IMP literature to be 
supplemented by the behavioural science literature. Accordingly, the next section 
 36 
provides insights into the behaviour that underpins human activities and establishes the 
link to network interactions in response to climate change. 
2.2.3 Behavioural aspects of responding to climate change 
One of the central ideas in the behavioural science is that human behaviour is subject to 
cognitive limitations, typified by three bounds: Bounded rationality, bounded willpower 
and bounded self-interest (Thaler, 1996; Jolls et al., 1998). These three behavioural 
limitations, also known as behavioural aspects that underpin a considerable amount of 
human behaviour, raise questions about “the central ideas of utility maximization, stable 
preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of information” (Jolls et al., 
1998, p.1476; see also Thaler, 1996). 
Firstly, the so-called bounded rationality refers to the cognitive limitations that constrain 
human behaviour when solving problems (Simon, 1955, 1990). Indeed, contrary to the 
traditional economic assumption that mankind acts rationally, Simon (1955, p.99) 
established that rationality is bound by “the access to information and the computational 
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man”. In other words, 
human cognitive abilities are limited and bound to limited information and processing 
capabilities. Mullainathan and Thaler (2000, p.5) put it simply: “We have only so much 
brainpower, and only so much time, we cannot be expected to solve difficult problems 
optimally”. As a result, humans tend to make judgements (beliefs) and choices that are 
irrational. Examples from the extensive list of how judgement may depart from rationality 
include 1) the irrational escalation of initial commitment, 2) the assumption that gain must 
come at the expense of another party, 3) the anchoring of judgements upon irrelevant 
information, 4) the ignorance of more relevant data, 5) the failure to learn from the other 
side’s perspective, and 6) being overconfident (see Kahneman et al., 1982; Bazerman and 
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Neale, 1993). Collectively, the illustrations show that rationality “of human choice is not 
always evidenced in reality” (Simon, 1955, p.16). 
Secondly, bounded willpower reflects that people may behave contradictory to their own 
long-term interests (Jolls et al., 1998). Such choices are predominately captured in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory which describes human decision 
making under uncertainty. Specifically, the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) suggests that positively framed problems, i.e. the gains that can be obtained when 
addressing a problem, prompt risk-averse behaviour. Negatively framed decisions, i.e. 
what can be lost when not addressing a problem, prompt risk-seeking behaviour 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky (1991), Tversky 
and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman et al. (1991) found that human behaviour is 
characterised by loss aversion as individuals have the tendency to prefer avoiding a loss 
rather than risk losing resources. As a result, Jolls et al. (1998) point out that a bounded 
willpower emerges and causes people to behave contradictory to their own long-term 
interests. 
Thirdly, bounded self-interest refers to the fact that people care about others and care 
about being treated fairly (Jolls et al., 1998). Hence, humans are willing to sacrifice 
themselves to help others (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). Indeed, contrary to the 
traditional economic assumption that self-interest is the primary driver of human 
behaviour, humans may take selfless action. 
These three bounds put forward by behavioural scientists provide some clues as to what 
may or may not explain some of the behaviours in business relationships and networks. 
In fact, the review of the behavioural science literature shows that not only do behavioural 
limitations exist but that even more complex types may occur when multiple actors 
interact (Mnookin, 2003). It seems that the inverse relationship between the number of 
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actors and the likelihood of reaching a positive result complicates the interaction. In an 
attempt to improve the chances of a positive result, individuals tend to behave in similar 
ways, a phenomenon known in the literature as herding (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978; 
Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 1995, 2000; Mouzas and Ford, 2011). 
Herd behaviour refers to the tendency of humans to act akin to others around them 
(Banerjee, 1992). In other words, “People who interact with each other regularly tend to 
think and behave similarly” (Shiller, 1995, p.181). The tendency to be part of such herds, 
however, may be characterised by irrationality. This includes motivations such as loyalty 
(e.g., Jost 1995) and frequently leads to irrationally supporting the herd’s arguments while 
neglecting potential oppositions (Shiller, 1995). 
Interestingly, a study conducted by Mouzas and Ford (2011), provides evidence that 
individual actors in business relationships and networks follow a similar pattern of 
behaviour. In fact, network actors may act alike and form herds based on joint 
understandings of a problem; this may occur unknowingly and even in the absence of any 
coordinated action. Such herding behaviour, so Mouzas and Ford (2011) conclude, may 
characterise activities when addressing a business problem.  
Herd behaviour might help us to understand how companies form coalitions (Sebenius, 
1983); a notion that appears intrinsically similar to the network approach. Rubin and 
Brown (1975) define such coalitional behaviour as: 
“The unification of the power or resources (or both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better 
chance of obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others not included in the coalition.” (Rubin 
and Brown, 1975, p.64) 
Coalitions are often based on analogous intrinsic values and beliefs, meaning that a 
powerful coalition has the ability to block any agreement that may not be in line with its 
shared principles (Lax and Sebenius, 1991; Sebenius, 1995). Moreover, the dynamics 
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within the coalition can lead to that coalition collectively exhibiting tough and unyielding 
behaviour (Hampson, 1995). Hence, coalitions – if performed in an imperfect manner – 
may be a source that explain the outcomes stemming from the interaction in business 
relationships and networks. 
Besides these behavioural aspects that explain much of the human behaviour in general, 
the behavioural science literature also suggests that a set of behaviours are operating when 
responding to climate change (Bazerman and Hoffman, 1999). These include a limited 
cognition of the problem (Hoffman and Bazerman, 2007; Gifford and Chen, 2017), 
behavioural habits (Knox and Inkster, 1968; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Lindenberg 
and Steg, 2007), discredence (Brehm, 1966; Opotow and Weiss, 2000) and uncertainty 
avoidance (Schiffman et al., 2006; Okereke, 2007). Overall, Gifford (2011) found a 
staggering amount of 36 different behaviours that may occur when responding to climate 
change. 
Most pertinent to this study, however, is that human behaviour in response to climate 
change is driven by concerns over the scarcity of resources and the basic human belief of 
a fixed-resource pool (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000). This may characterise responses to 
climate change as individuals perceive that they are not able to enlarge the planet and its 
resources are limited (Hardin, 1968). In fact, in such a situation, individuals benefit more 
when protecting their own business resources while continuing to exploit the natural 
resources. This behaviour will ultimately lead to an eradication of the resource (as vividly 
illustrated by the herdsmen tragedy earlier in this chapter) (ibid, 1968). 
Behavioural scientists have argued that responding to climate change relies on the ability 
to overcome inherent behaviours such as egoism, egocentrism, hyperbolic discounting, 
the undoing bias and risk recognition. Here, it is fundamental to acknowledge the self-
serving nature of actors (egoism) and diverging understandings of what the common 
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interest is (egocentrism) (Markovits, 2004; Epley et al., 2006; Susskind and Weinstein, 
1980). Moreover, humans have a tendency to hyperbolically discount benefits expected 
in the future (Weber, 2006). Thus, climate change mitigation may appear as a rather 
unattractive solution since immediate costs are incurred to create benefits that are 
discounted by the time they can be taken into account. 
Bazerman and Hoffmann (1999) found that behavioural aspects influence the risk 
recognition of humans because they create a biased view of the world and often operate 
subconsciously. In other words, ‘risk as feeling’ is the core driver of risk perception. 
Climate change, however, influences the perception at the level of ‘risk as thinking’, 
meaning that individuals would only start to perceive climate change as a threat when 
examples of harm are visualised (Bazerman and Malhotra, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Weber, 2006). 
These advances in the behavioural science could provide the incremental insights 
necessary to improve our understanding of the behaviour in networks. That said, however, 
the behavioural science literature is commonly based upon an examination of the 
behaviour of individual actors and hence can only shed light on how individuals respond 
to climate change. What is most pertinent to this study, in contrast, is the question of how 
such behaviours play out in the context of business responses to climate change. In fact, 
three fundamental changes are evident compared to the behaviour of individuals (Ferraro, 
2016). 
Firstly, the primary objective of a company is profit maximisation while an individual 
seeks to maximise utility. Secondly, businesses operate in a competitive environment that 
may affect individual behaviour. This could mean that competitiveness eliminates 
behavioural deficiencies. Thirdly, important decisions in companies are normally taken 
by a group of people rather than a single individual. Here, the behavioural science 
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suggests that groups may be more rational and less prone to some of the behavioural 
deficiencies occurring at the individual level (ibid, 2016). These commonly hypothesised 
explanations, however, are usually based on experimental approaches in laboratory 
conditions (Kelman, 2011). There is a lack of pertinent empirical evidence that could 
contribute to explaining how these behaviours play out ‘in the real world’ and particularly 
within a business context (Marewski et al., 2010). 
The IMP literature offers some clues as to how the insights stemming from the 
behavioural science may translate into a business situation. Guercini et al. (2014, 2015), 
for example, offer a starting point for examining the behavioural processes in business 
relationships and networks. Interestingly, Guercini et al.’s (2014) conceptual paper on 
behaviour in business relationships suggests that individual actors use heuristics in an 
effort: 
“To make sensible decisions because the commitments they make and the solutions and arrangements 
they identify and implement have substantial economic consequences.” (Guercini et al., 2014, p.930) 
Heuristics, as defined by Kahneman (2011, p.98), relate to “a simple procedure that helps 
find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions”. According to 
Simon (1967, 1972), actors rely on these heuristics in order to overcome their behavioural 
deficiencies. Although Guercini et al. (2014) assume that such heuristic procedures are 
used by actors in business relationships and networks, empirical evidence that confirms 
or rejects this proposition is yet to be produced. In fact, Guercini et al. (2014) conclude 
that: 
“Research on business relationships dealing with factors that explain individual behaviors has been 
limited, and most of the research on interaction in business relationships appears to ‘black-box’ 
individual interaction behaviors.” (Guercini et al., 2014, p.930) 
Therefore, Guercini et al. (2014, 2015) call for further research on the interaction and 
behaviour within and across different business relationships. 
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In conclusion, the behavioural science literature provides incremental insights into how 
businesses may behave in business relationships and networks. What is yet to be 
understood, however, is whether such behaviours translate directly into the behaviour in 
networks. In an attempt to answer this question, in the next section, I employ the 
theoretical understanding outlined above to propose an initial theoretical structure for the 
study of business responses to climate change. Thereby paving the way for unveiling the 
interaction and behaviour in networks, and thus ultimately to explain how companies 
respond to climate change. 
2.3 Towards an understanding of business responses to 
climate change  
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of business responses to climate 
change, I propose an initial theoretical structure that consists of three pillars: 1) Network 
tensions, 2) Network interactions, and 3) Network outcomes. This initial structure was 
driven from the theoretical understanding developed by the previously reviewed literature 
but also from the case studies. In fact, each of the three pillars emerged through an 
iterative process of moving back and forth between the extant literature and the empirical 
cases. The resulting structure for the study of business responses to climate change has 
therefore been redefined repeatedly whenever the empirical findings provided new 
insights. Before outlining this initial theoretical structure in more detail, I ought to provide 
an explanation of how I derived each of the pillars. 
During the early stages of analysing the empirical findings in light of the organisation and 
management literature on business responses to climate change, as well as the 
interactional and behavioural insights stemming from the network approach and the 
behavioural science literature, I realised that in each case it appeared that the socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes in response to climate change had 
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triggered efforts to mitigate carbon emissions. This was largely driven by a discontinuity 
between the needs emanating from contextual socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and 
economic developments and existing business practices. As a result of this empirical 
observation, I termed the first pillar of the initial theoretical structure as network tensions. 
Interestingly, in each of the empirical cases, the companies began to interact within and 
across their business relationships and networks in order to overcome such network 
tensions. To do so, companies initiated activities in order to access the necessary 
resources which were not available in concentrated form but rather located within the 
company’s business relationships and networks. In an attempt to account for these 
interactions and behaviours I included network interaction as the second pillar of the 
initial theoretical structure. 
These successive interactions and behaviours commonly resulted in observable outcomes 
which are covered in the third pillar of the initial theoretical structure: network outcomes. 
From this chronological process in each of the cases, I derived an empirically driven and 
theoretically grounded structure for the study of business responses to climate change that 
seeks to elucidate the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks. 
Within and across these three interrelated pillars of this structure, I focus on the three 
dimensions of actors, activities and resources. In fact, I hope that by now the attentive 
reader will have realised that I have implicitly introduced actors, activities and resources 
throughout the literature review as they are fundamental for the study of business 
responses to climate change. To further illuminate these three pillars, I draw upon the 
Actors, Activities and Resources (AAR) Model originally developed by Håkansson and 
Johanson (1992). 
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The AAR Model emphasises that the totality of interdependencies in business networks 
can only be “captured through an integrated view of the relationships among all these 
dimensions” (Easton and Håkansson, 1996, p.407). The first dimension of the AAR 
model refers to individual companies as actors that possess resources and perform 
activities (Gadde et al., 2003). These actors purposefully combine activities and resources 
in order to address and resolve short- and long-term problems (Guercini et al., 2014). 
The second dimension of the AAR model relates to successive interaction aimed at 
integrating and coordinating activities with counterparts (Ford et al., 2008). In doing so, 
the activities of actors (e.g., production, logistics, etc.) become more or less 
systematically linked. Depending on the strength of the emerging activity links, actors are 
able to benefit from synergies such as lower costs or increased efficiency (Ford et al., 
2008). 
The third and final dimension of the AAR model relates to the resources of actors. 
Through the process of interaction the resources of two actors “become more or less 
adapted and more or less mutually tied together” (Ford et al., 2008, p.14). This could 
include both tangible (e.g., plants, equipment) and intangible (e.g., knowledge) resources. 
As an outcome of interaction over time, resource ties “arise as the two parties in a 
relationship confront and mutually adapt their resources” (Ford et al., 2008, p.14). 
The three dimensions of actors, activities and resources comprise the content of the 
behaviour in business relationships and networks, and hence scrutinising the network 
tensions, network interactions and network outcomes in and around these dimensions 
permit the development of a more comprehensive understanding of business responses to 
climate change and ultimately enables an explanation of how companies interact and 
behave in response to climate change. 
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To do so, however, requires looking at the entire structure across the dimensions of actors, 
activities and resources for each of the three pillars of network tensions, network 
interactions and network outcomes. In fact, while each stage is individually significant 
for the study of business responses to climate change, it is only through the amalgamation 
of all three pillars that allows the development of a more comprehensive understanding. 
Figure 2 below illustrates this theoretically derived and empirically grounded structure 
for the study of business responses to climate change. 
 
Figure 2: An initial theoretical structure for the study of business responses to climate change 
Having established the importance of the three dimensions of actors, activities and 
resources, I now provide a more detailed explanation of the three pillars: 1) Network 
tensions, 2) Network interactions, and 3) Network outcomes. 
2.3.1 Network tensions 
Network tension, as the first pillar of the initial theoretical structure for studying business 
responses to climate change, refers to the tension between current operations (e.g., the 
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business focus on short-term profitability) and the emerging need to change (e.g., 
decarbonising business operations). Such tensions are driven by discontinuities between 
the needs (emanating from contextual socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures) and existing business offerings (existing business patterns). Here, the emphasis 
is on how these tensions play out across the actors, activities and resources domains of 
the AAR model when scrutinising the interaction and behaviour in business relationships 
and networks. 
The network tension aspects of the proposed theoretical structure were derived by setting 
the empirical findings against the organisation and management literature on business 
responses to climate change and against the interactional and behavioural insights 
stemming from the network approach and the behavioural science literature. Besides 
providing strong evidence of such network tensions throughout all of the five empirical 
cases underpinning this study, the existing knowledge, particularly the work of Okereke 
et al. (2012), as well as that of Wright and Nyberg (2017), highlights the fundamental 
importance of analysing the ways in which climate change, in particular, has created 
tensions within companies and their wider business relationships and networks. In fact, it 
is only a comprehensive understanding of such network tensions that can provide the 
basis for unearthing the interactional and behavioural aspects that explain how companies 
respond to climate change. This is largely because it appears to be the network tensions 
that reinforce the ways in which businesses interact and behave in relationships and 
networks and thus ultimately respond to climate change. 
2.3.2 Network interactions 
Network interactions, as the second pillar of the initial theoretical structure for studying 
business responses to climate change, refers to the interaction in business relationships 
and networks aimed at overcoming the network tensions that contextual changes, and its 
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antecedents, have brought about. In fact, network interactions relate to scrutinising the 
ways in which actors initiate activities to access the resources required to respond to 
climate change. The network interactions pillar is built on the notion that the resources a 
company requires to respond to climate change are not available in concentrated form but 
rather located within a company’s business relationships and networks. This was 
suggested by previous research (Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Ferraro et al., 2015) and vividly 
illustrated in each of the empirical cases. 
Besides the strong evidence for the interactional and behavioural aspects in the empirical 
cases, the relevance of the network interactions pillar came through particularly in the 
previous work by Ritter et al. (2004), Mouzas and Ford (2009), Veal and Mouzas (2010), 
Ansari et al. (2013) and Finke et al. (2016). Collectively, these studies highlight that 
developing a comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to climate change, 
requires moving beyond the individual company to take a network of companies as the 
unit of analysis. In fact, capturing how companies interact in business relationships and 
networks is vital to understanding how businesses access the network resources required 
to respond to climate change. 
Furthermore, analysing the network interactions when studying business responses to 
climate change permits an understanding of the mechanisms ingrained in the interactions 
and behaviours within the network that may explain the observed network outcomes. As 
previous research suggests, the interactional aspects ingrained in the network behaviour 
may include the multiplicity of interests held by actors (e.g., Finke et al., 2016) as well as 
the recognition of risk, framing and reference points, the abundance of conflicts and 
disputes (e.g., Veal and Mouzas, 2012), bounded rationality, bounded willpower and 
bounded self-interest (e.g., Thaler, 1996). How these behaviours play out at the network-
level simply cannot be uncovered when investigating individual companies. The 
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interaction in relationships and networks of businesses is, therefore, a central element of 
the initial theoretical structure for studying business responses to climate change. 
2.3.3 Network outcomes 
Network outcomes, as the third and final pillar of the initial theoretical structure for 
studying business responses to climate change, refers to outcomes stemming from 
successive interactions and behaviours over time. Such network outcomes are observable 
and manifested in the ways in which the network interaction has transformed actors, 
activities and resources. It is these that are the observable manifestations of the 
phenomena that I encounter. 
Previous research on network outcomes related-aspects stemming from business 
responses to climate change is limited. According to Finke et al. (2016) business 
interaction in response to climate change can lead to either inaction or action, while the 
latter “may not always be the case” (Finke et al., 2016, p.95). What the extant literature 
does not do, however, is to provide a more nuanced understanding of what brings about 
network outcomes. In fact, the “sheer unknowability of effects and outcomes in a 
network” (Ford and Mouzas, 2007, p.8) implicitly calls for establishing a deeper 
understanding of network outcomes. To do so, the third and final pillar of the initial 
theoretical structure accounts for the network outcomes that stem from business 
behaviour within and across their wider business relationships and networks aimed at 
accessing the resources necessary to respond to climate change. 
This seems particularly pertinent in the case of business responses to climate change 
because what appears to underpin all of the behaviours identified in the literature review 
(i.e., short-term economic objectives, a reliance on growth, uncertainty avoidance, 
overreliance on rules and regulations, and organisational inertia) (e.g., Bazerman and 
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Hoffman, 1999, 2007; Okereke, 2007; Gifford, 2011; Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Finke et 
al., 2016; Shevchenko et al., 2016; Wright and Nyberg, 2017) is that no individual 
company alone possess the resources necessary to respond adequately to climate change 
(Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Finke et al., 2016). It is only through analysing what brought 
about the network outcomes that permit answering the question of how companies 
respond to climate change. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the theoretical basis of this study. I started by providing an 
introduction to business responses to externally generated pressures in general and to 
climate change specifically. Next, I reviewed the business tensions that climate change 
has brought about. Then, I problematised the current organisation and management 
approaches employed to explain business responses to climate change. Furthermore, 
building on the business marketing literature in and around business relationships and 
networks, I outlined the network approach as an alternative theoretical lens. Next, I drew 
upon the behavioural science literature to dig deeper into the interactions and behaviours 
when companies respond to climate change. 
Towards the end of this chapter, and largely as a result of an iterative process between 
the three distinct kinds of literature introduced throughout this chapter and the empirical 
findings presented in this study, I proposed an initial theoretical structure for the study of 
business responses to climate change. 




This chapter outlines the methodological procedures underpinning this study. I begin 
by describing the research paradigm, thereby outlining my axiology, justifying critical 
realism as the research epistemology and elucidating the network approach ontology. I 
then provide insights into the research process of retroduction and systematic 
combining. Next, I explain the case study research method and outline the data sources 
as well as the data reporting. Subsequently, I introduce my approach to data analysis 
and show that research ethics have been upheld at all stages in the conduct of this study. 
I close this chapter with a brief conclusion. 
3.1 Research paradigm 
Research paradigms refer to the basic beliefs and worldview of the researcher. This 
includes “the nature of the ‘world’, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.107). To account for the basic 
beliefs and worldview that ultimately drove the inquiry articulated in the research 
questions, I now turn to the study’s axiology, epistemology and ontology. 
 51 
3.1.1 Axiology 
I would be naïve to argue that this thesis – just like any other research project – has been 
conducted in isolation from my personal values and beliefs. As suggested by Ponterotto 
(2005, p.131), therefore, “the researcher should acknowledge, describe, and ‘bracket’ 
his or her values, but not eliminate them”. Over the next few paragraphs, I concentrate 
on exactly this by highlighting the personal values that – at least to a certain degree – 
may have influenced the way in which I have conducted this study. 
While the fact that I am born in Germany may play a minor role in terms of my non-
native English, what seems more pertinent to this study is my interest in understanding 
responses to climate change. As highlighted in the introduction, my interest in climate 
change can be traced back to watching Al Gore’s movie ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ in 
2006. I was surprised that despite the increasing number of storms, droughts and other 
natural disasters that illustrate the threats stemming from global climatic changes, 
companies, governments and individuals alike continued to emit carbon emissions as 
usual. As a result of watching Al Gore’s movie, I wanted to understand how individuals 
and companies, in particular, behave when responding to climate change. 
Throughout my undergraduate and postgraduate studies in International Business, I was 
educated about companies and their inherent drive for profitability. Little, however, was 
taught about the negative externalities (such as carbon emissions) related to making 
such profits. Therefore, I signed up for an Interdisciplinary Summer School Programme 
on Climate Change, International Politics as well as Social and Political Philosophy at 
the University of Cambridge. It was during this time that I realised how little the 
international research community understands the processes of responding to climate 
change. It was this that prompted me to embark on the intellectual journey of conducting 
this study. 
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In the next section, I introduce critical realism as my epistemological stance. 
3.1.2 Epistemology – Critical realism 
In this thesis, I employed an epistemological stance that is in line with the critical realist 
perspective. Understanding the epistemological assumptions underpinning this study is 
crucial as it is reflected in the interpretation of my empirical findings. In other words, it 
builds the basis for “claiming to know what we know” (Easton, 1998, p.370). The 
central element of critical realism is the underlying assumption “that there is a reality 
‘out there’ waiting to be discovered and that reality is independent of us” (Easton, 1998, 
p.373). Since it is difficult to prove or disprove whether there is a ‘real world’ out there 
or not, however, it is that “we behave as if it was true, as if the world was real” (Easton, 
2010, p.119). I am therefore aware that the findings presented in this study are only one 
version of the story that could have been told. 
The reason for adopting a critical realist perspective is rooted in its ability to answer the 
research questions underpinning this thesis. Indeed, by utilising the critical realist 
epistemology I was able to unearth why certain events occurred and not merely that 
they took place (Mason et al., 2013). This is due to the structure of causal explanation 
on which critical realism is based upon: 
“Causality concerns not a relationship between discrete events (‘Cause and Effect’) but the ‘causal 
powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of objects and relations, or more generally their ways of acting.” (Sayer, 1992, 
p.104) 
Easton (2010) puts it in slightly less abstract terms: entities (organisations, people, 
relationships, etc.) are nested within structures (departments, processes, etc.) that affect 
one another through causal powers (e.g., to persuade other entities) and liabilities (e.g., 
to be rejected by other entities). Most pertinent to this study, however, is that these 
causal powers or liabilities will, if a specific condition is given (e.g., a demand is 
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matched with a suitable offer), cause an event (e.g., sale) and, if a specific condition is 
not given (e.g., an offer does not match the demand), then will cause a different event 
(e.g., no sale) (Easton, 2010). It is these causal powers or liabilities that explain how 
companies respond to climate change. The logic underpinning this structure of the 
causal explanation is based on Sayer’s original model (Sayer, 1992); illustrated in 
Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: The structure of causal explanation (Sayer, 1992, p.109) 
An essential premise of critical realism is the distinction between two types of relations 
between entities, namely necessary and contingent relations. Easton (2010, p.121) 
simplifies the differences between the two types of relations by stating that entities “can 
have some relation (necessary) that will affect one another and some (contingent) that 
may affect one another”. Necessary relations occur when entities are dependent on one 
another and cannot exist without their counterpart (Easton, 2010). An example from 
Sayer (1992, p.89) vividly proves this by referring to the slave and master relationship: 
 54 
“The relation between a slave and a master is necessary, in that what the object is 
dependent on is its relation to the other; a person cannot be a slave without a master 
and vice versa”.  
The ways in which the necessary relations of entities cause events are multifaceted; in 
one case it is characterised by rich information while in another case it is inherently 
logical (Easton, 2010). What is essential to this study, however, is the need to specify 
even the most trivial necessary relations. This is because necessary relations are 
embedded in a larger construct of referential and interdependent relations between 
entities which will affect one another (Easton, 2010). 
Contingent relations, as the second type of relations between entities, are present when 
“it is neither necessary nor impossible that they stand in any particular relation” 
(Sayer, 1992, p.89). Entities can, therefore, exist without their counterpart but may 
affect one another (Easton, 2010). In fact, critical realists acknowledge the fundamental 
importance of identifying the contingent relations since they are “the product of causal 
processes and have their own causal powers and liabilities” (Sayer, 1992, p.140). 
Unsurprisingly, when specifying both necessary and contingent relations it is essential 
to explain the events related to the phenomenon under study (Easton, 2010). A critical 
realist would argue, however, that these events cannot occur without being experienced 
and thus I differentiate between experience, events and mechanisms (Easton, 1998). 
In this regard, Bhaskar (1978) suggests distinguishing between the real, actual and 
empirical domain (Table 1 schematically illustrates Bhaskar’s classification of these 
domains). The domain of reality is highlighted by crosses (X) to signpost where 
mechanisms, events and experiences are present or possible. In the real domain, the 
existence of events presupposes the existence of mechanisms that created those events 
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(Tsoukas, 1989). Although these events occur in the actual domain, they are only 
experienced by the observer in the empirical domain (Bhaskar, 1978). 

























Table 1: Classification of the real, actual and empirical domains (Bhaskar, 1978, p.2) 
While this sounds reasonably straightforward in Bhaskar’s (1978) classification, in 
practice it turned out to be a key challenge; particularly the process of untangling the 
asynchronous nature of events – which were observed through the experience of the 
participants – and the mechanisms which created them. In an effort to overcome this 
challenge and thereby allowing to provide a robust explanation of why an event 
occurred rather than just what happened (Mason et al., 2013), I focused on repeatedly 
asking myself about each event: “‘what makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, 
‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or, more weakly, what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it” (Sayer, 
1992, p.104). 
Following this procedure has helped me to identify the string of causal powers and 
liabilities to develop an understanding of why the events occurred in the way they did 
and what must be true to have brought about these events in each of the five empirical 
cases. I argue that it was only through adopting a critical realist perspective, with its 
inherent focus on identifying causal mechanisms, that allowed me to move from 
answering what has happened to the more important question of why the events 
occurred in the way they did (Mason et al., 2013). Based on this argument, I see critical 
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realism as being the ideal research epistemology to answer the research question of how 
companies respond to climate change. 
In the next section, I outline how the critical realist epistemology is linked to the 
network approach as the ontological precept of this study. 
3.1.3 Ontology – The network approach 
At the most basic level, ontology refers to the underlying “assumptions about how the 
world is” (Easton, 2002, p.108). In line with the thinking originally established by the 
IMP Group, I see the world as consisting of exchange relationships and 
interdependencies that build the structures in which actors, activities and resources 
interact (Håkansson and Johanson, 1992; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). Within these 
structures, it is fundamental to capture both mechanism and context since “causal 
outcomes follow from mechanisms acting in context” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.58).  
The context describes the “conditions which allow the mechanism to come into 
operation” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.58). Interestingly, the causal mechanisms that 
explain why events unfolded in the way they did can only be unearthed when 
considering the context in which these events occurred. Based on what Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) describe as the mode of generative causation, I illustrate the interplay 
between an action, mechanism, outcome and context in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Generative causation of business responses to climate change (adapted from 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.72) 
The process of taking into account the broader context in which business relationships 
and interdependencies take place is referred to as a network ontology; although the term 
network is to be seen in its metaphoric sense (Easton and Araujo, 1994; Mouzas and 
Ford, 2009). Employing the network approach as the underpinning ontology of this 
study facilitated deconstructing the necessary and contingent relations between entities 
by acknowledging both their dyadic nature as well as the context in which these 
relations occur (Anderson et al., 1994; Easton, 2002; Mouzas, 2006). 
It is important to reiterate, however, that I take a “less prescriptive and more universal 
perspective” on relations, focusing on the nature of the phenomenon of business 
responses to climate change rather than the performance of a dyadic relationship 
(Easton, 2002, p.107). Indeed, by emphasising that the occurrence of a phenomenon is 
relative to the context in which it is embedded, the network ontology aided me to 
overcome the inherent challenge of so-called ‘dyadic atomization’ (Granovetter, 1992; 
Anderson et al., 1994). In other words, Easton and Araujo (1994, p.75) explain that “all 
real life exchange takes place in the context of relations more extensive than the 
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exchange itself” (emphasis of the original work by Macneil, 1986, p.577). It is therefore 
particularly the higher level of aggregation, at which the network ontology operates, 
that enabled me to move beyond the analysis of dyadic relations and unearth the causal 
explanation for the interactions and behaviours in business relationships and networks 
(Mouzas, 2006). 
The inherent focus on business relationships and networks that defines the network 
ontology, however, is intrinsically linked to the methodological challenge of 
determining the boundaries of the networks under study. In fact, since networks are 
characterised by flexibility and interconnectedness with a multiplicity of other 
networks, at least in theory, they do not have natural boundaries and hence are limitless 
and indefinite. In practice, however, it is impossible to capture the entirety of all 
necessary and contingent relations (Rowley, 1997; Mouzas and Ford, 2009). In order to 
overcome this challenge, I used the research objective of answering how companies 
respond to climate change to determine the specific network boundaries (Easton, 2010). 
Hereby, the network boundaries equate to the limits of the underlying ontological 
assumptions about how the world is. I further illuminate my process of setting network 
boundaries in the research method section on Data reporting. 
In the next section, I introduce retroduction and systematic combining as the research 
process that I adopted in this study. 
3.2 Research process 
The research process refers to the researcher’s primary method of analysis and approach 
to developing theory. In this section, I introduce this by describing retroduction and 
systematic combining as the procedures that guided the conduct of this study. 
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3.2.1 Retroduction 
The research process under critical realist conditions is inherently driven by 
retroduction, i.e. the identification of causal mechanisms (Easton, 2010). Retroduction, 
as a meta-process underpinning this study, can be best defined as a “mode of inference 
in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are 
capable of producing them” (Sayer, 1992, p.107). Retroduction involves ‘moving 
backwards’ in the research process by asking “What happened?”, “Why did it 
happen?” or in other words “What must be true in order to make this event possible?” 
(Easton, 2010, p.123). This does not mean that I hypothesised causal mechanisms and 
then collected the data, however. Instead, it rather followed Easton’s (2010, p.124) 
assumption that “in practice, the process is likely to be an iterative one”. In fact, this 
tied in well with the Data analysis procedures explained later in this chapter as the 
analysis of the data was an iterative process rather than following linear conventions. 
The research process was, therefore, one of systematic combining (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). 
3.2.2 Systematic combining 
When I started to conduct this study, I was faced with the decision of either following 
an inductive or deductive approach. Inductive cycles of data collection focus on 
generating theory from empirical data (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). In this approach, the 
literature is sought after the data has been collected, which is commonly referred to as 
grounded theory (e.g., Glaser and Strauss, 1967). On the other hand, deductive cycles 
of data collection are based on identifying a phenomenon of interest and developing a 
theoretical structure that allows testing these propositions through empirical data 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Easton, 2010). As the process of conducting this study 
unfolded, however, I found it challenging to keep inductive and deductive approaches 
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distinct. It was impossible for me to go entirely theory-free into the data collection and 
analysis. With a purely deductive approach, on the other hand, I felt restricted in my 
ability to generate theory through the case studies. In an attempt to overcome these 
limitations, I used systematic combining as a procedure to guide the research process. 
Systematic combining is grounded in an abductive logic (e.g., Peirce, 1931) which 
allows “constantly going ‘back and forth’ from one type of research activity to another 
and between empirical observations and theory” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.555). 
Guided by systematic combining, the research process underpinning this study started 
by developing an initial theoretical structure consisting of theoretically-derived 
preconceptions about the empirical phenomenon of business responses to climate 
change. It was the unanticipated insights gained from empirical observations, however, 
that led me to re-examine the literature in order to include the nuances related to the 
interactional and behavioural aspects in business relationships and networks. In line 
with Dubois and Gadde (2002), it was this evolving conceptual framework that guided 
the research process. I, therefore, repeated the process of constantly moving between 
initial theoretical structure, empirical observation, data analysis, conceptualisation as 
well as drawing and verifying conclusions about how companies respond to climate 
change. 
Adapted from Dubois and Gadde (2002), I illustrate the systematic combining research 
process and the associated interplay of theory, initial theoretical structure, the empirical 
world and the case in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Systematic combining (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.555) 
In the next section, I focus on answering how the critical realist epistemology, the 
network ontology as well as the research process of retroduction and systematic 
combining have enabled the development of five in-depth case studies. It is these cases 
that formed the empirical basis for the provision of a causal explanation of how 
companies respond to climate change. 
3.3 Case study research method 
In this section, I introduce the case study approach as the prevailing research method of 
this study. To do this, I start by outlining how the research objectives, as well as the 
epistemological and ontological precepts, drove the selection of the research methods. 
Next, I explain the method for data collection, outline the rationale for selecting the 
cases (casing) and review how the cases were reported and analysed. 
3.3.1 Research method 
My decision to select the case study research method was an outcome of the research 
objectives as well as the underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions. The 
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objective of my study was to explain how companies respond to climate change. In line 
with this research objective and the critical realist epistemology, I had to select a 
research method that would allow me to develop valid explanatory knowledge to 
dismantle the causes of how companies respond to climate change. Furthermore, the 
network ontology inherently required the identification of such causal mechanisms and 
the context in which entities operate. The research methods, therefore, had to be based 
on sources of empirical data that describe entities in relation to their context. 
As a result of this requirement, I have chosen the case study research method. I argue 
that the case study research method is well-suited to meet all the requirements stated 
above. In fact, Yin’s (2009) definition of a case study indicates how well it fits with the 
research objectives as well as the epistemological and ontological precepts of this study: 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident.” (Yin, 2009, p.18) 
One common shortcoming of case study research, however, is the challenge of ‘only’ 
investigating “one or a small number of social entities or situations” (Easton, 2010, 
p.119). Consequently, the issue of generalisation needs consideration. Positivists would 
argue that one case cannot be generalised because case studies are inferential when 
statistically generalising to the whole population (Easton, 1998). In line with the critical 
realist epistemology, however, I did not aim to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation) but rather to identify causal explanations that allowed me to expound 
and generalise theoretical propositions (analytical generalisation) (Yin, 2009). 
By scrutinising the nature of the phenomenon under study (business responses to 
climate change) as well as the underlying assumptions of the critical realist 
epistemology and the network ontology I further illuminate how rigorous and coherent 
the case study research method is for this study. 
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Firstly, the objective of this study is to shed light on business responses to climate 
change which, by its nature of being a contemporary phenomenon, requires rich and 
timely data in order to be able to specify the causal mechanisms at play (Easton, 1998; 
Halinen and Törnroos, 2005). The case study method, which is usually conceived as an 
empirical inquiry into a contemporary phenomenon, permits the capture of rich and 
timely data by using “multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 2009, p.18). In fact, Halinen 
and Törnroos (2005, p.1286) confirm that “case research is particularly welcome in 
new situations where only little is known about the phenomenon”. The empirical 
phenomenon of responding to climate change represents such a new situation. 
Secondly, critical realist research seeks to develop valid explanatory knowledge of 
mechanisms that create an “event or set of events (i.e. case) by unpacking and 
describing the contingent causal power of objects that brought them about” (Easton, 
1998, p.382). The case study research method is inherently driven by being inquisitive 
and allowing to unveil the underpinning causal mechanisms and hence is well-suited to 
achieve this aim of critical realist researchers. Easton (1998, p.379) illustrates this match 
between critical realism and case study research method by stating that the latter 
enables: 
“[…] to disentangle complexities and to conceptualise and reconceptualise, test and retest, to be both 
rigorous and creative and above all to seek for the underlying reality through the thick veil which 
hides it.” (Easton, 1998, p.379) 
Thirdly, the network ontology reasons that the causal explanation of a mechanism can 
only be achieved when capturing the context in which entities operate and create events 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Unsurprisingly, Halinen and Törnroos (2005, p.1286) 
suggest that it is particularly the case study research method that permits this because it 
is based on the notion of providing a “many-sided view […] of a situation in its 
context”. The case study method can, therefore, be said to fit well with the underlying 
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network ontology. Furthermore, it is the complexity associated with capturing both 
mechanism and its context that, “requires a methodology which can handle rich sources 
of data and multiple forms of data collection” (Easton 1998, p.385). 
In light of these specifications, I conclude that the case study research method is 
justified as the most suitable research method since this study is 1) investigating a 
contemporary phenomenon, 2) aiming to develop explanatory knowledge, and 3) 
capturing mechanisms and its context. In the next section, I introduce the types of 
primary data and supplementary types of data sources and how I collected them. 
3.3.2 Data sources and data collection 
This study is based on a widespread of data sources that serve as evidence. In fact, as a 
direct outcome of constantly going ‘back and forth’ between the different types of 
research activities (systematic combining), the emerging cases are built on a multiplicity 
of different data sources (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Yin (2009) distinguishes six types 
of data sources for case study research, namely documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts. A rigorous 
case study is based on multiple types of these data sources as “no single source has a 
complete advantage over all the others” (Yin, 2009, p.101). Moreover, Easton (1998) 
suggests that the underpinning epistemological and ontological assumptions of the 
researcher drive the type of data source that is collected. I, therefore, had to collect data 
from sources that would allow me to unveil the causal mechanisms operating and 
creating events within a context. 
Moreover, the combination of different data sources had the advantage of permitting 
the triangulation of evidence. Data triangulation, as defined by Huberman and Miles 
(1994, p.438), refers to “self-consciously setting out to collect and double check 
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findings, using multiple sources and modes of evidence”. Indeed, it was this mode of 
triangulation, embedded in the data collection process, which allowed me to provide a 
causal explanation of the mechanisms that explain how companies respond to climate 
change. 
An additional advantage of using multiple data sources was that this multiplicity 
possesses the ability to reveal “aspects unknown to the researcher, i.e., to discover new 
dimensions of the research problem” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.556). For me, this 
became particularly apparent throughout the research process of systematic combining. 
In light of these specifications, the types of data underpinning this study are semi-
structured interviews as well as supplementary documentation such as policy fora 
transcripts, consultations, legislative documents as well as strategy and emission 
reduction policy documents and media releases. Figure 6 illustrates and quantifies this 
convergence of evidence. 
 
 
Figure 6: The convergence of evidence 
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In the next section, I provide more details on the nature of the interviews as the primary 
type of data as well as documentation as the supplementary type of data. 
3.3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
This study is based upon 31 in-depth semi-structured interviews as the primary type of 
data source. Interviews are “probably the most widely used method employed in 
qualitative research, a central resource for social science” (Edwards and Holland, 
2013, p.1). Yin (2009) confirms that this is particularly true in case study research since 
case studies are concerned with human behaviour and events. In line with Edwards and 
Holland (2013), as well as Yin (2009), I found that it was the well-informed 
interviewees who were able to provide the best insights about the interactions and 
behaviours, as well as events, that explain how companies respond to climate change. 
I adopted a semi-structured approach to interviewing as this allowed me to probe 
answers and modify questions based on the topics opened up by the interviewee. The 
resulting dialogue between the interviewee and myself enabled me to gather “the 
context and content of the interview, how the interviewee understands the topic(s) under 
discussion and what they want to convey to the interviewer” (Edwards and Holland, 
2013, p.29). For each interview, I delineated a broad structure of topics that guided the 
discussion but remained flexible enough to pursue additional topics which suggested 
fruitful and relevant insights. The typical structure of topics pertinent to the interviews 
was:  
1) The interviewee’s role in the company 
2) The company’s understanding of climate change 
3) The company’s responses to climate change 
4) The company’s engagement with other actors in response to climate change 
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I argue that it was particularly the controlled flexibility characterising the semi-
structured interviews underpinning this study that enabled me to minimise inaccurate 
preconceptions about the empirical world and to redefine the initial theoretical structure 
and conceptual framework of business responses to climate change (retroduction and 
systematic combining). 
I recruited the interviewees for this study based on their ability to provide insights into 
the business relationships and networks in the context of responding to climate change. 
The nature of studying business networks, however, came with the paramount challenge 
of gathering multi-faceted insights from all actors embedded within a network. It, 
therefore, seemed intuitively appealing to me to engage with participants during 
industry conferences. Firstly, this had the advantage of having multiple network actors 
in one place at the same time. Secondly, attendees were industry or government experts 
in the topic under discussion. Thirdly, it allowed me to engage with potential 
interviewees during the networking sessions to share information about my research. 
Interestingly, whether or not I talked to a specific attendee during the industry 
conferences, seemed to play a minor role in how likely the eventual participation in my 
study was. In fact, when inviting conference attendees to participate in the study, it was 
rather the notion of sharing the experience of attending an event on a specific topic both 
relevant to the interviewee and myself that helped me to recruit interviewees. 
Throughout the process of conducting this study, I attended five industry conferences 
in the UK with the specific purpose of engaging with potential interviewees. After each 
event, I contacted selected attendees via email to invite them for an interview (see 
Appendix 1 for a sample email). Throughout the data collection process, I sent 
approximately 600 email enquiries and received nearly 150 responses. Some conference 
participants respectfully declined my invitation, others agreed to participate but it turned 
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out to be impossible to find time for the interview. While the participant recruitment 
process was somewhat random in the beginning, it became more focused as the five 
distinct cases emerged (see Table 4: Overview of case studies on page 88). Ultimately, 
I conducted 31 interviews of which 28 were directly related to the case studies (see 
Table 3: Data source material on page 77 for more details). Each interviewee was able 
to provide insights into the specific behaviour in business relationships and networks in 
the context of responding to climate change. Moreover, I gathered multi-faceted insights 
from multiple actors embedded in a business network. 
The location of interviews was determined by convenience and accessibility for the 
interviewee and me. It was crucial to ensure that interviews were not interrupted and 
that audio recording was possible. As illustrated in the sample participant recruitment 
email (Appendix 1), I asked the interviewee to choose between a face-to-face and 
telephone interview. Most interviewees preferred the latter option because of their busy 
schedules and the additional work associated with hosting me as a visitor to their 
organisation. The advantage of conducting interviews via telephone was that it was 
time-efficient, saved travel expenses and allowed a wider geographical spread. This was 
particularly important as I continued to conduct telephone interviews with interviewees 
located in the UK while completing a three-month research visit at Nankai University 
in Tianjin, China. 
I acknowledge that this came at the expense of not being able to gather information 
about the interviewee’s appearance, non-verbal communication and the physical 
context (Edwards and Holland, 2013). Since some interviews were conducted face-to-
face or via SkypeTM and therefore offered the benefits of visual contact, however, it 
became clear that it is the in-depth insights into how interviewees’ experienced specific 
events, rather than their appearance, non-verbal communication and the physical 
 69 
context that would ultimately allow the underlying mechanisms that explain how 
companies respond to climate change to be uncovered. 
Answering the question of how many interviews are sufficient to allow the underlying 
mechanisms to be unveiled is fundamental in any study conducted under critical realist 
conditions. The ideal number of interviews depends on the uniqueness and complexity 
of the phenomenon under study, as well as practical issues such as the time and finances 
available (Edwards and Holland, 2013). In this study, I used the concept of saturation 
as an indicator of a sufficient number of interviews. Saturation describes the point in 
the interview process at which the insights gained from an additional interview are 
incremental since interviewees largely repeat arguments that have been made by other 
interviewees (Edwards and Holland, 2013). This point was reached after approximately 
25 interviews. I continued to conduct six additional interviews, however, as I had 
already scheduled these when the first signs of saturation appeared. The insights that I 
gained from the additional interviews were incremental which I interpreted as indicative 
of having reached a sufficient degree of saturation. 
In the next part, I introduce the supplementary documentation (e.g., policy fora 
transcripts, consultation documents, legislative documents and strategy as well as 
emission reduction policy documents and media releases) that I used to triangulate the 
insights gained from the semi-structured interviews. 
3.3.2.2 Supplementary documentation 
This study is based upon 14 policy fora transcripts, 65 consultation documents, 28 
legislative documents, 70 strategy and emission reduction policy documents and 230 
media releases as supplementary data sources. The explicit role of this documentation 
was to supplement and triangulate the data collected through the 31 semi-structured 
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interviews. In fact, as suggested by Yin (2009), this documentary information has 
helped me to corroborate and augment the semi-structured interviews in four different 
ways. 
Firstly, the documentary information allowed me to verify the names of organisations, 
names of individuals and technical information that were mentioned during the 
interviews. By the nature of this study, the interviewees frequently referred to their 
interaction with other organisations. In some instances, it was only through the 
documentation collected from the policy fora that allowed me to identify the correct 
spelling of these organisations and names. 
Secondly, the documentation contained specific details that helped me to corroborate 
information gathered from the interviews. This study required to discuss socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures and how such contextual changes triggered 
interactions and behaviours within their organisation and across the business network. 
Here, it was predominantly the legislative documents (e.g., UK Energy Act 2004; 
Climate Change Act 2008) that helped me to corroborate the statements about such 
changes and the interwoven array of events that occurred as observed by the 
interviewees; particularly the legal/regulatory demands were often quite complex. 
Thirdly, the documentation provided insights into the network of actors that were 
potentially involved in a case as it commonly included participation lists. It is important 
to highlight, however, that I have not taken these network actors and their potential 
interactions as definitive findings but rather as “clues worthy of further investigation” 
(Yin, 2009, p.103). Indeed, although policy forum participation lists have indicated 
network actors and their potential interaction, it was the semi-structured interviews that 
enabled me to gain more specific empirical insights. 
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Lastly, the documentation proved to be a valuable source of information when preparing 
for the interviews. I repeatedly used the insights gained from documentary data to 
delineate the structure of topics that guided the discussion during the semi-structured 
interviews. Nonetheless, I used the documentary information only as an indicator of 
topics that might be relevant for a specific interviewee. The structure of topics remained 
flexible enough to allow the pursuit of additional issues that arose through the interview 
process. 
I followed a systematic approach to identifying the documents relevant to this study; 
repeatedly asking myself how the document at hand helped to 1) answer the research 
questions; 2) advance the conceptual framework; and/or 3) triangulate the empirical 
insights. This served as a guide for the systematic search for the supplementary 
documentation necessary to build in-depth cases. I acknowledge, however, that 
documentation, just like any other type of data, is associated with a set of disadvantages 
(Yin, 2009). 
Firstly, documents may not always be entirely accurate and “should not be accepted as 
literal recordings of events that have taken place” (Yin, 2009, p.103). This shortcoming 
of documentary information was apparent when I collected the policy fora transcripts. 
As stated at the beginning of each transcript:  
“Despite the best endeavours by Westminster Forum Projects and its suppliers to ensure accuracy, 
text based on transcription may contain errors which could alter the intended meaning of any portion 
of the reported content.” [Policy Forum 12, p.1] 
In an attempt to counteract this issue, I used the insights gained from documentation as 
indicative of topics that may bring about a fruitful addition to the semi-structured 
interviews. The documentary information was only included in the cases when the 
information was corroborated through such an interview and/or other secondary data 
sources. 
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Secondly, Yin (2009, p.105) raises the issue of falsely assuming that documentary 
information “contain the unmitigated truth”. Here, it is important to acknowledge that 
any documentation collected to inform the cases underpinning this study has actually 
been written with a specific purpose and for a specific audience. The purpose and target 
audience of strategy and emission reduction policy documents, for example, were most 
likely not to have envisaged for this study. Therefore, I have adopted a process of 
constantly identifying and critically evaluating the underlying objectives that led to the 
production of any documentation that is included as supplementary data. Cooper (1998) 
argues that it is this process that limits the risks of falsely interpreting documentary 
information. 
In light of the shortcomings of documentary information, I have to reiterate that 
documentation was never seen as a stand-alone entity but was used to indicate topics 
worthy of further investigation, as well as to supplement, corroborate, augment and 
triangulate the insights gained through semi-structured interviews or other secondary 
data sources. I now briefly describe each type of supplementary documentation that I 
used in this study. 
The first type of documentary information that I collected were transcripts of 14 policy 
fora. Although this type of documentation is available publicly, it was only through 
attending five of these events that I was able to collect the information. As the empirical 
focus of this study is the UK energy sector, the documentary data that I collected 
through attending and/or accessing transcripts was from energy sector-related policy 
fora organised by Westminster Forum Projects (WFP). The Westminster Forum 
Projects describes its purpose as following: 
“The forums organise senior-level conferences on a wide range of public policy areas. None of the 
forums has a policy agenda of its own, other than simply to raise the quality of debate on public policy 
developments and to create opportunities for informed discussion. Each WFP forum is structured to 
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facilitate the formulation of 'best' public policy by providing policymakers and implementers, and 
those with an interest in the issues, with a sense of the way different stakeholder perspectives 
interrelate. Usually, this is through impartially-framed, inclusive discussion conducted either in 
public or under the Chatham House Rule. Forum conferences are frequently the platform for major 
policy statements from senior Ministers and regulators, Opposition spokesmen and leading opinion-
formers in industry and interest groups. Conferences regularly receive prominent coverage in the 
national media and trade press.” (Westminster Forum Projects, 2017) 
I have used the WFP’s policy fora relevant to the UK energy sector as a means to 
indicate topics worthy of further investigation, as well as to supplement, corroborate, 
augment and triangulate the insights gained through semi-structured interviews. The 
policy fora took place between March 2016 and March 2017 and the written transcript 
of each event was normally distributed approximately ten working days after the event. 
Although this type of documentation is publicly available, the documents were not free 
of charge (£80 per transcript). I was fortunate, however, that the WFP’s team supported 
my study by offering complimentary access to these documents. Furthermore, the 
Editorial Board of the WFP has granted permission to reference the transcripts in this 
study. A detailed list of the specific events upon which the policy fora transcripts are 









Date Event name Location 
March 2016 Energy policy for London – security, infrastructure 
and sustainability 
London 
March 2016 UK energy security: supply, storage and resilience London 
April 2016 Next steps for UK domestic energy efficiency 
policy 
London 
May 2016 Next steps for renewable energy in Scotland Edinburgh 
June 2016 The future of research and innovation in the energy 
sector 
London 
July 2016 Nuclear energy in the UK: innovation, skills, and 
supply chain development 
London 
July 2016 Delivering Electricity market Reform and priorities 
for new Contracts for Difference 
London 
July 2016 Realising Wales’ energy potential Cardiff 
October 2016 Competition in the UK energy market London 
November 2016 Implementing the smart meter roll-out London 
November 2016 The future for Scotland’s energy sector Edinburgh 
December 2016 Future of the UK electricity network London 
March 2017 Priorities for energy security in the UK London 
March 2017 Next steps for energy efficiency policy in England London 
Table 2: Policy fora dates, name and location 
The second type of documentary information that I collected were 65 consultation 
documents. This included industry responses and other documents related to 
government proposals for new regulations relevant to the UK energy sector. Through 
these consultations, the UK government gathered industry views and evidence on 
matters that should be taken into account in the design and implementation of new 
regulation. Understanding the ways in which companies responded to the consultations 
in and around the UK energy sector helped me to identify the concerns of companies 
about the emerging legal/regulatory changes. The consultation documents that I 
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collected covered the CCS Commercialisation Competition and the Electricity Market 
Reform. 
The third type of documentary information that I collected were 28 legislative 
documents. This included documents related to 22 intergovernmental climate change 
negotiations organised by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement), and six UK national legislation 
related to energy and/or climate change (e.g., Climate Change Act 2008; Energy Act 
2011). Although not legally binding, the intergovernmental agreements provided a 
framework that guided governmental activities when formulating and implementing 
climate change policies. 
The UK legislation related to energy and/or climate change, on the other hand, 
represents the legally binding set of rules and regulations formulated and implemented 
by the UK government under which business networks operate. The Climate Change 
Act 2008, for instance, provides regulatory guidance by setting the UK carbon emission 
reduction target for 2050 of at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline. More 
specifically, the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) scheme, as an explicit measure to 
reduce carbon emissions, is based on the Gas Act 1986, the Electricity Act 1989 and 
the Utilities Act 2000. The ECO requires energy suppliers to implement energy 
efficiency measures in low-income households (this was particularly pertinent to the 
first case: ‘Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme’). Understanding how the ECO 
scheme and other legal/regulatory changes influence business behaviour was only 
feasible by including UK national legislation as documentary information. 
The fourth type of documentary information that I collected were 70 strategy and 
emission reduction policy documents. This type of documentation was important in 
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order to develop an in-depth understanding of the business responses to climate change. 
For example, the Sustainability Reports of the case companies provided detailed 
information about the company’s emission statistics and the ways in which the company 
planned to respond to climate change. 
The fifth and final type of documentary information that I collected were 230 media 
releases. This included publications by the case companies as well as media reports 
related to the case companies. By gathering these documents, I was able to unearth the 
ways in which the companies publicly committed to and justified their response 
strategies. Furthermore, such media releases also provided insights into the way in 
which the emerging socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes prompted 
the business responses to climate change. 
Collectively, these five types of documentary information have helped me to 
supplement, corroborate, augment and triangulate the data collected through semi-
structured interviews. Table 3 summarises both the primary and supplementary types of 









Case Actors Documents 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
6 respondents (Interview and/or policy forum 
contribution) 
01-05 Utiliko (01 Chief Corporate Officer; 02 
Managing Director for Offshore; 03 Head of 
Business Development; 04 Development Manager; 
05 Energy Policy Manager); 06 Exxelo UK (06 
Policy Manager) 
9 Policy fora;        
6 Consultations;    
1 Legislation;      
12 Strategy and 
emission reduction 
policy documents;         
10 Media releases 
Case 2: 
Olectra 
6 respondents (Interview and/or policy forum 
contribution) 
01-03 Olectra (01 Chief Executive Officer; 02 
Head of Wholesale Policy; 03 Business 
Development Manager); 04-05 PlentiOil (04 
Carbon Capture & Storage Manager; 05 Analyst); 
06 Planwey (06 Regional Director) 
9 Policy fora;      
16 Consultations;  
3 Legislations;    
22 Strategy and 
emission reduction 
policy documents;         
55 Media releases 
Case 3: 
Energize 
6 respondents (Interview and/or policy forum 
contribution) 
01-03 Energize (01 Chief Executive Officer; 02 
Board of Directors; 03 Head of Orientation); 04-05 
MDfE (04 Head of Energy Security; 05 Analyst); 
06 Mygrid (06 Capacity Market Manager) 
10 Policy fora;    
31 Consultations;  
2 Legislations;    
11 Strategy and 
emission reduction 
policy documents;         
27 Media releases 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
8 respondents (Interview and/or policy forum 
contribution) 
01 Vonergy (01 Chief Executive Officer); 02-03 
Xidoa (02 Chief Executive Officer technology; 03 
Chief Commercial Officer); 04 Morhaven 
International (04 Director of Facilities and Project 
Management); 05 Pantegis (05 Chief Operating 
Officer); 06-07 Gryd (06 Director of UK System 
Operator; 07 Spokeswoman); 08 MDfE (08 Head of 
Electricity Systems) 
12 Policy fora;    
12 Strategy and 
emission reduction 
policy documents;         
86 Media releases 
Case 5: 
Connectica 
8 respondents (Interview and/or policy forum 
contribution) 
01-04 Connectica (01 Chief Executive Officer; 02 
Managing Director; 03 Commercial Director; 04 
Head of Environment); 05-06 Ecovair (05 Founder; 
06 Chief Executive Officer); 07 Qubeta (07 
Advisor); 08 MDfE (08 Head of Regulation) 
10 Policy fora;    
12 Consultations; 
13 Strategy and 
emission reduction 
policy documents;         
52 Media releases 
Table 3: Data source material 
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To conclude, in this section I have justified the selection of semi-structured interviews 
as the primary type of data source and documentation as a supplementary type of data 
source. In doing so, I have outlined the systematic procedures underpinning the 
collection of the data sources. I hope thereby to have managed to overcome some of the 
inherent criticisms of the case study research method and qualitative interviews.  
Firstly, I counteracted the critique of interviews being anecdotal and illustrative with 
the concept of saturation as well as the supplementation, corroboration, augmentation 
and triangulation through the documentary data sources. The process of conducting 
semi-structured interviews was repeated until a certain degree of repetitiveness in 
interviewee responses became apparent. Moreover, even if all 28 interviews utilised to 
across the five case studies were anecdotal and illustrative, then the supplementary data 
sources provided the confidence needed to suggest that the insights were based on valid 
and robust evidence. 
Secondly, the insights gained from interviews may be seen as leading to descriptive 
findings. The critical realist epistemology overcomes this descriptive nature, however, 
since it acknowledges the differences between the empirical, the actual and the real, and 
seeks an explanation that is fundamentally interpretive in nature (Easton, 2010). The 
critical realist conditions underpinning this study have contributed to interpretive rather 
than descriptive findings, therefore. 
Thirdly, it may be argued that studies based on qualitative interviews lack rigour, are 
unsystematic and biased. Here, it is particularly the structured approach that I applied 
to sampling, the transparency about the topics that I used to guide the discussion in the 
semi-structured interviews as well as the supplementary documentation and the 
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systematic procedures underlying the data collection, data reporting and data analysis 
procedures that characterise the rigorousness of this study. 
Fourthly, the issue of the limited replicability and generalisability of interviews is 
frequently raised. I argue that the transparent and systematic procedures followed in the 
sampling process as well as the detailed outline of the topics that were covered in the 
semi-structured interviews, provide a solid basis for replicating the interviews 
underpinning this study. With regards to the issue of limited generalisability, under 
critical realist conditions, the aim is to identify the causal explanation that allows 
expounding and generalising theoretical propositions (analytical generalisation) (Yin, 
2009). It is the analytical generalisation of insights gained from multiple types of data 
sources (semi-structured interviews and supplementary documentation) that justifies the 
case study research method as “a rigorous, coherent one based on justified 
philosophical positions” (Perry, 1998, p.799). 
3.3.3 Empirical setting 
In this section, I describe the selection of the UK energy sector as an empirical setting 
of this study.  
The selection of the UK energy sector as the empirical setting of this study was 
inherently driven by the research objective, as well as the underlying epistemological 
and ontological assumptions. The empirical setting had to enable the capture of 1) the 
contemporary phenomenon of business responses to climate change, 2) rich, timely and 
multiple sources of data necessary to specify the causal mechanisms that, “operate to 
cause events to happen” (Easton, 1998, p.378), and 3) the context in which objects 
operate and create events (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). I reached the conclusion that the 
UK energy sector meets all of these requirements. 
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Firstly, the UK energy sector is inevitably required to respond to climate change in order 
to achieve the UK carbon emission reduction targets for 2050 of at least 80% lower than 
the 1990 baseline. Since this target was set in the Climate Change Act in 2008, the UK 
energy sector has embarked on a long-term transition towards a low-carbon energy 
supply system. While this transformation progressed rapidly in the beginning, from 
2015 onwards it has slowed down as concerns about the security of energy supply and 
maintaining energy affordability interfered with governmental policies aimed at 
reducing energy sector-related carbon emissions. This interplay is commonly referred 
to as the ‘energy trilemma’ (e.g., Boston, 2013). The UK’s Department of Energy & 
Climate Change (which became part of the Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy as of July 2016), for instance, stated in a report on delivering UK 
energy investment: 
“Our new policies for investment and reform had to address the ‘energy trilemma’ – the challenge of 
keeping the lights on, at an affordable price, while decarbonising our power system.” (Department 
of Energy & Climate Change, 2014, p.4) 
The slower pace of this transformation in recent years has irreversible effects on the 
natural environment (Stern, 2006; Hess, 2013). Since neither the UK government nor 
individual companies alone have the necessary resources (Veal and Mouzas, 2010), 
mounting a notable response to the challenge of reducing energy sector-related carbon 
emissions unavoidably requires the interaction of multiple actors involved in the UK 
energy sector. Consequently, the UK energy sector represented an ideal empirical 
setting for a case study in and around the empirical phenomenon of business responses 
to climate change. 
Secondly, the contemporary nature of the UK energy sector’s transition towards a low-
carbon energy supply system has enabled the gathering of rich, timely and multiple 
sources of data. For example, the Westminster Forum Projects organised 14 energy 
 81 
sector-related events between March 2016 and March 2017. This indicates the 
availability and depth of the timely data which is necessary to specify the causal 
mechanisms that, “operate to cause events to happen” (Easton, 1998, p.378). The UK 
energy sector is, therefore, an empirical setting that is well-suited for case study research 
conducted under critical realist conditions. 
Lastly, the network ontology underpinning this study assumes that the world consists 
of business relationships and networks that build the structures in which actors, 
resources and activities interact (Easton and Araujo, 1994; Mouzas and Ford, 2009). In 
these structures, it is fundamental to capture both the mechanism and its context since 
“causal outcomes follow from mechanisms acting in context” (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997, p.58). The UK energy sector as the empirical setting of this study permitted 
capturing the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes that triggered much 
of the interactions and behaviours in the business relationships and networks in which 
entities operated and created events. 
In the next section, I outline how I reported the primary and secondary sources of data 
collected in the empirical setting of the UK energy sector. In doing so, I justify the 
multiple case design and describe the process of drafting as well as reporting of the 
cases. 
3.3.4 Data reporting 
In this section, I justify the multiple case design and delineate the process of drafting as 
well as reporting of the cases. I close this section with a summary of each case and 
outline the reasons for selecting these specific cases. 
As the next step, I was faced with the challenge of “describing the phenomenon and 
context richly” (Folger and Turillo, 1999, p.756) while maintaining the underlying 
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replication logic and the possibility of cross-case comparisons. Interestingly, the 
literature on case study research is predominately driven by a rather positivistic 
approach of scholars such as Yin (2009), Eisenhardt (1989) or Miles and Huberman 
(1994). Positivist case study researchers prefer a multiple case study design due to the 
underlying replication logic and the possibility of cross-case comparisons. 
Yin (2009, p.53), for example, argues that “the evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more 
robust”. In line with this, Eisenhardt (1989, p.545) states that “a number between 4 and 
10 cases usually works well” as it leads to theories being “better grounded, more 
accurate, and more generalizable” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p.27). The multiple 
case study design has been criticised, however, for only scratching the surface and thus 
neglecting the deep structures and context in which causal mechanisms operate and 
create events (Dubois and Gadde, 2014). The epistemological and ontological 
assumptions underpinning this study, however, required the unveiling of such 
mechanisms embedded in the interplay between the social processes, practices and 
events experienced by entities and capturing the context which “allow the mechanism 
to come into operation” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.58). This calls for going “deeper 
into one case instead of increasing the number of cases” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, 
p.558). 
I solved this dilemma by selecting five deep probing cases; a number of cases at the 
lower end of Eisenhardt’s (1989) ideal quantity of four to ten cases. This allowed me to 
maintain the richness of information necessary to describe a phenomenon and its 
context while at the same time ensuring the robustness, accuracy and analytical 
generalisability of the theoretical contribution. Here, it is important to acknowledge that 
although I was seeking a certain degree of replication and comparisons across most or 
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all of these cases, each case is to be seen as a “very powerful example” (Siggelkow, 
2007, p.20) that takes the “rich context surrounding the cases into consideration” 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2014, p.1278). Indeed, it was this process of combining the 
multiple case design with the richness of a single case that allowed the unearthing of 
“new theoretical relationships and question old ones” (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p.614). 
Through this, I was able to overcome the shortcomings of both single and multiple case 
studies. 
In the next part, I describe the process of the drafting and reporting of these cases. 
I drafted and reported the five cases with the aim of convincing you, the reader, that, 
“the knowledge or ‘finding’ is worth paying attention to” (Hogg and Maclaran, 2008, 
p.132). To do so, I have put the highest emphasis on the concept of “representation, i.e. 
the way case studies are written and reported to the audience” (Borghini et al., 2010, 
p.17) as this usually helps the reader to accept the findings stemming from the case 
study as one possible reality (Stern, 1998). 
In the business marketing domain, case study findings are commonly presented 
“through a description and narration of the case, the use of protagonists’ verbatim and 
narratives as well as the use of graphics, tables, and figures” (Borghini et al., 2010, 
p.16). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), however, highlight that overreliance on 
graphics, tables and figures to summarise the case study might come at the cost of less 
detailed narratives which may disappoint the reader. I have therefore included only one 
network figure per case and focused instead on narrating the case in a rich and lively 
way as this approach “unveils the dynamics of the phenomena and helps us identify 
similar dynamics in the reader's own research or daily life” (Borghini et al., 2010, 
p.18). Thereby, I hope to have provided clarity in respect to the construct that is being 
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studied and, at least to some extent, made reading the cases enjoyable; with an ‘aha’ 
experience (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) or ‘wow’ factor (Young, 2002). 
When writing up the cases, I was struggling with the dynamics of acting as a case study 
writer and researcher. While in my role as a case study writer I aimed at developing a 
rich and lively story, in my role as a researcher I had to provide robust evidence to 
support the proposed contribution to theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Borghini 
et al., 2010). This was particularly important given that, when employing a multiple 
case study design, theory is to be regarded as the “overarching organizing frame” 
(Borghini et al., 2010, p. 18) which needs to be “demonstrated by evidence from at least 
some of the cases” (Borghini et al., 2010, p.18). Since supporting every aspect of a 
theoretical contribution in the story is difficult to achieve and rarely feasible, however, 
summarising the empirical findings in the form of “extensive tables and other visual 
devices” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p.29) enables the researcher to prove that the 
theoretical contribution is grounded in-depth and is supported by detailed empirical 
evidence. I have described each case in a rich and lively way in the Empirical Findings 
chapter and included a summary of such evidence in graphics, tables, and figures in the 
Analysis and Discussion chapter. Hereby, I hope to have provided the evidence for the 
theoretical propositions stemming from the cases without unduly inhibiting the 
readability of the Empirical Findings chapter. 
Furthermore, when writing each case I focused on “sticking to the theoretical 
background and asking which details really help tell the story and illustrate the 
mechanism behind one's arguments” (Borghini et al., 2010, p.18). For this reason, I 
have written each case narrative based on a standardised structure in order to streamline 
the search for patterns across cases. This structure originally derived from the 
theoretical understanding of business responses to climate change as established 
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towards the end of the literature review but was updated based on the retroduction and 
systematic combining research process. As a result, each case is structured in and 
around the three pillars that comprise the initial structure for the study of business 
responses to climate change as put forward in the Literature Review chapter, namely 1) 
Network tensions, 2) Network interactions and 3) Network outcomes. 
At the beginning of each case, I introduce the relevant actors and describe the contextual 
changes that triggered the company’s response to climate change (network tensions). 
Next, I depict the key relationships and interactions within and across the business 
network affected by the company’s activities in response to climate change (network 
interactions). This unfolds a rich and lively story that enables the underlying 
mechanisms that explain how companies respond to climate change to be unearthed 
(network outcomes). 
By writing the case narratives based on the empirically derived and theoretically 
grounded framework of network tensions, network interactions and network outcomes, 
I aimed to facilitate cross-case comparisons while trying “to make representation as 
close as possible to the phenomena under scrutiny” (Borghini et al., 2010, p.23). It was 
through this systematic approach to reporting the empirical findings that I hope to have 
assisted the reader to understand the causal mechanisms underpinning the interactions 
and behaviours in business relationships and networks, and thus ultimately to explain 
how companies respond to climate change. 
Before I introduce each of the cases in the next section, it is vital to specify how I have 
set the case boundaries (following-up on the brief introduction earlier in this chapter). 
Given that there are no natural boundaries in the empirical world (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002), the connected relationships between the actors that construct a business network 
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are theoretically limitless (Easton, 1995). Since “one can never study the entire 
industrial network” (Halinen and Törnross, 2005, p.1287), however, I had to set case 
boundaries that allow sufficient relevant aspects to be captured so as to reveal the causal 
mechanisms that explain how companies respond to climate change. I, therefore, set the 
case boundaries based on the aspects relevant to capturing 1) the contemporary 
phenomenon of business responses to climate change, 2) the rich, timely and multiple 
sources of data necessary to specify the causal mechanisms that, “operate to cause 
events to happen” (Easton, 1998, p.378), and 3) the context in which entities operate 
and create events (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Furthermore, the network ontology underpinning this study required distinguishing 
between “what belongs to the case network and what belongs to its context” (Halinen 
and Törnroos, 2005, p.1287). According to Knoke (1994), a distinct separation between 
a network and its context can be achieved by focusing on either actor attributes, types 
of relations or a critical event. In this study, critical events or, in other words, the 
business response to climate change (such as establishing an energy supply company as 
a supplier of 100% renewable energy), defined the network boundaries. 
Moreover, in line with Håkansson and Johanson’s (1992) AAR model, each of the case 
networks in my study contains all actors (organisations involved in the critical events), 
activities (the interactions between those actors) and resources (the currency in the 
interaction process). It was these ‘whole’ networks that I used as the unit of analysis 
(e.g., Mouzas, 2006). The context of the case networks included the socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic changes that have triggered the interactional and 
behavioural processes within and across the business network. The combination of all 
the considerations explained above led to five deep probing cases. 
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This study is based on five cases of business responses to climate change. In the next 
section, I briefly introduce each of the five cases and provide a justification for including 
the case in this study. 
I have selected each case based on systematic procedures aimed at developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the issues I sought to engage with, in terms of 
answering how companies respond to climate change. A comprehensive understanding, 
in this context, refers to providing robust empirical evidence that enables a rigorous 
examination of the causal mechanisms at play that explain how companies respond to 
climate change. In an effort to permit cross-case comparability with regards to the socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes that triggered the company’s response 
to climate change, I focused on a single industry in a single country: The UK energy 
sector. 
Table 4 summarises the five cases by referring to their specific roles within the UK 
energy supply sector, a company profile, the contextual changes that primarily triggered 
the companies’ response to climate change and a brief description of the subsequent 
activities in response to climate change. 
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One of the UK’s largest energy supply 
companies driving towards being 
carbon neutral by 2050 (in 2010, 90% 
of its energy generation was from fossil 
fuels). 
The ECO scheme as a legal/regulatory pressure 
that focuses on mitigating carbon emissions and 
addressing fuel poverty.  
In 2012, the company decided to comply with 
the ECO scheme (a regulation focused on 
addressing fuel poverty and carbon 






One of the UK’s largest operators of 
renewable generation assets (3.3 GW 
in 2012). 
The Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
commercialisation competition as a 
legal/regulatory pressure that offers funding for 
developing CCS for gas-fired power plants. 
In 2012, the company decided to retrofit its 






One of the UK’s largest emitters of 
carbon emissions (42 megatons of 
carbon emissions in 2014). 
The Climate Change Act and the Renewables 
Obligation as legal/regulatory pressure that set 
the UK carbon emission reduction targets and 
imposes fines. 
In 2014, the company decided to restructure 
its energy generation portfolio with the aim of 
establishing itself as a renewables-only 










One of the UK’s largest energy supply 
companies specialised in supplying 
energy to large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers (8.2 GW 
generation capacity and 200,000 
British commercial and industrial 
energy customers). 
The Energy Entrepreneurship Fund (EEF) and 
the Capacity Market Mechanism as a set of 
supportive regulatory mechanisms in order to 
enable further growth of the DSR market in the 
UK. 
In 2014, the company decided to expand its 
product portfolio in response to climate 
change and establish itself as a provider of 






One of the UK’s largest energy supply 
companies (twelve million domestic 
energy customers in 2014). 
The financial benefits of providing carbon 
reduction technologies as economic pressure. 
Socio-cultural and legal/regulatory pressures 
may have additionally influenced the business 
response. 
In 2015, the company decided to establish 
itself as a provider of connected home 
technologies. 
Table 4: Overview of case studies 
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I now introduce each case in chronological order and provide a justification for 
including each case in this study. 
The first case examines how one of the UK’s largest energy supply companies is driving 
towards being carbon neutral by 2050 (in 2010, 90% of its energy generation was from 
fossil fuels). The case describes the company’s efforts to comply with the ECO scheme 
(a legal/regulatory change that focuses on mitigating carbon emissions and addressing 
fuel poverty). Moreover, the case provides insights into the interactions with seven 
actors (a ministerial department, a social housing association, an administrative body, 
an insulation company, domestic energy consumers, a small energy supply company 
and an energy industry association). These interactions were driven by the focal 
company’s effort to install energy efficiency measures in domestic households. 
The second case examines how one of the UK’s largest operators of renewable 
generation assets (3.3 GW in 2012) responded to climate change. The case describes 
the company’s efforts to decarbonise its gas-fired power plant. Moreover, the case 
provides insights into the interactions with eight actors (a multinational Oil and Gas 
company, two ministerial departments, three energy services companies, a local 
authority and a technology test centre). These interactions were driven by the focal 
company’s effort to retrofit a gas-fired power plant located in Scotland with CCS 
technology. 
The third case examines how one of the UK’s largest emitters of carbon emissions (42 
megatons of emissions in 2014) responded to climate change. The case describes the 
company’s efforts to restructure its energy generation portfolio with the aim of 
establishing itself as a renewables-only energy supply company. Moreover, the case 
provides insights into the interactions with five actors (a ministerial department, a 
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multinational energy distribution and transmission company, domestic and industrial 
consumers, an energy supply company and the EU ETS). 
The fourth case examines how one of the UK’s largest energy supply companies 
specialising in supplying energy to large commercial and industrial energy consumers 
(8.2 GW generation capacity and 200,000 British commercial and industrial energy 
customers) responded to climate change. The case describes the company’s efforts to 
establish itself as a provider of demand-side response (DSR) technology. Moreover, the 
case provides insights into the interactions with six actors (a DSR technology provider, 
a multinational hospitality company, an energy supply company, a distribution network 
operator, a ministerial department and a diesel-power generation company). 
The fifth and final case examines how one of the UK’s largest energy supply companies 
(twelve million domestic energy customers in 2014) responded to climate change. The 
case describes the company’s efforts to establish itself as a provider of connected home 
technologies. Moreover, the case provides insights into the interactions with five actors 
(a connected home technology provider, an independent research organisation, 
domestic energy consumers, an advertising agency and a ministerial department). 
These five cases are outlined in chronological order of occurrence in time to allow their 
historical sequence to be preserved. This was intended to safeguard the temporal aspects 
relevant to the analysis of how companies respond to climate change. 
In the next section, I outline the systematic procedures that I applied to analyse these 
five empirical cases. 
 91 
3.3.5 Data analysis 
The purpose of this section is to describe how I got from over 10,000 pages of raw data 
to final conclusions. As a starting point, I begin this description by introducing some of 
the challenges associated with qualitative data analysis. I then outline the explanatory 
power of the theoretical structure which guided the data analysis process. Next, I 
describe the systematic data analysis procedures underpinning this study by outlining 
the sequences: 1) raw data, 2) data reduction, 3) coding, 4) memo writing, and 5) 
conclusions. By being precise and transparent about the data analysis procedures I hope 
to convince the reader that I managed to overcome the challenges associated with 
qualitative data analysis and hence that my study offers credible, robust and rigorous 
findings. 
In the introduction to their seminal book on ‘Qualitative Data Analysis’, Miles and 
Huberman (1994) describe qualitative data as being ‘sexy’ but habitually associated 
with a lack of well-formulated methods of analysis. However, if qualitative data 
analysis procedures are outlined explicitly and applied in a systematic manner, then 
qualitative data can be “a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations 
of processes in identifiable local contexts” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.1). If not, 
then one should question the reliability and validity of conclusions stemming from 
qualitative studies. Miles (1979, p.591) illustrates this by asking, “how can we be sure 
that an ‘earthy’, ‘undeniable’, ‘serendipitous’ finding is not, in fact, wrong?”. 
While some researchers continue to put little emphasis on vindicating their data analysis 
procedures based on the argument that, “the unequivocal determination of the validity 
of findings is impossible” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.2), others argue that 
qualitative data analysis is an art form which inherently requires an intuitive approach. 
What is clear, however, is that on too many occasions the reader is left alone with 
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“classifications and patterns drawn from the welter of field data, in ways that are 
irreducible or even incommunicable” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.2). 
A slightly more reasonable – yet not acceptable – excuse for disregarding explicit 
qualitative data analysis procedures is that researchers possess different epistemological 
and ontological assumptions about what constitutes ‘reality’ and therefore the necessity 
of defining general laws for qualitative data analysis is in doubt (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Here, I acknowledge that one may question whether critical realism, just like any 
other research paradigm, offers the ‘right’ answer. The outcome, of what would 
probably be an extensive philosophical discussion, will most likely depend on accepting 
or rejecting its basic assumptions. As for this study, I accept the critical realist views of 
the world and, as argued earlier in this chapter, it is the most suitable approach for the 
research objectives underpinning this study. Consequently, the procedures described in 
this section are not to be seen as definite laws for qualitative data analysis but rather to 
assist the reader in understanding the steps that I followed to derive at the conclusions. 
The data analysis was based on the initial theoretical structure derived from the 
literature review (see Figure 2: An initial theoretical structure for the study of business 
responses to climate change, p.45). This initial theoretical structure, however, was 
modified whenever I gained unanticipated insights from the empirical findings. It was 
this theoretically derived and empirically grounded structure that guided the data 
analysis process. It is important to highlight, however, that the initial theoretical 
structure is to be interpreted as assisting the development of explanation rather than to 
create labels that are set in stones. In fact, the explanatory power of the initial theoretical 
structure guided the process of specifying the causal mechanisms that explain how 
companies respond to climate change. Elman (2009, p.122) states that such explanatory 
typologies “invoke both the descriptive and classificatory roles of typologies, albeit in 
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a way that incorporates their theoretical focus”. The explanatory typology that I 
adopted in this study consists of a descriptive, classificatory and explanatory function. 
Elman (2009) summarises the purpose of these functions by referring to their ‘analytical 
move(s)’ and ‘question(s) answered’. See Table 5 for a simplified outline of what Elman 
(2009, p.122) calls the “goal of typologies”. 
 




concepts (types) to 




Makes predictions based on 
combinations of different values of 
a theory’s variables. Places data in 
relevant cells for congruence 
testing and comparisons to 
determine whether it is consistent 
with the theory. 
Question(s) 
answered 
What constitutes this 
type? 
What is this a 
case of? 
If my theory is correct, what do I 
expect to see? Do I see it? 
Table 5: Goals under the explanatory typology (Elman, 2009, p.122) 
The strength of studies that adopt explanatory typologies is the inherent requirement to 
question the accuracy of the existing theory when the empirical findings suggest an 
alternative reality (Elman, 2005). In fact, Elman (2005) argues that it is the self-
conscious approach underpinning the explanatory typology that provides reassurance 
about the rigour of the research and improves transparency (Elman, 2005). 
In line with the explanatory typology, I used the initial theoretical structure as a guide 
for the process of data analysis. Indeed, I followed an explanatory typology by 
repeatedly asking questions, such as ‘How can theory explain my empirical findings?’ 
and more specifically ‘How can the existing literature on interactions in business 
relationships and networks as well as the behavioural science literature help to explain 
the observed business responses to climate change?’. 
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In the next section, I describe how the explanatory typology underpinning my data 
analysis translated into a specific sequence of data analysis procedures. Figure 7 
illustrates this process, based on Miles and Huberman (1994) as well as Friese (2012), 
and this serves as a structure for the remainder of this section. 
 
Figure 7: Sequence of data analysis (adapted from Miles and Huberman, 1994 & Friese, 
2012) 
3.3.5.1 Raw data 
The starting point for the process of data analysis was when the first items of raw data 
had been gathered. By raw data, I mean the primary sources of data, such as the 
transcripts of semi-structured interviews, and supplementary sources of data, such as 
the policy fora transcripts, consultation documents, legislative documents, strategy and 
emission reduction policy documents as well as media releases. During the process of 
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collecting the raw data, I constantly moved ‘back and forth’ between empirical 
observations and the initial theoretical structure. Based on these early insights, and 
guided by a research process of retroduction and systematic combining, I collected 
additional raw data and sharpened the initial conceptualisations. 
3.3.5.2 Data reduction 
Data reduction refers to “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, 
and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.10). During the data reduction stage of the data analysis 
process, I faced several analytical choices that had the potential to shape the conclusions 
stemming from the data analysis. For example, I had to make well-conceived decisions 
about which parts of the over 10,000 pages of raw data should be coded, which parts 
were vital for the development of a coherent and rigorous analysis and which parts 
would ultimately reveal the causal mechanisms of how companies respond to climate 
change. In an effort to follow systematic data analysis procedures, I used software to 
help sharpen, sort, focus, discard and organise the raw data. 
Using software to aid the data analysis not only helped me to be more systematic and 
explicit in the process of analysing the data, but it also offered the flexibility to adjust 
analytical variables through the research process (Tesch, 1989). This was particularly 
pertinent to this study because of the systematic combining research process that 
required a process of continuously going ‘back and forth’ between data analysis and 
theories (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Furthermore, Ragin and Becker (1989) point out 
that using computer-aided analysis is particularly beneficial when adopting a case study 
research method as it allows “interconnected arguments about interrelated events” to 
be revealed (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.44). Indeed, using computer-aided 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) helped me to elevate the data analysis, 
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historically characterised by handicraft using pen and paper, to a more rigorous and 
efficient level. 
The decision of which CAQDAS programme to use was predominately driven by the 
reliability of the software. In a Lancaster University PhD Research Training Programme 
on ‘Choosing and Using Software for Qualitative Data Analysis’, two programmes, 
namely ATLAS.ti and Nvivo, were introduced. Although both options offered similar 
tools and functions, ATLAS.ti was known to be less vulnerable to crashes. Hence, I 
decided to use ATLAS.ti. 
It is important, however, to elucidate that any CAQDAS programme “does not actually 
analyse data; it is simply a tool for supporting the process of qualitative data analysis” 
(Friese, 2012, p.1). The strength of CAQDAS programmes is to find coded data 
segments and show their interconnectedness. Yet, it was my task “to tell the computer, 
by way of coding, which data segment has what kind of meaning” (Friese, 2012, p.1). 
This leads critics (e.g., Smith and Hesse-Biber, 1996) to question the adequacy of 
software in a qualitative research context by asking, “if the computer doesn’t do the 
coding, then what it is good for?” (Friese, 2012, p.1). I find this critique rather 
paradoxical. After all, most of such critics are probably using a word processing 
software despite the fact that they still need to type the words themselves. Friese (2012, 
p.1) reiterates: 
“Software frees you from all those tasks that a machine can do much more effectively, like modifying 
code words and coded segments, retrieving data based on various criteria, searching for words, 
integrating material in one place, attaching notes and finding them again, counting the numbers of 
coded incidences, offering overviews at various stages of a project, and so on. By using ATLAS.ti, it 
becomes much easier to analyse data systematically and to ask questions that you otherwise would 
not ask because the manual task involved would be too time consuming.” (Friese, 2012, p.1) 
In the following paragraphs, I describe how I conducted the computer-aided analysis. 
Friese (2012) defines this process as a journey through unknown territory (empirical 
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data) while having some preconceptions (initial theoretical structure) about what may 
or may not prove to be the ‘reality’ under critical realist conditions. In fact, it was the 
CAQDAS programme ATLAS.ti that enabled me to manoeuvre through the empirical 
data in order to draw and verify conclusions. 
3.3.5.3 Coding 
I coded the data based on noticing, collecting and thinking as the three components that 
Friese (2012) labels as a computer-assisted NCT analysis: 
1. Noticing. This referred to the early stages of my data analysis and involved 
reading the interview transcripts and documentary information in order to 
identify specific incidents in the data that seemed relevant to answering how 
companies respond to climate change. Thereby, I was able to derive initial ideas 
for basic descriptions of such incidents. 
2. Collecting. This referred to the process of discovering further incidents that were 
similar to and fitted under the same basic descriptions (code names) as the 
incidents identified in the earlier stages of the data analysis. As suggested by 
Corbin and Strauss (2008), this helped me to compare incidents based on 
similarities and differences. As an outcome, I grouped similar incidents into 
main or subcategories. 
3. Thinking. This referred to the brainpower it took to notice first incidents in the 
data, to identify similarities between incidents and when grouping the incidents 
into categories. Naturally, without the ability to think critically and question the 
possible causal mechanisms that led to the occurrence of an event it would be 
impossible to complete the data analysis process. 
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Below I describe more specifically how I explored the data, identified incidents, coded 
them, added structure to the code list and then started to take descriptive codes to a more 
abstract and conceptual level. 
I began the NCT analysis by importing the raw data into the CAQDAS software 
ATLAS.ti and then reading the interview transcripts and policy fora transcripts. As I 
was going through the documents, I started to code what was the easiest to recognise: 
the names of organisations and interviewees. The typical ‘participant code’ followed 
the structure P for the participant, Int for Interview, EnSup for energy supply company 
(or alternative format for other types of organisations), then an abbreviation of the 
company name and lastly the interviewee name (e.g., 
P_Int_EnSup_CompanyName_IntervieweeName). I have used these shortened codes 
because only the first 20 characters of code appear when running queries in the 
ATLAS.ti code management tool. 
While attaching the participant codes, I started to notice interesting bits and pieces that 
appeared relevant to explaining how companies respond to climate change. I 
highlighted such incidents and assigned the first descriptive codes. While reading 
further, I came across similar and different incidents. Whenever they fitted under an 
already established code, I simply attached the same code; in case they did not, I 
developed new descriptive codes. 
As suggested by Friese (2012, p.230) a first saturation point is reached when “you no 
longer notice anything new, when no codes are added and you can only apply already 
existing ones”. I reached this point after I had compiled a list of 828 different descriptive 
codes (see Appendix 2 for a sample of descriptive codes). The next step was to structure 
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these codes by creating “more abstract conceptual-level codes and developing codes 
into categories and subcategories” (Friese, 2012, p.231). 
I structured the code list by developing categories that captured related codes. Here, I 
used code frequencies as pointers for what may or may not become a category code. 
Although frequencies of codes do not provide definite answers, it helped me as an 
indicator for codes that I may want to subsume as in a category or subcategory. Some 
codes only appeared once or twice in the code list but nonetheless were fundamental 
and hence also needed to be put under a more abstract conceptual-level code. 
It was at this stage that I re-evaluated the initial codes and developed them into more 
abstract and conceptual level codes. Here, it was the process of reading through the 
‘quotations’, i.e. the raw data underpinning the descriptive codes, which allowed me to 
identify commonalities and differences between codes. Based on these insights, the first 
ideas emerged and I was able to define labels for categories and subcategories. In fact, 
particularly at this stage, employing a computer-assisted analysis was a key advantage 
because it permitted me to “look at only a selection of the data” (Friese, 2012, p.96). 
The second stage of coding was characterised by applying the code list, developed in 
stage one, to the remaining primary sources of data, such as transcripts of semi-
structured interviews, and supplementary sources of data, such as policy fora 
transcripts, consultation documents, legislative documents, strategy and emission 
reduction policy documents, and media releases. Although the majority of new insights 
gained from the additional raw data fitted well under the structure determined by the 
code list, in some instances I was struggling to apply the codes and hence I continued 
to add a few new codes and made minor modifications. 
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Friese (2012) describes this process as a way of validating the code list. Furthermore, 
Saldaña (2009, p.149) states that the purpose of the second stage coding is “to develop 
a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization”. At the 
end of the second stage, the code list was even further structured and applied to the 
primary and secondary sources of data. Table 6 below illustrates the first-order 
categories under which I summarised the codes. This list made it possible to access the 















High rate of return 
Higher energy prices 
Internal assessment 
Lack of infrastructure 











Table 6: First-order categories 
Based on these first-order categories, I moved on to the conceptual level analysis. 
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3.3.5.4 Memo writing 
At the memo writing stage of the data analysis process, my analytical focus shifted 
towards the conceptual level. In other words, I set the first-order categories derived from 
the empirical data against the initial theoretical structure in and around network 
tensions, network interactions and network outcomes, as established in the literature 
review (see Figure 2 on page 45). While once again immersing myself in the data, I 
wrote memos about my thoughts and interpretation of coded incidents that I found 
helpful to explain how companies respond to climate change. Thereby, I attempted to 
link the data segments that illustrated aspects of the initial theoretical structure. 
In fact, I was astonished at how the process of writing such memos helped me to 
progress seamlessly to a more conceptual level of analysis. At the end of the memo-
writing process, I had established second-order themes as well as the aggregate 
dimensions derived from the systematic combining research process. 








It was at this stage that the potential explanations of the observed network outcomes 
(discharging, protecting, herding) became apparent. I then employed theory to explain 
why the observed network outcomes emerged and, hereby, provided a potential 
explanation of how companies respond to climate change. Specifically, I created a 
checklist of all the interactional and behavioural aspects that have been identified 
throughout the literature review and examined whether any of these may have occurred 
in the five case studies of business responses to climate change. 
Interestingly, three sets of behaviours in networks soon emerged: 1) Frames and reference 
points; 2) Loss aversion and the belief in a fixed-resource pie; and 3) Herd behaviour. In 
fact, these network behaviours resulted in companies 1) discharging their responsibility 
by passing the impact to others, 2) protecting their resources and rationalising activities 
rather than bearing risks of change, and 3) acting akin, or have the propensity to adopt a 
herd mentality, to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than 
operating in isolation. At this stage, it seemed plausible to infer that antecedents related 
to these network outcomes reinforce one another in business relationships and networks, 
and I used theory to explain the three observed network outcomes. To ensure the 
robustness of the findings, however, further validation of these insights was required. 
3.3.5.5 Conclusions 
The final stage of the data analysis procedures underpinning this study was to draw and 
verify conclusions. Throughout the process of analysing the data, I made notes which 
ultimately fed into writing the memos. Such notes typically included explanations and 
propositions of potential factors that explain how companies respond to climate change. 
I kept these notes, which may be interpreted as early-stage conclusions, as pointers of 
what might be true instead of seeing them as definite findings. It was only throughout the 
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course of the data analysis process that some conclusions became more explicit and 
grounded while others simply did not seem to hold up. 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.11) see such verifications as taking different forms, it “may 
be as brief as a fleeting second thought crossing the analyst’s mind during writing, with 
a short excursion back to the field notes, or it may be thorough and elaborate, with 
lengthy argumentation and review”. As a result of verifying each conclusion drawn 
throughout the data analysis process, I was able to ensure the validity of the findings 
stemming from this study. Drawing and verifying conclusions represented the final stage 
of the data analysis procedures underpinning this study. 
In the next section, I demonstrate that I have followed ethical procedures at all stages in 
the conduct of this study. 
3.4 Research ethics 
Following best practice for research ethics should be of paramount importance for any 
research project undertaken around the world. Unfortunately, in many cases, this does not 
hold true and, consequently, the rights of humans, companies or animals are not respected. 
In an attempt to counteract this issue, I have put the highest emphasis on complying with 
the Lancaster University Research Ethics Code of Practice (GAP/2009/0521). These 
standards are set up to ensure the “dignity, rights, and welfare of participants” (Lancaster 
University Research Ethics Code of Practice, 2009, p.1) and are somewhat similar to the 
Research Ethics Framework developed by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC). The ESRC has laid out six key principles of research ethics which can be labelled 
1) Integrity and quality, 2) Transparency, 3) Confidentiality and anonymity, 4) Voluntary 
participation, 5) Avoiding harm, and 6) Partiality and conflicts of interest. I use these six 
key principles of research ethics as a structure for the remainder of this section. The 
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Lancaster University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) has reviewed the measures that 
I have put in place to uphold these principles and granted ethical approval on 17 th 
November 2015 (UREC RS2015/47). 
The first principle of research ethics underpinning this study is integrity and quality. 
Integrity refers to upholding moral principles such as complying with the law (e.g., 
national legislation, codes of ethical practice, Human Rights Act) as well as seeing 
openness and honesty as the norm (e.g., about research methods, procedures or findings). 
Quality, on the other hand, refers to the standard of excellence and fitness for purpose of 
all procedures that eventually led to writing this thesis. 
Throughout the process of conducting this study, I have put several measures in place in 
order to meet the highest standards of integrity and quality. Firstly, I complied with 
national legislation, I studied both the Lancaster University Research Ethics Code of 
Practice and the Research Ethics Framework laid out by the ESRC to ensure that I was 
following their principles and, at all stages, I safeguarded the rights of anyone directly 
involved in, or indirectly affected by, my research. Secondly, I put the highest emphasis 
on openness and honesty by providing a detailed outline of the research methods, with a 
particular focus on how I drew and verified conclusions based on the raw data (see section 
3.3 for details). Thirdly, I aimed for a standard of excellence that would allow parts of 
this thesis to be published in world-leading journals in my field of study (e.g., Academy 
of Management, British Journal of Management, Industrial Marketing Management, 
Organization Studies). The fitness for purpose has been particularly stressed in this 
methodology chapter as I offer an explicit justification of why the applied case study 
research method is ideal for answering the research questions posed. Lastly, the integrity 
and quality of this study has been reviewed continuously, both internally (e.g., Lancaster 
University Research Ethics Committee, the Marketing Department first-year PhD 
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upgrade panel, the Doctoral Conversations Initiative in the Marketing Department, and in 
frequent meetings with my supervisors) and externally (e.g., a Doctoral Colloquium at 
the 31st Annual IMP Conference 2015 at the University of Southern Denmark in Kolding). 
The second principle of research ethics is transparency. This refers to openness and 
accountability for all the processes that led up to writing this thesis. In particular, this 
includes explicitly stating and making anyone involved in the research project aware of 
the research purpose, the underpinning methodology, and requirements for participation, 
highlighting potential risks and outlining how the research findings may be disseminated. 
In this regard, I have focused on establishing the research purpose (e.g., in the 
Introduction chapter) and I have justified the underpinning case study research method 
in the Methodology chapter. Furthermore, I developed a detailed Participant Information 
Sheet that provided details for participants (see Appendix 3). The document answered 
questions such as ‘What is the purpose of this study?’, ‘What will I be asked to do if I 
take part?’, ‘What will the interview involve?’, ‘What are the possible risks of taking 
part?’ or ‘What will happen to the results of the study?’. I made this explicit from the 
outset and I gave participants the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
The third principle of research ethics, followed throughout the process of conducting this 
study, is confidentiality and anonymity. Confidentiality refers to keeping participant 
information private; this would typically include personal data (e.g., names of 
interviewees and organisations). Anonymity, on the other hand, refers to the state of 
withholding sensitive information (e.g., names or unusual features) that would allow the 
identification of individuals. Upholding confidentiality and anonymity was particularly 
important because the policy fora (see Table 2 on page 74) were held under the Chatham 
House Rule, which reads as follows: “Participants are free to use the information 
received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other 
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participant, may be revealed” (Chatham House, 2018, p.1). In order to achieve this, I 
have treated all information as confidential and in accordance with the UK Data 
Protection Act (1998). It was only me who had access to any raw information that one 
could be associated with a particular participant. Any information that I shared was 
anonymised, including through the use of pseudonyms. I stored personal details and the 
research content in two separate, encrypted and password protected files. 
The fourth principle of research ethics is voluntary participation. This refers to the 
requirement that participants took part in this study based on their own free will and that 
their rights, dignity and welfare were respected. I made this clear from the outset of the 
study by providing an answer to the question, ‘Do I have to take part?’ in the Participant 
Information Sheet (Appendix 3). I explicitly stated that participation in this study is 
entirely voluntary and that it is completely up to the participant to decide whether or not 
they want to take part. Moreover, I highlighted that the participant can withdraw from the 
study at any time, without having to provide any reason. 
The fifth principle of research ethics refers to avoiding harm. This includes ensuring that 
no one experiences any distress, embarrassment or anxiety as an outcome of being 
involved in this study. I, therefore, had to ensure that participants and I are not harmed 
psychologically, physically, legally, socially or economically. Although I would argue 
that taking part in this study generally bore very low risks for any kind of distress, 
embarrassment or anxiety, I acknowledged – in the Participant Information Sheet – that 
the specific interactions and behaviours when responding to climate change may be 
perceived as a sensitive topic. I, therefore, encouraged participants to raise any doubts 
about the study and reiterated that they had the right to end the interview at any time. I 
have also dedicated time towards the end of each interview to clarify whether the 
participants felt that the information provided may lead to any distress, embarrassment or 
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anxiety. All participants confirmed that the information they provided did not cause them 
any distress, embarrassment or anxiety, although, they commonly asked for 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
The sixth and final principle of research ethics underpinning this study is partiality and 
conflicts of interest. Partiality refers to any form for a preference of one participant over 
another, or for research finding over another. A conflict of interest, on the other hand, 
refers to a situation in which a person or organisation has multiple diverging aims through 
which personal benefits are possible. The chosen research method ensured that I remained 
independent of any participant or the organisations that they represented. In the 
Participant Information Sheet, I explicitly stated that there are no specific benefits from 
taking part other than insights into how companies within the UK energy supply sector 
respond to climate change. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research paradigm (axiology, epistemology and ontology), 
outlined the research process of retroduction and systematic combining, and justified the 
case study research method. Furthermore, I explained the process of data collection, 
sources and reporting. In addition, I provided insights into my approach to data analysis. 
I closed this chapter with an illustration of how research ethics have been upheld at all 
stages of conducting this study. 
In the next chapter, I will examine the context and industry-specific aspects that act as the 
empirical boundaries of this study.
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4 Context and industry 
definition 
This chapter outlines the context and industry-specific aspects relevant to this study. In 
doing so, this chapter serves as a justification for why the UK energy supply sector is 
one of the best empirical examples for developing theory in and around business 
responses to climate change. In fact, by 2015 the UK managed to reduce the carbon 
emissions from its energy supply sector by 39% compared to 1990 levels (HM, 2016). 
Despite this seemingly positive trend, the UK national energy sector remains the single 
most emitting sector in the UK, accounting for almost one-quarter of the total UK 
carbon emissions annually (CCC, 2015). As a result, the UK energy supply sector is 
exposed to a variety of contextual changes, ranging from socio-cultural and 
legal/regulatory to economic demands. 
Furthermore, a 2016 Progress Report issued by the UK Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC) revealed that the progress to meet the 2030 and 2050 emission reduction targets 
continues to be insufficient. The UK CCC, therefore, called for significant efforts to 
foster collaboration between multiple actors to enable further reductions in carbon 
emissions (CCC, 2016). This provides an ideal context for examining the interaction 
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and behaviour in business relationships and networks when companies respond to 
climate change. This rationale will be explained further across the rest of this chapter. 
I begin by describing what brought about the imbalance between nature and society, 
and why, as a consequence, the world is experiencing climatic changes. I then offer an 
outline of the contextual changes that emerged as a result of climate change (socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic). Furthermore, I explain the role of the global 
energy supply sector in responding to climate change and introduce the UK’s national 
energy transition. I close this chapter with a brief conclusion. 
4.1 The emerging imbalance between nature and society 
Several contextual changes have emerged as a result of global climatic changes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to answer the question of what has happened in recent history 
to have brought about these climatic changes. If one leaves the hard science on climate 
change aside, answering this question is surprisingly simple. 
The world’s population was relatively stable until the mid-18th century and then 
increased rapidly from 1900 to reach nearly 7.6 billion as of mid-2017 (UN, 2017). This 
growth in population has created unprecedented demand for energy, food and 
transportation. The increasing demand led to significant economic growth. This 
explosion of economic activity, however, came with a negative externality called 
‘carbon emissions’. Carbon emissions are released into the atmosphere when fossil fuels 
are burned. Almost in step with population and economic growth, carbon emissions 
have increased steadily since the 19th century and have significantly picked up speed in 
recent years (IPCC, 2014). As of May 2019, the accumulated emissions in the 
atmosphere stand at the highest ever rate of almost 411 ppm (NASA, 2019). Figure 9 
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below illustrates the increase in population, economic growth and the rise in carbon 
emissions from 1960 until 2016. 
 
Figure 9: Global population, economic and carbon emission trends (Based on data from 
IMF, 2017; UN, 2017; NASA, 2019) 
Fully understanding the implications that population and economic growth have on 
nature, however, requires explaining the role that carbon emissions play in the world’s 
ecosystem. After all, for most people, the consequences of carbon emissions in the 
atmosphere might not be entirely evident and figures such as 411 ppm have little to no 
meaning. 
The temperature on planet Earth is determined by the amount of energy (sunlight) 
reaching the Earth minus the infrared (heat) that is radiated back into space. According 
to the French scientist Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier, this would lead to an average 
Earth’s surface temperature of -18°C, and hence the world would be frozen (e.g., 
Giddens, 2009; Howard-Grenville et al., 2014). Fortunately, the world is surrounded by 
a mixture of gases (nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, methane) and water vapour. 
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Collectively, these gases comprise the atmosphere that both allows plants and animals 
to survive and serves to trap some of the infrared radiation leaving the Earth, thereby 
increasing the average surface temperature. 
The influx in carbon emissions stemming from economic activities have – at least 
partially – caused global temperatures to increase by 1.2 °C from pre-industrial levels 
and, on the current trajectory, this number is forecasted to reach 4 °C by 2100 (Bataille 
et al., 2016; WMO, 2016). The higher temperatures have already altered the world’s 
climate system and future changes are likely to be even more significant (IPCC, 2014). 
Glaciers and ice caps have started to melt leading to rising ocean levels and flooding of 
coastal areas as well as of low-lying countries (Meehl et al., 2007). Moreover, extreme 
weather events (such as heatwaves, droughts, floods and storms) are occurring more 
frequently and are forecasted to further increase in intensity (IPCC, 2014). The 2017 
hurricanes, for example, have severely damaged large parts of the Caribbean and the 
south-east coast of the United States. They have been fuelled and gained magnitude 
through water evaporated by the warmer oceans; a direct outcome of higher 
temperatures. Almost always, such consequences disproportionally affect the world’s 
poor who simply do not have the resources to protect themselves (Arnold and Bustos, 
2005; see Delaporte and Maurel, 2016, for a study on the impact of climate change on 
agriculture in Bangladesh). 
While the economic growth will most likely continue along with the increase in 
population (8.6 billion by 2030; 9.8 billion by 2050; and 11.2 billion by 2100), a parallel 
rise in emissions may transform the Earth into an inhabitable planet (IPCC, 2014; UN, 
2017). The planet will survive; the more pressing query is whether the human species 
will (e.g., Giddens, 2009; Wittneben and Kiyar, 2009; IPCC, 2014). 
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Answering this question in the affirmative will largely depend on how humanity 
responds to what is frequently referred to as one of the greatest challenges of the 21st 
century (e.g., Wittneben and Kiyar, 2009). Where humanity, and companies, in 
particular, focus their attention, largely depends on the contextual changes that act as a 
stimulus for responses to climate change. In the next section, I turn my attention to 
reviewing the contextual changes that climate change has brought about. 
4.2 Contextual change in response to climate change 
Over the past two decades, climate change has substantially altered the context in which 
businesses operate (Nyberg et al., 2018). This is manifested in socio-cultural (e.g., 
sustainable lifestyle choices, anti-consumption), legal/regulatory (e.g., international 
agreements, national legislation, policies, standards) and economic (e.g., greening of 
capitalism, competitiveness, profitability) changes. Below, I depict the externally 
generated pressures emerging from the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
changes that have acted as a stimulus for business responses to climate change 
(Galbreath, 2011). 
4.2.1 Socio-cultural 
Socio-cultural pressures operating at the individual, national and even global level may 
act as a trigger for business responses to climate change. This is because climate change 
is experienced, understood and shaped by society (Chatzidakis and Shaw, 2018). In fact, 
decades of rising standards of living and the explosion of the world’s population have 
enabled unprecedented demands for products and services (Carrington et al., 2016). 
This social reproduction and consumption, however, was – and still is – based on the 
economic use of the natural environment (UNEP, 2012, 2013), which is fundamentally 
unsustainable (Shove, 2010). 
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With the emergence of climate change, the socio-cultural values and norms have started 
to shift towards more sustainable forms of living, working and consuming (Carvalho 
and Burgess, 2005). It has been recognised that over-consumption represents a principal 
challenge that needs to be altered if society wants to mitigate global climatic changes 
(e.g., Carley and Spapens, 2017). Anti-consumption (e.g., the resistance to acquiring 
and using a polluting car) and socially responsible consumption (e.g., making a 
purchase based on a company’s role in society and ethical behaviour) indicate the 
evolving socio-cultural pressures (Black et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, it appears that, at least in Western countries, these socio-cultural changes 
increasingly determine purchasing decisions (Roberts, 1996). For example, a study 
conducted by Vershoor (1997), 75% of consumers stated that the ethical behaviour of 
companies influences their consumption behaviour. Simultaneously, developing 
countries such as Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia focus widely on ever-more 
consumption. Take, for example, the pollution from petrol-driven electricity generators 
in Russia, the millions of old cars imported from the West in Nigeria or the extensive 
air-conditioning in Saudi Arabia. Even more worryingly, in developed countries, only 
a very few consumers are actually translating their environmental concerns into actual 
purchasing behaviours (e.g., Caruana et al., 2016). Öberseder et al. (2011, p.457) 
explain this so-called attitude-behaviour gap as “positive attitudes toward buying 
products from socially responsible companies, but these positive attitudes are not 
transferred into actual purchase behavior”. 
This implies that the socio-cultural changes demand companies to respond to climate 
change but consumers are not willing to reward the responses with extensive purchases. 
Business responses to climate change may be triggered by socio-cultural changes but, 
at the same time, limited by the extent to which consumer’s value and financially reward 
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such responses (Adger et al., 2009). In other words, while socio-cultural changes play 
a central role in response to climate change, they can also constrain business responses 
to climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006). 
Furthermore, socio-cultural changes are not occurring autonomously but are embedded 
in a variety of legal/regulatory changes that climate change has brought about. 
4.2.2 Legal/regulatory 
Legal/regulatory changes initiated by national governments are designed to promote 
business responses to climate change. In fact, the increasing amount of carbon 
emissions in the atmosphere, the emerging socio-cultural concerns about the 
consequences of climate change and the intergovernmental climate change agreements 
(e.g., Paris Agreement) have pressured national governments “to regulate industries 
and corporations to promote deep reductions in emissions and foster rapid changes in 
business practices and culture” (Okereke et al., 2012, p.11). 
National governments have therefore started to alter the legal/regulatory framework. 
This commonly involves setting environmental protection standards (e.g., banning 
harmful materials and equipment) and directly regulating the activities of companies 
(e.g., introducing taxes on carbon emissions to increase costs of pollution) (Stavins, 
1997; Ang et al., 2016). For a detailed overview of the legal/regulatory options in 
response to climate change see Stavins (1997). 
Such legal/regulatory changes are based on the aim of reducing carbon emissions. In 
many countries, however, such legal/regulatory demands to mitigate emissions are 
patchy or even non-existent (Wittneben, 2009; Okereke et al., 2012). In fact, many 
national governments “have struggled to craft a strong, integrated, and comprehensive 
regulatory system for managing climate change” (Keohane and Victor, 2011, p.7). For 
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example, following the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the German 
government decided to close down all nuclear power plants by 2022 (Okereke et al., 
2012). As a consequence of this reduction in nuclear power plants, which are a source 
of zero-carbon energy supply, Germany had to continue running highly polluting coal-
fired power plants. As a result, in 2017, 40% of Germany’s total energy supply was 
based on coal (Bloomberg, 2017). This example indicates the conflicting pressures that 
national governments may face when crafting a legal/regulatory framework that seeks 
to decarbonise its economy. 
Additionally, in many countries, the emerging legal/regulatory changes have proven to 
be “ineffective as a tool to lower emissions” (Okereke et al., 2012, p.24). This is largely 
because of concerns over the increasing costs of a low-carbon energy supply system 
(Bassi et al., 2013). In fact, in a recent study, Ang et al. (2016) found that the 
legal/regulatory changes introduced by the UK’s government in response to climate 
change have increased the unit electricity price by 37%, thereby hampering national 
economic growth and weakening the global economic competitiveness of British 
companies. A similar congruence of thinking leads Okereke et al. (2012, p.11) to the 
conclusion that “the pressure to achieve deep emission reductions and economic 
growth simultaneously poses challenges to business and government”. 
This suggests that legal/regulatory changes in response to climate change are not 
occurring autonomously but are linked to economic changes. 
4.2.3 Economic 
Climate change has altered the economic context in which business responses to climate 
change occur. In fact, the emerging socio-cultural and legal/regulatory changes have 
had implications for the global economic system (Goodall, 2008; Wright and Nyberg, 
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2015). Disparte (2017, p.1), for example, suggests that climate change puts “nearly $2.2 
trillion in economic output at risk through 2025”. 
For centuries the cost-effectiveness of fossil fuel-based energy generation has enabled 
unprecedented economic growth and underpins much of the contemporary business 
activities. With the realisation of the environmental consequences of carbon emissions 
and the resulting socio-cultural and legal/regulatory changes, however, it has become 
increasingly costly to run a carbon-intensive business (Nyberg et al., 2018); leading to 
implications for competitiveness and business survival (Lubin and Esty, 2010; 
Chatzidakis and Shaw, 2018). 
Interestingly, the logic underpinning the ways in which businesses address these 
emerging economic changes is based on ideas related to economies of scale (O’Reilley 
et al., 2018). In fact, it appears that the economic context in which business responses 
to climate change occur pressures companies to run emission reduction initiatives based 
on the assumption that “existing economic, social and political arrangements can 
remain largely unchanged by applying a ‘common-sense’ and universal organizational 
principle of efficiencies via economies of scale” (O’Reilley et al., 2018, p.221). 
Despite the emerging socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes, very few 
companies have embraced a truly radical transformation in response to climate change 
(Okereke et al., 2012). This calls for an alternative conceptualisation and novel 
approaches to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how companies respond 
to climate change. 
One industry that appears particularly pertinent in responding to climate change, and 
one that has actually embarked on a transition towards low-carbon, is the global energy 
supply sector. 
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4.3 The relevance of the global energy supply sector 
With almost 50% of the global annual carbon emissions, the energy supply sector is the 
largest single emitter of carbon emissions (IPCC, 2014; IEA, 2016). Moreover, the 
annual emissions stemming from the global energy supply sector have increased by 
3.1% annually between 2000 and 2010, and continue to do so (IPCC, 2014). 
Predominantly based on burning fossil fuels, the global energy supply sector is one of 
the underlying causes of climate change (Giddens, 2009; IPCC, 2014). Interestingly, 
the factors that have brought about the dependence on fossil fuels as a primary source 
of energy are similar to the causes of the climatic changes described in the first section 
of this chapter. 
Indeed, the increase in population and the associated economic growth demanded a 
supply of energy at a scale that was impossible to meet with the traditional low-carbon 
energy sources (e.g., animals, water and windmills). In the search for more concentrated 
sources of energy, coal-fired power plants gained significant attention. From the 19th 
century onwards, coal established itself as the dominant source of energy (Fouquet, 
2010). It is evident, however, that this shift was an unsustainable solution as the natural 
environment was no longer able to absorb the influx in carbon emissions stemming from 
an energy supply system based on fossil fuels (IPCC, 2014). The global energy supply 
sector has therefore moved to the forefront in the global quest to address climate change 
(Giddens, 2009). 
Meeting the targets set in the Paris Agreement requires halving emissions from the 
global energy supply sector by 2050, and completely decarbonising the sector by 2100 
(Bataille et al., 2016). This endeavour is particularly complex since the energy supply 
sector is deeply ingrained in every aspect of human life. Government energy policies 
can therefore never be solely based on establishing a more sustainable energy supply 
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system but must also ensure affordability and the security of supply (Hammond and 
O’Grady, 2017). Taken together, these three aspects are referred to as the energy 
trilemma. While the energy trilemma may slow down the global transition towards a 
low-carbon energy system, it is still feasible to make substantial progress in 
decarbonising the global energy supply sector. I now turn my attention to the existing 
options to do so. 
Decarbonising the global energy supply sector can be achieved through a range of 
measures spanning from improving energy efficiency, eliminating fugitive emissions in 
fossil fuel extraction (e.g., flaring) as well as in energy transmission and distribution, 
and switching to low-carbon energy supply technologies (e.g., renewable energy) 
(IPCC, 2014). No single measure alone, however, will reduce carbon emissions 
satisfactorily and hence it requires a diversified investment across all options. 
Combining and significantly scaling up these measures “can solve the carbon and 
climate problem in the first half of this century” (Pacala and Socolow, 2004, p.968). 
In the next section, I introduce the UK energy supply sector as the industry context of 
this study. 
4.4 The UK national energy transition 
The UK energy supply sector is the single most emitting sector in the UK, accounting 
for almost one-quarter of the total UK carbon emissions annually (CCC, 2015). This 
has led to substantial efforts by the UK government to alter the legal/regulatory 
framework to promote decarbonising the sector. 
In the 1990s, the approach to achieve this followed a market logic (Keay, 2016). The 
government tended to leave it to market forces to reduce carbon emissions. From 2000 
onwards, however, the approach shifted towards following a government logic and a 
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centrally coordinated approach to responding to climate change (ibid, 2016). The 
government started to implement a national climate change policy framework that 
forces companies to reduce their emissions. 
While the government logic generally offers a higher carbon emission reduction 
potential (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017), the UK government has not reconciled these 
two approaches as they emerged over time. As a result, the UK transition towards a 
low-carbon energy supply system finds itself in a limbo between market-oriented and 
government-coordinated policies (Keay, 2016). Over the following paragraphs, I review 
these policies. In doing so, I outline the UK energy and climate change policy as these 
are the most pertinent policy areas for the UK energy supply sector. 
The energy policy in the UK is driven by three fundamental objectives: affordability, 
the security of supply and decarbonisation (Foxon, 2013; DECC, 2014). Although the 
relative importance of each objective has changed over time, the Climate Change Act 
in 2008 led to a substantial increase in efforts related to decarbonisation. As the most 
central UK policy aimed at addressing climate change, and due to its considerable 
impact on the energy supply sector, it requires a more detailed review. 
The UK Climate Change Act of 2008 included the world’s first legally binding emission 
reduction target set by a national government (HM, 2016). Passed by the UK Parliament 
in 2008, the Climate Change Act requires the UK to cut carbon emissions by 80% below 
1990 levels by 2050. Furthermore, it set up the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
as an independent and science-based advisory body responsible for setting ‘carbon 
budgets’ and holding the UK government accountable for putting emission reduction 
measures in place (Foxon, 2013). 
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The carbon budgets set by the CCC determine the total amount of carbon emissions to 
be emitted in a five-year period. The first three carbon budgets cover the period from 
2008-2012, 2013-2017 and 2018-2022 required maximum total emissions of 3,018 
MtCO2e, 2,782 MtCO2e and 2,544 MtCO2e respectively (HM, 2016). Annual carbon 
emissions were subsequently set to be no more than 1,950 MtCO2e in the fourth carbon 
budget (2023-2027) and to 1,725 MTCO2e in the fifth carbon budget (2028-2032). 
Meeting these carbon budgets would equate to a 57% reduction from 1990 levels by 
2032, and would keep the UK on track to reach the overall target of 80% fewer 
emissions by 2050. 
Achieving this, however, continues to be challenging since it requires decarbonising 
almost all sectors of the economy, and especially energy supply, transportation and 
heating, in a fair and cost-effective way (HM, 2016). Although challenging, the CCC 
reassures that even with today’s technologies it is feasible to reach the targets under the 
2008 Climate Change Act (CCC, 2016). In an attempt to achieve this, the UK 
government has designed a range of policies in order to encourage scaling up low- and 
zero-carbon sources of energy supply.  
By way of contextual and industry-specific information pertinent to this study, I have 







Year Policy name Brief description 
2001 Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) 
A tax on electricity consumed by companies. Fuels used for the 
electricity generation and from renewable sources are exempt. 
2002 Renewables 
Obligation (RO) 
Obliges energy suppliers to generate a specific proportion of 
their total energy production from renewable sources. 
2005 European Union 
Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) 
An emissions trading scheme that establishes maximum 
greenhouse gas allowed to be emitted by participants. Permits 
for any excess emissions must be traded in the system. 
2012 Energy Companies 
Obligation (ECO) 
A scheme that encourages energy efficiency measures. It obliges 
energy suppliers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
minimise costs for home heating. Under ECO2, this also 
involves an obligation to reduce emissions from rural and low-
income areas. 
2012 Energy Entrepreneurs 
Fund (EEF) 
Provides funding for the development and demonstration of 
energy efficiency, electricity generation and heat/electricity 
storage technologies, products and/or services.  
2013 Carbon Price Floor 
(CPF) 
Imposes a tax on fossil fuel-based generation of electricity. 
Establishes a minimum ‘floor’ price for emissions of UK energy 
suppliers participating in the EU ETS. 
2013 Green Deal (GD) A loan scheme for households and companies to finance energy-
saving measures. Loan repayment through energy bills. 
2014 Capacity Market 
(CM) 
Incentivises investment in secure energy supply. The required 
capacity is contracted as a result of a competitive auction. 
Successful energy suppliers committed to the delivery of 
electricity in exchange for a steady payment. The CM is a main 
element of the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) that 
encourages diverse investments in a low-emissions energy mix. 
2014 Contracts for 
Difference (CfDs) 
Electricity supply price guarantee contracts with the national 
government. If the pre-agreed electricity price exceeds the 
market price, the generator pays the government; and vice versa 
when the pre-agreed price is below the market price. The CfDs 
are a main element of the Electricity Market Reform (EMR). 
Table 7: UK energy and climate change policy (based upon Ang et al., 2016) 
As a result of these policies, the energy supply sector-related emissions are down by 39% 
relative to 1990 levels (HM, 2016). In fact, the UK’s energy supply companies have 
racked up investments in renewable energy sources. For two consecutive years (2015 and 
2016), no other European country has invested more in renewable energy than the UK 
(US$ 24 billion) (REN, 2017). The UK has not only met the first (2008-2012) and second 
(2013-2017) carbon budget, it has also set the groundwork for meeting the third (2018-
2022) carbon budget. While the progress so far is remarkable, moving ahead with the 
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UK’s transition towards a low-carbon energy supply system is facing significant 
challenges. 
Indeed, a recent progress report released by the UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 
2016) suggests that on current carbon emission projections, the UK would not meet the 
fourth carbon budget (2023-2027) by 10% and the fifth carbon budget (2028-2032) by 
18%. The report concludes that today’s legal/regulatory demands are not enough as they 
at best would “deliver around half of the emissions reductions required by 2030” (CCC, 
2016, p.12). As a result, Keay (2016, p.247) concludes that “without the coordination 
and direction which could come from a centralised approach or the efficiencies and 
innovation which might emerge from a more consistent market based policy” the UK 
risks meeting every single aspect of the energy trilemma. 
While the emissions reduction targets have been met so far, its continued success will be 
largely dependent on driving further change through the cooperation of all actors involved 
in the UK’s low-carbon energy transition (Parkes and Spataru, 2017). This makes the UK 
national energy transition one of the best empirical examples for developing theory in and 
around the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks. Indeed, the 
UK’s transition towards a low-carbon energy supply system is difficult to achieve without 
getting the energy supply companies themselves onboard (Foxon, 2013). 
In the next section, I introduce the UK’s national energy network. 
4.5 The UK’s national energy network 
The UK’s national energy sector is dominated by six energy supply companies: British 
Gas, EDF, E.ON, RWE nPower, Scottish Power and SSE. Collectively, these energy 
companies are known as the ‘BIG-6’ and comprise the UK’s energy supply network. 
These six energy supply companies have a market share of approximately 85% of all 
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energy supply in the UK. The remaining 15% is split between smaller energy supply 
companies such as Co-operative Energy, First Utility, OVO, Utilita, Utility Warehouse 
and others (Ofgem, 2017). 
Energy supply companies are responsible for all stages from energy extraction to the 
delivery of electricity to consumers (IPCC, 2014). The process typically begins with the 
extraction of elementary inputs such as minerals, materials or land use (extraction stage). 
These inputs are then either processed into energy and fuel (processing stage), directly 
transported to power stations (transportation stage) or injected into electricity generation 
facilities (generation stage). Electricity is then generated by burning fossil fuels and 
natural gases, through nuclear reactions or through renewable energy sources. Once the 
electricity is generated, it is fed into the grid system that distributes the electricity across 
the country to the final consumer (distribution stage) (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017). 
By way of contextual information, in 2016, the UK’s electricity was generated from four 
key sources of energy: natural gas (43%), renewables (24%), nuclear (21%) and coal 
(9%). The remaining 3% is covered by oil and other minor sources (based on 2016 figures 
reported in BEIS, 2017). The recent policy decision to phase out coal as a source of energy 
has led to a reduction in electricity generated from coal of 59% relative to 2015 figures. 
Natural gas has picked up some of the gap in supply that has been left by using less coal. 
Electricity generated from natural gases increased by 43% relative to 2015 figures. Low-
carbon electricity generation (including renewables and nuclear) accounted for almost 
half of total electricity generation in 2016. A more detailed look at electricity generated 
from renewables (24% of total electricity generation) shows a substantial increase in 
electricity generated from Solar PV (+36%) while Wind (-14%) and Hydro (-15%) have 
supplied less electricity (BEIS, 2017). I have illustrated the UK electricity generation by 
of source of energy in Figure 10 below. 
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Figure 10: UK electricity generation by the source of energy (2016) (Based upon data from 
BEIS, 2017) 
This mix of energy sources is predominantly supplied by the six energy supply companies 
that dominate the UK’s energy supply sector. Interestingly, these energy supply 
companies aim at increasing revenues by selling the maximum amount of electricity at 
the lowest possible costs (UKERC, 2006). Indeed, the underlying business model 
disincentivises these companies from reducing their customers’ electricity consumption 
(Hannon et al., 2013). While this has been recognised by the UK government and policies 
have been implemented to incentivise companies to sell fewer units of electricity (e.g., 
the Energy Company Obligation), the emission reductions stemming from less demand 
for electricity alone may not suffice to meet the fourth and fifth carbon budgets as well 
as the commitments under the Paris Agreement. Doing so requires changes in current 
patterns of electricity generation and consumption. The question, however, is how UK 
energy supply companies respond to the contextual changes (socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic) emanating from climate change. In the next chapter, I 
introduce five cases of how companies do exactly this. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the context and industry-specific aspects necessary to 
comprehend the empirical cases. I started by describing why an imbalance between nature 
and society emerged, and how this brought about climatic changes. I then offered an 
outlined of the changes in the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures that 
occurred in response to climate change. Next, I explained the fundamental role of the 
global energy supply sector in responding to climate change. I closed this chapter by 
giving information about the UK national energy supply sector. 
In all, I hope that this chapter has highlighted the timely and relevant nature of studying 
how British energy supply companies respond to climate change. In the next chapter, I 





5 Empirical findings 
This chapter presents the empirical findings stemming from five in-depth case studies 
of business responses to climate change. The first case provides insights into an energy 
supply company’s efforts to respond to a regulation aimed at mitigating carbon 
emissions. In the second case, I describe how an energy supply company respond to 
climate change by decarbonising its gas-fired energy generation assets. The third case 
describes a multinational energy supply company’s efforts to establish itself as a 
renewables-only energy supply company. In the fourth case, I outline how an energy 
supply company responded to climate change by expanding its product portfolio with 
demand-side response technology. The fifth and final case refers to ways in which an 
energy supply company attempted to realign its business towards connected home 
technologies. 
Collectively, these five cases are some of the best empirical examples for developing a 
more comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to climate change and 
to develop theory in and around the interaction and behaviour in business relationships 
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and networks. In an attempt to show explicitly why these cases are such a good fit with 
the research objectives of this study, I have structured each case as follows: 
At the beginning of each case, I introduce the relevant actors and describe the contextual 
changes that triggered the company’s response to climate change. Next, I depict the key 
relationships as well as the interactions and behaviours within and across the business 
network affected by the focal company’s response to climate change. I then describe 
the outcomes stemming from the business attempt to respond to climate change. I close 
each case by providing a brief conclusion. 
For clarity, I provide a table containing the names and roles of all actors and their 
respective representatives involved in each case below (Table 8). In order to safeguard 












Case Actor Name Job title 
Case 1: Utiliko  Utiliko Rudy Chief Corporate Officer 
  Robert Managing Director for Offshore 
  Andrew Head of Business Development 
  Lucy Development Manager 
  Julia Energy Policy Manager 
 Exxelo UK Sheila Policy Manager 
Case 2: Olectra Olectra Brian Chief Executive Officer 
  Adam Head of Wholesale Policy 
  Simon Business Development Manager 
 PlentiOil Kevin Carbon Capture and Storage Manager 
  Anna Analyst 
 Planwey Omar Regional Director 
Case 3: Energize Energize Walter Chief Executive Officer 
  John Board of Directors 
  Ben Head of Orientation 
 MDfE Scott Head of Energy Security 
  Adam Analyst 
 Mygrid Emma Capacity Market Manager 
Case 4: Vonergy Vonergy Steven Chief Executive Officer 
 Xidoa Joe Chief Executive Officer 
  Luke Chief Commercial Officer 
 Morhaven Int. Richard Director of Facilities and Project Mgmt. 
 Pantegis Isaac Chief Operating Officer 
 MDfE Connor Head of Electricity Systems 
 Gryd Claire Director of UK System Operator 
  Claudia Spokeswoman 
Case 5: Connectica Connectica Hannah Chief Executive Officer 
  Alistair Managing Director 
  Grace Commercial Director 
  Tom Head of Environment 
 Ecovair Paul Founder 
  Charlotte Chief Executive Officer 
 Qubeta Michael Advisor 
 MDfE Gary Head of Regulation 
Table 8: List of actors, names and job titles 
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5.1 Case 1: Utiliko’s response to the Energy Company 
Obligation 
The first case examines the response of Utiliko, an energy supply company, to the 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO); a supplier obligation model that mandated the 
company to install energy efficiency measures in domestic households in order to 
reduce emissions. In an attempt to achieve this representatives of Utiliko engaged in 
interactions within and across the company’s business network. I concentrate on eight 
key actors within this business network: Utiliko, the energy company itself, the UK’s 
Ministerial Department for Energy (MDfE), the social housing association 
Thameswide, the administrative body of Brixwell Council, the insulation company 
Isotec, domestic energy Consumers as well as The Energy Bjird, an energy supply 
company directly competing with Utiliko, and the energy industry association Exxelo 
UK. 
5.1.1 Introduction to the network actors 
Utiliko is a British energy supply company and distribution network operator supplying 
electricity and gas to just over 5.2 million households and businesses across the UK. 
With 6,000 employees in England, Scotland and Wales, the company is one of the 
largest energy suppliers in the UK. Size notwithstanding, Utiliko represents an 
interesting research case because of its public commitment to reduce the company’s 
carbon footprint by 40% by 2030 and its aim to be carbon neutral by 2050: 
“We have set out a commitment to reduce our carbon footprint by 40% by 2030 and we aim to be 
carbon neutral by 2050.”  [Robert, Managing Director for Offshore Business, Utiliko] 
Interestingly, in its 2010 Annual Review of Corporate Social Responsibility, Utiliko 
stated total annual carbon emissions of 18.5 megatons; largely stemming from its fossil 
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fuel-dominated energy generation portfolio. In 2010 the company generated over 90% 
of its energy from fossil fuels (39.1% coal and 52.2% gas) and only 8% from 
renewables. In an effort to increase the share of renewables, in 2012 Utiliko planned to 
invest £7 billion until 2020 to become the leading developer of wind energy generation 
assets. Robert, Utiliko’s Managing Director for Offshore, was seemingly excited about 
the company’s drive towards renewables and decarbonisation: 
“For a utility that is a very big commitment because obviously, 25% of all carbon emissions come 
from the electricity sector.” [Robert, Managing Director for Offshore, Utiliko] 
At the same time, however, the MDfE altered the design of a regulation, namely the 
ECO scheme. While supplier obligation models, such as the ECO scheme, had been 
around for more than 20 years, the latest revamp of the scheme focused particularly on 
reducing the emissions of low-income households and harder-to-treat properties, i.e. 
dwellings in which it is most difficult to fit wall insulation. Through this, the MDfE 
aimed at addressing two of the department’s key performance indicators: mitigating 
energy-related emissions and addressing fuel poverty. 
By way of contextual information, the ECO scheme required all energy supply 
companies with more than 250,000 customers to install energy efficiency measures to 
collectively generate lifetime carbon emission savings of 28 megatons. Although 
energy supply companies had the freedom to choose their approach to installing the 
energy efficiency measures, the MDfE had designed the regulation in a way that it would 
stipulate a focus on solid wall insulation in vulnerable and harder-to-treat homes. This 
meant that in 2013 alone, Utiliko was required to insulate 100,000 solid walls. Solid 
wall insulation, however, is a very complex task that requires skilled insulation 
specialists. Furthermore, specifically targeting vulnerable households made it difficult 
to identify eligible households. While this increased the administrative costs associated 
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with fulfilling the ECO scheme requirements, non-compliance was no option for Utiliko 
as the MDfE threatened a fine of up to 10% of the company’s annual turnover; based on 
its 2012 revenue of £5.9 billion, this meant that Utiliko would have faced a fine of £590 
million. 
In the process of responding to the ECO scheme, Thameswide, Brixwell Council and 
Isotec played a crucial role. Thameswide is one of the UK’s oldest and largest social 
housing associations owning over 50,000 properties across London, Brixwell Council 
is an administrative body responsible for the strategic regional administration of London 
and Isotec is a leading British wall insulation specialist. Most pertinent to his study, 
however, is Thameswide’s and Brixwell Council’s knowledge about eligible households 
and Isotec’s expertise in solid wall insulation. 
Another important consideration for Utiliko were the consumers living in eligible 
households. Roughly 800,000 of Utiliko’s consumers were living in fuel poverty and 
the majority of these lived in properties with an energy efficiency rating of C or below; 
meaning that the fuel poor live in the most energy inefficient properties and face high 
running costs. Many such eligible households, however, made use of their right to reject 
Utiliko’s effort to implement energy efficiency measures in their houses because solid 
wall insulation was deemed to be too intrusive as it usually involves scaffolding and 
takes at least two weeks to complete. 
Furthermore, Utiliko’s competitor The Energy Bjird, a small energy supply company, 
played an important role. As a result of having less than 250,000 customers, The Energy 
Bjird was not obligated to comply with the ECO scheme and since it did not have to 
bear the costs of installing energy efficiency measures in vulnerable households. 
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Unsurprisingly, The Energy Bjird was able to offer its customers a 20% lower energy 
price than Utiliko’s average energy price. 
Lastly, the role of Exxelo UK, a British energy industry association, cannot be ignored. 
Exxelo UK held regular meetings with all of its 118 member companies in order to 
establish industry positions on the key energy regulations (such as the ECO). Exxelo 
UK’s close engagement with the MDfE allowed them to push back on aspects of energy 
regulations. 
Scrutinising the interactions within and across the network of actors that influenced 
Utiliko’s attempt to comply with the ECO scheme in a cost-effective way, enabled me 
to develop a holistic understanding of the issues I sought to engage with in terms of how 
companies respond to climate change. Indeed, it was clear that, for Utiliko, the business 
network was a key component to install the required quantity of energy efficiency 
measures in order to achieve the required reduction in carbon emissions. 
The remainder of this case focuses on this by outlining the contextual changes that 
triggered Utiliko’s response to climate change, by describing the interactions within and 
across the company’s business network and by reviewing the outcome stemming from 
Utiliko’s interactions in response to climate change. The case closes with a brief 
conclusion. 
5.1.2 Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme 
In 2012, largely as a result of the MDfE’s focus on low-income households and harder-
to-treat properties, Utiliko’s senior leadership team became more and more concerned 
about reaching its target of being carbon neutral by 2050. In fact, Utiliko’s Chief 
Corporate Officer Rudy instigated an emergency meeting to this discuss the “big 
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increase” [Rudy, Chief Corporate Officer, Utiliko] in costs associated with responding to the 
amended ECO scheme. Rudy said that the obligation’s focus on solid wall insulation 
was “a much more difficult, costly and time-consuming process” [Rudy, Chief Corporate Officer, 
Utiliko] and hence he was worried about the cost-effectiveness of installing the energy 
efficiency measures required to comply with the ECO scheme. 
One of the key reasons for the increased costs, so Utiliko’s Business Development 
Manager, Lucy, explained, was the lengthy process of identifying eligible households 
and convincing them to participate in the scheme: 
“When you have solid wall insulation installed in your house, then you always talk about scaffolding 
on the outside and workmen hanging around your house for two weeks. […] Engaging consumers to 
actually accept those two weeks’ work and that sort of inconvenience is difficult because your front 
garden, your back garden and the sides of your house will have scaffolding. […] When you are living 
in blocks of flats, then you have got scaffolding on them for weeks.” [Lucy, Business Development 
Manager, Utiliko] 
Furthermore, she found that the ECO scheme’s focus on low-income households meant 
that Utiliko had to fund a larger share of the costs associated with installing the energy 
efficiency measures: 
“The ECO has moved more and more towards the priority group customers. So, these customers that 
haven't the money to contribute, so we're having to fund up to a hundred per cent of these measures.” 
[Lucy, Development Manager, Utiliko] 
She concluded that this was not only hindering Utiliko from installing the required 
amount of energy efficiency measures but also leading to a decrease in carbon emission 
savings: 
“So, obviously it will mean that fewer measures are installed which ultimately means less carbon 
saved as the focus is going away from carbon more towards helping vulnerable people.” [Lucy, 
Development Manager, Utiliko] 
As a result of the discussion during this meeting, Chief Corporate Officer Rudy decided 
to take parts of the £7 billion capital set aside to establish Utiliko as a leading developer 
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of wind energy generation assets and instead double the spending on the ECO scheme 
to £134 million. This budget, as Rudy pointed out, was based on the MDfE’s estimation 
that it would cost energy supply companies £50 per household per year to respond to 
the ECO scheme. Rudy concluded that it was of utmost importance to implement the 
required energy efficiency measures in the most cost-effective way to stay within this 
budget. 
5.1.3 Interactions during Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme 
Utiliko’s attempt to implement energy efficiency measures was embedded in a network 
of business relationships with the actors introduced above. 




Figure 11: The network affected by Utiliko’s response to climate change
 137 
 
Throughout the two years of interactions within and across this business network, I 
focus on five key relationships held by Utiliko. Delineating the interactions in and 
around these relationships enables the development of a holistic understanding of how 
companies respond to climate change. 
5.1.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): Cost-effectively installing energy efficiency measures 
The first relationship that affected Utiliko’s response to climate change was with 
Thameswide, Brixwell Council and Isotec. For these three actors, the ECO scheme was 
a big opportunity. 
The social housing association, Thameswide, had recently announced its intention to 
put the most vulnerable people first by providing high-quality and affordable homes. 
What was interesting for Utiliko, however, was the fact that Thameswide had detailed 
information about 50,000 properties and knew the ones that were inhabited by 
consumers eligible for the ECO scheme. In return for sharing this knowledge on eligible 
households, Utiliko committed to getting as many of Thameswide’s properties as 
possible retrofitted with energy efficiency measures. 
Furthermore, Brixwell Council, responsible for the strategic regional administration of 
London,  perceived the ECO scheme as an opportunity to secure additional funding to 
meet its climate change and energy objectives. In fact, Brixwell Council and Utiliko 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding that obliged Utiliko to maximise the number 
of energy efficiency measures installed within the Brixwell Council area in exchange 
for the latter providing detailed information and access to 21% of all ECO qualifying 
households. Lucy, Utiliko’s Business Development Manager, was the driver behind this 
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agreement as she perceived that Utiliko could gain substantial cost-benefits from 
collaborating with Brixwell Council: 
“[Brixwell Council] obviously has knowledge of the properties and the areas that can help with 
planning measures such as solid wall insulation. It is also about their branding. It's good to have 
[Brixwell Council’s] support for the project as it gives consumers confidence.” [Lucy, Business 
Development Manager, Utiliko] 
Once Thameswide and Brixwell Council had helped Utiliko identify eligible 
households, the company’s Business Develop Manager Lucy tasked the British wall 
insulation specialist Isotec with installing solid wall insulation. Isotec had the 
manpower and technical expertise needed to install wall insulation at scale because the 
company had invested heavily in training their staff in anticipation of the large-scale 
delivery of solid wall insulation required to meet the ECO.  
5.1.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): The willingness of eligible households 
The role of consumers in shaping Utiliko’s effort to implement energy efficiency 
measures cost-effectively cannot be ignored. While Utiliko’s close engagement with 
Thameswide and Brixwell Council increased consumer confidence, getting eligible 
households to agree to have the energy efficiency measures installed remained a major 
challenge. Indeed, Utiliko’s Business Development Manager Lucy was devastated: 
“We can't make consumers do things to their homes. Even in social housing, the tenant has the right 
to say, 'I don't want those cooperies filled' despite [Thameswide] trying their best to have it done.” 
[Lucy, Business Development Manager, Utiliko] 
As a result, over the first six months of the ECO scheme and despite the cost-efficiencies 
stemming from working closely with Thameswide, Brixwell Council and Isotec, 
Utiliko’s costs in respect to installing energy efficiency measures added up to over £90 
per household per year. Utiliko’s Chief Corporate Officer Rudy was concerned since 
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this was 80% more than the MDfE’s estimate of £50 per household per year; the amount 
that would have allowed Utiliko’s to stay within its ECO budget of £134 million. 
Since the costs of responding to the ECO scheme had skyrocketed, Utiliko’s profits 
dropped by 7.3% by the end of 2012. As a result, and effective as of January 2013, Rudy 
had no choice but to increase energy prices by 8.8%. 
Andrew, Head of Business Development at Utiliko, criticised the way in which the ECO 
scheme was designed as it ultimately led to an increase in energy prices: 
“ECO has got to be affordable for consumers; that is the most critical point.” [Andrew, Head of 
Business Development, Utiliko] 
In fact, the increase in energy prices of 8.8% not only put more households into fuel 
poverty, but it also risked losing customers. 
5.1.3.3 Relationship 3 (R3): Competing for market share 
The increasing costs stemming from Utiliko’s obligation to install energy efficiency 
measures in low-income homes and harder-to-treat properties put the company at a 
competitive disadvantage in comparison to the small energy supply company The 
Energy Bjird. As a result of having less than 250,000 customers, The Energy Bjird was 
not required to oblige with the ECO scheme and hence was soon able to offer its 
customer’s energy prices approximately 20% below Utiliko’s average energy price. 
Although some consumers did not switch to The Energy Bjird due to lack of trust in 
smaller energy suppliers, Utiliko’s Chief Corporate Officer Rudy believed that the ECO 
scheme had put its company in an unfair position as it indirectly subsidised small energy 
supply companies. In early 2013, he concluded that this issue had to be brought to the 
attention of the MDfE. 
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5.1.3.4 Relationship 4 (R4): Establishing industry-wide consensus 
Utiliko interacted with Exxelo UK, a British energy industry association, to establish an 
industry-wide consensus about the challenges associated with responding to the ECO 
scheme. 
Engaging with Exxelo UK was within the remit of Julia, Utiliko’s Energy Policy 
Manager. She initiated a meeting with Sheila, the designated Policy Manager at Exxelo 
UK, to discuss the company’s position on the ECO scheme: 
“We work with [Exxelo UK] and then use that to try and establish industry positions on certain 
aspects of the legislation. We agree as much as we can in the industry, then those messages are going 
into government and to the regulator. It certainly helps when we have got all the same message!” 
[Julia, Energy Policy Manager, Utiliko] 
As a result, Exxelo UK’s Policy Manager Sheila organised a workshop to which she 
invited the Policy Managers of the six largest energy supply companies to further 
discuss the issues raised by Julia. In this meeting, Utiliko’s Business Development 
Manager Lucy said that they quickly reached consensus on the extensive administrative 
burden and costs related to responding to the ECO scheme: 
“I mean, one of the examples was, and this was for all suppliers, when they launched ECO, the policy 
has totally moved towards solid wall insulation and after six month when it was launched, you know, 
we all said it's going to be hard because the solid wall supply chain hasn't developed efficiently to 
deliver the number of solid wall measures that were required.” [Lucy, Business Development 
Manager, Utiliko] 
The demand of the Policy Managers of the six largest energy supply companies was 
clear: The MDfE had to scale back the ambition of the ECO scheme to allow energy 
supply companies to achieve their obligation through installing energy efficiency 
measures other than just solid wall insulation. 
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5.1.3.5 Relationship 5 (R5): Negotiating alterations to the ECO scheme 
The fifth and final relationship that affected Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme was 
with the MDfE. Between mid- and late-2013, Exxelo UK’s Policy Manager Sheila 
engaged with the MDfE in response to her request to revise the ECO scheme. Sheila felt 
that the discussions with the MDfE were constructive as they had a common interest in 
improving policies: 
“My experience with the [MDfE] has been that they are extremely open to talking to us and listening 
to our views and trying to improve the scheme.” [Sheila, Policy Manager, Exxelo UK] 
Sheila was also self-critical, however, and acknowledged that the current design of the 
ECO scheme was partially Exxelo UK’s fault as they were involved in the initial design: 
“One of the mistakes that we didn't want to make was having to change the policy retrospectively by 
making sure that everything is developed early, but now we have failed.” [Sheila, Policy Manager, 
Exxelo UK] 
While Utiliko appreciated Exxelo UK’s engagement, the magnitude of the issue also led 
Julia, Energy Policy Manager at Utiliko, to engage directly with a representative of the 
MDfE: 
“In the case of ECO, there are so many aspects of how much that costs us and what the cost to the 
consumer is. It is not just about delivering it but the costs have to be low otherwise the government 
will not favour that option. You know, it has to be affordable for consumers because they are 
dependent on the electricity.” [Julia, Energy Policy Manager, Utiliko] 
During six months of extensive negotiations, Julia repeatedly emphasised the high costs 
of delivering the ECO scheme and the burden that higher bills put on the consumers of 
energy. In support of her argument, she provided evidence for why the scheme was not 
working in terms of installing energy efficiency measures cost-effectively. In doing so, 
she highlighted that, despite collaborating with Thameswide, Brixwell Council and 




In late 2013, the MDfE announced an alteration to the initial design of the ECO scheme. 
The concerns over the ECO’s impact on consumer bills had caused the MDfE to revise 
down the carbon emission saving targets by 25% while also broadening its scope to 
include less expensive energy efficiency measures. These changes were effective as of 
January 2014. 
5.1.4 The outcome of Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme 
So far, this case has outlined the five key relationships relevant to Utiliko’s response to 
the ECO scheme. This section now describes the outcome stemming from two years of 
interactions in and around these relationships. 
In the months following the alteration of the ECO scheme, Utiliko’s costs of responding 
to the ECO scheme fell by 50%. As a result, Utiliko’s Chief Corporate Officer Rudy 
decided to pass on these savings and lower energy prices by 3.3% as well as granting 
its customers a £12 rebate. At the same time, Rudy advocated Utiliko’s strong progress 
towards meeting the targets set under the new ECO design. 
Insulation company Isotec and low-income consumers, however, were continued to be 
disadvantaged as an outcome of Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme. Isotec had 
invested in training their staff to deliver large-scale wall insulation measures. Since 
solid wall insulation targets were revised down from 100,000 to just over 20,000 per 
year, Isotec had no choice but to lay off half of its workforce at short notice. 
Households living in fuel poverty also suffered from the amendments of the ECO 
scheme that were the outcome of Utiliko’s activities. While the ECO scheme has helped 
to mitigate the energy bills of the fuel poor that actually had the solid wall insulation 
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measures done, the vast majority were now facing higher bills than before the ECO 
scheme was set up in 2012. 
Furthermore, Utiliko’s response to the ECO scheme led to a drop in the ECO scheme’s 
ambition to improve the energy efficiency of homes and hence to save carbon 
emissions. As part of the changes to the ECO scheme, the carbon emission saving 
targets were revised down by 25%. 
5.1.5 Conclusion 
This case examined an energy supply company’s response to the ECO scheme; an 
legal/regulatory pressure emanating from climate change. I scrutinised Utiliko’s 
interactions in and around implementing energy efficiency measures in domestic 
households as required under the ECO scheme. I concentrated on the five key 
relationships as well as the interactions and behaviours within and across the business 
network affected by Utiliko’s response to climate change. This included Utiliko itself, 
the UK’s Ministerial Department for Energy (MDfE), the social housing association 
Thameswide, the administrative body of Brixwell Council, the insulation company 
Isotec, domestic energy consumers as well as The Energy Bjird, an energy supply 
company directly competing with Utiliko, and the energy industry association Exxelo 
UK.  
The purpose of this case was to develop a holistic understanding of how the case 
company Utiliko responded to the legal/regulatory pressures emanating from global 
climatic changes. Hereby, this case links well to the second case which scrutinises how 
an energy supply company responded to climate change by decarbonising one of its 
fossil fuel energy generation assets.
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5.2 Case 2: Olectra’s efforts to decarbonise a gas-fired power 
plant 
The second case examines the interactions when the energy supply company Olectra 
decided to decarbonise its gas-fired power plant in response to climate change. To 
achieve this, representatives of Olectra engaged in interactions within and across the 
company’s business network in order to retrofit a gas-fired power plant with Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology. I concentrate on nine key actors within 
Olectra’s business network: Olectra, the energy supply company itself, the 
multinational oil and gas company PlentiOil, the UK’s Ministerial Department for 
Energy (MDfE), three energy services companies called Projexon, Advantegis and 
Planwey, the local authority Ablefield Council as well as the Henley CCS technology 
test centre and the UK government department of House Windsor. 
5.2.1 Introduction to the network actors 
Olectra is a British energy company supplying electricity and gas to 7.7 million 
households and businesses in the UK and Ireland. With over 20,000 employees, the 
company is considered to be one of the BIG 6 companies that dominate the UK energy 
supply sector. Size notwithstanding, Olectra itself represents an interesting research 
case because of its public commitment to drive the UK’s low-carbon energy transition. 
In fact, in its 2012 Annual Report, Olectra stated the stringent target of reducing the 
carbon intensity of its energy generation assets by 50% by 2050. At the time, Olectra 
already perceived itself as “a big investor in renewables” [Adam, Head of Wholesale Policy, 
Olectra]. Indeed, with 3.3 GW (equivalent to 14% of the company’s total energy 




Most pertinent to this study, however, is the simultaneous operation of several fossil 
fuel-based power plants in England and Scotland. Interestingly, in 2012 coal- and gas-
fired power plants accounted for 84% of Olectra’s total energy generation (35% coal 
and 49% gas). This not only resulted in annual carbon emissions of 25.3 megatons but 
also put the company’s target to reduce its carbon intensity in jeopardy. 
PlentiOil is a multinational oil and gas company and a leading player in North Sea 
exploration. The company produces 10% of the UK’s total annual oil and gas yields and 
operates gas transmission pipelines as well as terminals that ensure the delivery of 20% 
of the UK’s annual gas supply. Notwithstanding this, and important for this study, is 
the fact that PlentiOil had made the development of CCS technology the company’s 
strategic priority in 2010. Within two years, the company had developed its very own 
CCS technology and was able to demonstrate its technical viability by successfully 
retrofitting coal-fired power plants in Australia and Canada. 
By way of contextual information, CCS technology allows the capture and deep 
underground storage of carbon emissions from power stations and industrial plants. In 
the UK, CCS plays an important role because it enables the decarbonisation of gas-fired 
generation assets which is likely to continue to be the backbone of the UK’s energy mix. 
The United Nations IPCC and the UK’s Committee on Climate Change both classify 
CCS as: 
“Very important for reducing emissions across the economy and could almost half the cost of meeting 
the 2050 target in the UK’s Climate Change Act.” [Report, UK Committee on Climate Change] 
Indeed, an analysis published by the UK’s Energy Technologies Institute suggests that, 
without CCS technology, the costs of meeting the UK’s commitments under the Climate 
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Change Act would be £32 billion higher. The United Nations IPCC added that a global 
CCS technology industry is required to reach net-zero carbon emissions globally. 
In addition to PlentiOil, the interactions with the MDfE, a British ministerial department 
responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate, secure, affordable and 
environmentally friendly energy, were an important consideration for Olectra. 
Particularly because the MDfE was keen on encouraging private companies to develop 
carbon reduction technologies (such as CCS). 
As a result, in April 2012, the MDfE announced a so-called CCS commercialisation 
competition. The rules were simple: The private company that was able to demonstrate 
the commercial and technical viability of deploying CCS technology in the UK would 
be awarded up to £1 billion to support the actual construction of the project. This 
represented a relatively low amount compared to MDfE’s estimation that a new and 
world-leading British CCS industry could contribute to cutting the costs of meeting the 
UK’s commitments under the 2008 Climate Change Act by over £32 billion and at the 
same time add £6.5 billion annually to the UK’s gross domestic product. 
The three energy services companies Projexon, Advantegis and Planwey played a 
crucial role in the process of demonstrating the commercial and technical viability of 
retrofitting Olectra’s gas-fired power plant Yankee with CCS technology. Projexon is a 
French project support company and oil and gas infrastructure specialist, Advantegis is 
a British consulting company with expertise in the energy sector and Planwey is a 
British energy service company specialised in subsea and pipeline engineering work. 
Olectra tasked these three companies with the important role of completing the Front-
End Engineering Design (FEED) phase of the Yankee CCS project. In fact, the quality 
and outcome of Projexon’s, Advantegis’ and Planwey’s engineering work during the 
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FEED phase would ultimately decide Olectra’s chances of securing parts of the £1 
billion CCS commercialisation fund. 
Besides the completion of the engineering work during the FEED phase, Olectra 
required planning permissions from Ablefield Council; the local authority in which the 
Yankee power station was situated. This was an important consideration for Olectra 
because if Ablefield Council deemed that the project would have negative impacts on 
the municipal district and its citizens, then it had the authority to block Olectra’s attempt 
to retrofit its Yankee gas-fired power plant with CCS technology by not granting a 
planning permission. 
Furthermore, Olectra interacted with the world’s largest test centre for CCS 
technologies, the Henley Centre. The Henley Centre, located in a remote town in 
Norway, provided two post-combustion flue gas turbines required for testing, verifying 
and ultimately demonstrating the technical viability of Olectra’s CCS project. 
Lastly, the role of House Windsor, a British governmental department responsible for 
the UK’s public finance and economic policy, cannot be ignored. Jointly with the MDfE, 
it was in the remit of House Windsor to make a final investment decision and award the 
winner(s) of the CCS commercialisation competition. 
Scrutinising the interactions within and across the network of actors that were affected 
by Olectra’s efforts to decarbonise its gas-fired power plant in response to climate 
change, enabled me to develop a holistic understanding of the issues I sought to engage 
with, in terms of answering how companies respond to climate change. In fact, it was 
evident that for Olectra, the business network was a key component in achieving the 
company’s response to climate change. 
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The remainder of this case focuses on this by outlining the contextual changes that 
triggered Olectra’s response to climate change, by describing the interactions within 
and across the company’s business network and by reviewing the outcome stemming 
from Olectra’s response to climate change. The case closes with a brief conclusion. 
5.2.2 Olectra’s response to climate change 
In the quest for potential solutions to meet the company’s stringent carbon intensity 
reduction target of 50% by 2050, Olectra’s CEO Brian had long recognised the potential 
of CCS technology: 
“If our long-term targets for reducing emissions are to be met, CCS technology must be applied as 
widely as possible.” [Brian, CEO, Olectra] 
Nonetheless, CEO Brian was, up until now, hesitant to invest in retrofitting Olectra’s 
fossil fuel-based energy generation capacity with CCS technology. This was largely 
because of the disproportionate costs and lack of short-term commercial viability of 
doing so. In fact, just like any other project, efforts to respond to climate change had to 
be “fundamentally a commercial opportunity” [Simon, Business Development Manager, Olectra].  
Simon continued by explaining that the lead time and risk associated with carbon 
reduction projects, as well as not being able to spend the money on other projects 
(opportunity costs) led to the requirement of high rates of return: 
“We actually require quite high rates of return, because the project is quite risky and you have to 
expect lead times from those projects and all that, so, you know compared with other projects. So, 
yeah absolutely, if there is stuff that I want to do in terms of projects, then it has to achieve a certain 
rate of return, if it doesn't, then it won't be signed off.” [Simon, Business Development Manager, 
Olectra] 
With the recently announced CCS commercialisation competition, however, CEO Brian 
perceived that retrofitting one of the company’s gas-fired power plants could actually 
turn into a huge commercial opportunity. He, therefore, initiated a comprehensive 
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assessment of the company’s gas-fired generation assets to decide which plant might be 
particularly well-positioned for being retrofitted with CCS technology. 
Olectra’s gas-fired power plant Yankee soon came into the spotlight. Open since 1980, 
the Yankee gas-fired power station had played an important role in ensuring a reliable 
supply of gas for decades and would, at least CEO Brian hoped, continue to be an 
important earning’s driver for Olectra. While the Yankee gas-fired power plant was a 
profitable asset, with one megaton of carbon emissions it contributed to Olectra’s total 
annual carbon emissions. Operating the Yankee gas-fired power plant, therefore, stood 
in contradiction with Olectra’s aim to reduce its carbon intensity. 
On further analysis of the strategic options for its Yankee gas-fired power plant, CEO 
Brian recognised that 1) a significant proportion of the necessary infrastructure to 
transmit the carbon emitted at Yankee was already in place, 2) its location was in close 
proximity to offshore gas pipelines, and 3) a depleted gas reservoir was only 100 miles 
off the coast. 
Simon, Olectra’s Business Development Manager, pointed out however that the 
company lacked the technological expertise to retrofit its gas-fired power plant Yankee 
by itself and denied being anything but an energy supply company: 
“We’re not a technology manufacturer, we’re a utility so you know we rely on others to produce 
things like technology and innovate.” [Simon, Business Development Manager, Olectra] 
CEO Brian and his business development team, led by Simon, concluded that reducing 
the emissions stemming from its Yankee power plant was only possible through a 
partnership with a CCS technology provider. Indeed, Simon said that, just like the UK’s 
low-carbon energy transition as a whole, “it would be crazy to think that one company could do 
this on their own.” [Simon, Business Development Manager, Olectra]. 
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This triggered Olectra’s decision to collaborate with PlentiOil as a strategic partner to 
retrofit its Yankee gas-fired power plant with CCS technology. If successful both 
Olectra and PlentiOil would not only be able to capture ten megatons of carbon 
emissions over ten years but also gain reputational benefits from developing the world’s 
first large-scale gas-CCS project. 
5.2.3 Interactions during Olectra’s response to climate change 
Olectra’s attempt to retrofit its gas-fired power plant with CCS technology was 
embedded in a network of business relationships with the actors introduced above. 




Figure 12: The network affected by Olectra's response to climate change
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Throughout the three years of interactions within and across this business network, I 
focus on the five key relationships held by Olectra. Delineating the interactions in and 
around these relationships enables a holistic understanding of how companies respond 
to climate change. 
5.2.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): Collaborating with PlentiOil to develop CCS project 
The first relationship that affected Olectra’s attempt to retrofit its Yankee gas-fired 
power plant with CCS technology was with PlentiOil. PlentiOil had developed a CCS 
technology that allowed the mitigation of the carbon emissions stemming from coal-
fired power plants. In theory, making a few minor adjustments to the CCS technology 
for coal-fired power plants would also allow the technology to be used to capture the 
emissions of gas-fired power plants. In practice, however, the technical viability had 
still to be proven as PlentiOil had not yet retrofitted its CCS technology to a gas-fired 
power plant. 
Within PlentiOil, it was the company’s Carbon Capture and Storage Manager, Kevin, 
who was the key figure in respect to Olectra’s interest in retrofitting the Yankee gas-
fired power plant with PlentiOil’s CCS technology. Kevin was particularly excited 
about what he perceived as a major commercial opportunity: 
“A successful scheme at [Yankee] could pave the way for massive investment in carbon capture and 
storage in the UK [and] with thousands of gas-fired power plants around the world, there could be a 
huge demand for the technology overseas.” [Kevin, Carbon Capture and Storage Manager, PlentiOil] 
Following lengthy contract negotiations that precisely defined the remits and legal 
obligations of both companies, Olectra and PlentiOil agreed on terms to build: 
“The first commercial-scale application of CCS technology at a gas-fired power station anywhere in 
the world by capturing up to one million tons of CO2 annually.” [Annual Report, Olectra] 
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The contract stated that Olectra was responsible for making modifications to its Yankee 
gas-fired power plant so that it could be retrofitted with PlentiOil’s CCS technology. 
PlentiOil, on the other hand, was tasked with making adjustments to its CCS technology 
so that it could capture the carbon emissions stemming from gas-fired power plants and 
ensure that these emissions could be transported and safely stored. PlentiOil’s Carbon 
Capture and Storage Manager, Kevin, described that this required installing a 20 miles 
long transmission pipeline connecting the Yankee gas-fired power plant with an existing 
offshore pipeline between a gas terminal and one of PlentiOil’s depleted gas reservoirs 
in the North Sea. Moreover, Kevin said that PlentiOil had to install a new compression 
unit to push the carbon through the transmission pipelines. 
Although the Yankee gas-fired power plant was located in close proximity to PlentiOil’s 
depleted gas reservoir and a large proportion of the necessary transmission 
infrastructure was already in place, Kevin, as well as his counterpart, Olectra’s Business 
Development Manager, Simon, soon raised concerns over skyrocketing costs. Simon 
named three key reasons: 1) This kind of project bear higher risks for investors and 
hence requires a higher return on investment, 2) It was expensive to build new transport 
and storage infrastructure, and 3) PlentiOil’s CCS technology was built using costly 
equipment. Olectra’s CEO Brian concluded that it was only through government 
support that the costs of retrofitting gas-fired power plants with CCS technology could 
be lowered from the estimated of £170 per megawatt-hour (MWh) to more acceptable 
levels of £100 per MWh. 
Olectra’s Head of Wholesale Policy, Adam, however, raised concerns over relying 
heavily on government policies to allow progress with the project: 
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“One of the big concerns is, for investors and definitely for companies like mine, is the degree to 
which we make a commitment to maintain the policy that is in place. And what we actually see in the 
past years is a lot of flip-flopping from the government where they make an initial commitment on 
one hand and then suddenly things change.” [Adam, Head of Wholesale Policy, Olectra] 
Nevertheless, CEO Brian and Simon’s business development team, jointly with 
PlentiOil, participated in the CCS commercialisation competition by submitting a 
proposal to retrofit the Yankee gas-fired power plant with CCS technology. 
In late 2013, the MDfE announced that Olectra and PlentiOil were one of the two 
preferred bidders in the CCS commercialisation competition. Representatives of the 
MDfE decided to invest £100 million of the £1 billion competition budget to take these 
two projects forward and award contracts to support FEED studies over a period of 18 
months. The MDfE awarded Olectra and PlentiOil with a contract guaranteeing 
payments of £28 million. 
This, so Olectra’s CEO Brian estimated, would cover approximately 75% of the costs 
associated with the detailed engineering work during the FEED phase. PlentiOil’s 
Carbon Capture and Storage Manager Kevin was seemingly excited when he described 
moving ahead towards the FEED phase as a “hugely important step” [Kevin, Carbon Capture 
and Storage Manager, PlentiOil] that would allow accelerating the progress of retrofitting 
the Yankee gas-fired power plant with CCS technology. 
5.2.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): Contracting the engineering work during the Front-
End Engineering Design (FEED) phase of the CCS project 
Olectra and PlentiOil appointed the three energy services companies, Projexon, 
Advantegis and Planwey, to deliver the engineering work during the FEED phase of the 
Yankee CCS project. In March 2014, Projexon was tasked with making modifications 
to the gas turbine at the Yankee power plant, as well as with establishing a new 
 155 
 
compression unit to push the carbon through the transmission pipelines. Advantegis was 
responsible for project management, organisation and coordination across the various 
engineering disciplines and project roles required to complete the FEED phase. Planwey 
used its experience of “30 years of subsea infrastructure design” [Omar, Regional Director, 
Planwey] to design the carbon transmission pipeline connecting the Yankee gas-fired 
power plant with an existing offshore pipeline between a gas terminal and a depleted 
gas reservoir in the North Sea. Most pertinent to this study, however, is the fact that 
within one year all three energy services companies delivered their assigned task within 
the given timeframe and budget. 
5.2.3.3 Relationship 3 (R3): Obtaining planning permission from Ablefield 
Council 
In addition to the completion of the engineering work during the FEED phase, Olectra’s 
Business Development Manager, Simon, and PlentiOil’s Carbon Capture and Storage 
Manager, Kevin, met with representatives of Ablefield Council. This was a crucial step 
in the Yankee CCS project because Ablefield Council had the authority to withhold a 
planning permission if they perceived that the project would harm the municipal district 
and its citizens. Ablefield Council, however, was hoping that both the construction 
work, as well as the guaranteed operation of the power station for at least another decade 
would create the desperately needed jobs for the local community. In fact, at the time 
Ablefield Council had an unemployment rate of 8.6%; significantly above the UK 
average of 5.5%. Unsurprisingly, Olectra’s and PlentiOil’s planning application was 
approved in June 2015. 
5.2.3.4 Relationship 4 (R4): Testing the CCS technology at the Henley Centre 
The final stage before the full-scale operation was to demonstrate the technical viability 
of the Yankee CCS project. To achieve this, the world’s largest test centre for CCS 
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technologies, the Henley Centre, independently tested and officially verified PlentiOil’s 
CCS technology. The testing and verification process involved retrofitting the 
technology to two post-combustion flue gas turbines. After a month of in-depth testing, 
the Henley Centre suggested minor areas of improvement but overall confirmed the 
technology’s readiness for full-scale operation. 
After 18 months of hard work during the FEED phase, both Simon and Kevin concluded 
that everything was in place and stated explicitly that there were no technical barriers 
to retrofitting the Yankee gas-fired power plant with PlentiOil’s CCS technology. 
The final go-ahead for construction, however, depended on a positive outcome of the 
CCS commercialisation competition. As highlighted earlier in this case, Simon and 
Kevin had concerns over the high upfront costs required actually to build the project. 
The senior leadership team of both Olectra and PlentiOil, therefore, made clear that 
they were reluctant to commit to the project until the MDfE committed to guaranteeing 
parts of the proposed £1 billion of funding. PlentiOil’s Carbon Capture and Storage 
Manager Kevin summarised: 
“The process is such that we will take a decision on the potential project around the end of 2015, and 
then the government will take theirs – the timing is in their hands.” [Kevin, Carbon Capture and 
Storage Manager, PlentiOil] 
5.2.3.5 Relationship 5 (R5): The MDfE’s cancellation of the CCS 
commercialisation competition 
The fifth and final relationship that affected Olectra’s attempt to retrofit its Yankee gas-
fired power plant with PlentiOil’s CCS technology was with the MDfE and House 
Windsor. As outlined in the introduction to this case, House Windsor, jointly with the 
MDfE, had the authority to make the final investment decision and award the winner(s) 
of the £1 billion CCS commercialisation competition. 
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On 25th November 2015, however, the MDfE announced that the £1 billion budget for 
the CCS commercialisation competition was no longer available and that therefore the 
competition was cancelled. This decision was preceded by a disagreement between the 
MDfE and House Windsor. In fact, it became clear that a disagreement about the long-
term costs of the CCS commercialisation competition led to the eventual cancellation. 
Interestingly, when setting up the competition in 2012, the MDfE and House Windsor 
did not agree on the total financial support available. At the time, the MDfE estimated 
that the competition would cost a maximum of £6 billion over 15 years. In its 2015 
spending review, however, House Windsor found that this figure had risen to £8.9 
billion. House Windsor concluded that the cost for consumers would be too high, that 
the competition was intrinsically aimed at delivering CCS before it was cost-efficient 
to do so and that the competition would not guarantee the additional investments 
required to establish a world-leading British CCS industry. The potential cost savings 
of over £32 billion in meeting the UK’s commitments under the 2008 Climate Change 
Act and the additional £6.5 billion annually to the UK’s gross domestic product was not 
mentioned by the MDfE nor House Windsor. 
5.2.4 The outcome of Olectra’s response to climate change 
So far, this case has outlined the five key relationships in relation to Olectra’s efforts to 
decarbonise its gas-fired power plant Yankee. This section now describes the outcome 
stemming from three years of interactions in and around these relationships. 
Following the MDfE’s cancellation of the CCS commercialisation competition, Olectra 
and PlentiOil were devastated. After three years of hard work the Yankee CCS project 
was dead and could not proceed. Olectra’s Business Development Manager Simon 
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explained that the key problem was the high upfront capital required to build the project 
without having any guarantee about the future benefits: 
“I think the problem we have at the moment is that we are trying to pretend that we can finance the 
expensive demonstration phase by some promise of jam tomorrow and the golden megawatt hour that 
is suddenly going to shower great wealth upon whoever actually gets there, but as with CCS that just 
doesn’t work, we need to find a way of providing the upfront capital support to make that work.” 
[Simon, Business Development Manager, Olectra] 
Simon held the MDfE responsible as for lacking the “sense of urgency that is required” 
[Simon, Business Development Manager, Olectra] to meet the UK’s decarbonisation challenge.  
Upon further reflection, Olectra’s Head of Wholesale Policy Adam concluded that it 
ultimately came down to consumers who do not seem to be willing to bear some of the 
costs associated with transitioning towards a decarbonised energy system: 
“One other point would be the way in which the energy sector communicates with the public and 
draws people along with you in terms of what needs to be done to address climate change. While a 
lot of people now are definitely aware of climate change in such a way that they understand that 
particularly in the energy sector we are in a transition and there are costs associated with 
transitioning into a decarbonised system.” [Adam, Head of Wholesale Policy, Olectra] 
PlentiOil, although acknowledged the difficulty of MDfE’s decision in light of House 
Windsor’s spending review, PlentiOil simultaneously shared their disappointment via a 
statement on the company’s website: 
“[PlentiOil] is disappointed at the withdrawal of funding for the CCS Commercialisation 
Competition, in which our [Yankee] CCS project was one of the final contenders. We have worked 
tirelessly over the last two years to progress our plans for this project. It has the potential to bring 
huge value to the UK, both in terms of immediate emissions reductions and developing knowledge for 
the benefit of a wider industry.” [Statement on the company website, PlentiOil] 
In an emergency meeting preceding these statements, Olectra’s CEO, Brian, and his 
Business Development Manager, Simon, met with PlentiOil’s Carbon Capture and 
Storage Manager, Kevin. It was their final attempt to somehow rack up the upfront 
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capital required to move on to the construction stage. None of the companies, however, 
were willing to bear the financial risks stemming from doing so: 
“The high cost of developing innovative, first-of-a-kind projects like [Yankee] CCS, need strong 
governmental support – as illustrated by the gradual development of other energy technologies in the 
past –. In the absence of the Competition and potential funding, we reluctantly concluded that there 
is no longer a future for the [Yankee] project in the near term.” [Joint statement by Olectra and 
PlentiOil]  
As a result, Olectra, just like before the decision to retrofit its Yankee gas-fired power 
plant with CCS technology, continued to emit carbon emissions through the operation 
of their fossil fuel-fired power plant Yankee. In fact, Olectra’s CEO Brian decided to 
operate the Yankee gas-fired power plant without capturing its carbon emissions. 
Therefore, continuing to causing one megaton of the company’s carbon emissions 
annually. 
In addition, Olectra’s attempt to demonstrate that gas-fired power plants can be 
retrofitted with CCS technology in a commercially solid way may have slowed down 
the development of the CCS industry in the UK; an industry needed to meet the UK’s 
2008 Climate Change Act commitments in the most cost-effective way. Hence, the 
outcome stemming from Olectra’s may have wider negative impacts on the future 
development of CCS as a potential solution in response to climate change. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
This case examined an energy supply company’s efforts to decarbonise its gas-fired 
power plant in response to climate change. I scrutinised Olectra’s interactions in and 
around retrofitting its gas-fired power plant Yankee with CCS technology. I 
concentrated on the five key relationships in Olectra’s business network. This included 
Olectra itself, the multinational oil and gas company PlentiOil, the MDfE, three energy 
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services companies (Projexon, Advantegis and Planwey), the local authority Ablefield 
Council as well as a CCS technology test centre called Henley and UK government 
department of House Windsor. The purpose of this case was to develop a holistic 
understanding of how the case company Olectra responded to climate change. This case 
links well to the third case which scrutinises how an energy supply company attempted 
to establish itself as a renewables-only energy supply company.
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5.3 Case 3: Energize’s efforts to establish itself as a 
renewables-only energy supply company 
The third case examines the interactions when the large energy supply company 
Energize decided to restructure its energy generation portfolio in response to climate 
change. To do so, representatives of Energize engaged in interactions within and across 
the company’s business network in order to establish the company as a supplier of 100% 
renewable energy. Within Energize’s business network, I concentrate on six key actors: 
Energize, the energy supply company itself, the UK’s Ministerial Department for 
Energy (MDfE), the British multinational energy distribution and transmission company 
Mygrid, both domestic and industrial consumers, AMP, an energy supply company 
directly competing with Energize, as well as the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS). 
5.3.1 Introduction to the network actors 
Energize is a multinational energy company supplying electricity, gas and heating to 
6.9 million British households. With over 50,000 employees, the company is one of the 
largest energy suppliers in Europe. Size notwithstanding, Energize represents an 
interesting research case because of its substantial carbon emissions, exposing the 
company to climate change. Indeed, in its 2014 Sustainability Report, Energize stated 
that in the preceding twelve months the company’s energy generation had caused 95.7 
megatons of carbon emissions globally, of which approximately 42 megatons were 
attributable to its UK operation. At the time, Energize’s energy generation portfolio in 
the UK was dominated by fossil fuels (46.7% coal and 27.1% gas). Renewables (hydro, 
solar and wind) accounted for 12.0%. 
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Interestingly, Energize publicly acknowledged the key role it has to play in addressing 
climate change globally and, particularly, in mitigating its carbon emissions in the UK. 
To achieve this, Energize’s CEO, Walter, had set the target of establishing the company 
as a renewables-only energy supply company. 
The MDfE, as the ministerial department responsible for ensuring that the UK is 
supplied with sufficient, low-carbon and affordable energy, advocated international 
climate change action and set up a regulatory framework to facilitate a reduction in the 
UK’s carbon emissions by at least 80% by 2050. As a result, the MDfE launched a tax 
on carbon and designed the Renewables Obligation. Through this, the MDfE aimed at 
encouraging energy supply companies to increase the proportion of renewables as part 
of their overall energy generation portfolio to 24.4% by 2015, 29.0% by 2016 and 
34.8% by 2017. Energy supply companies who do not meet these targets were legally 
obliged to pay a compensation fee of up to £45 per MWh. Energize, falling short of the 
2015 target by 12.4% (and even more in the years thereafter), was pressured by this 
multimillion-pound fine. 
In addition to the MDfE, the interactions with the multinational energy distribution and 
transmission company Mygrid were an important consideration for Energize. Mygrid is 
one of Europe’s largest owners and operators of electricity and gas distribution and 
transmission networks. This includes more than 11,000 miles of long voltage electrical 
grid. Most pertinent to this study, however, is the company’s responsibility to keep the 
balance between supply and demand within the grid. In other words, to ensure that the 
supply of energy to the grid never falls below the demand of British energy consumers. 
To do so, Mygrid typically kept a so-called capacity reserve margin of at least 10%, 
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thereby, avoiding large-scale energy blackouts like the 2003 London blackout which 
left over 500,000 people without power for up to two hours. 
The role of energy consumers, whether they be domestic or industrial, cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, after energy bills increased by 55% between 2002 and 2012, Energize’s 
6.9 million customers demanded lower energy bills. Consumers had become 
increasingly price-sensitive and frequently used energy price comparison and supplier 
switching services. This required Energize’s attention because higher energy prices 
would be unavoidable in case the company had to pay a multimillion-pound fine for 
missing the targets set under the strengthened environmental regulation set up by the 
MDfE. These concerns indicate the price competition that was occurring within the UK 
energy supply sector. 
AMP is a multinational energy supply company directly competing with Energize. In 
2014, AMP supplied electricity, gas and heating to 4.3 million customers in the UK. 
AMP’s energy generation portfolio (31% coal, 50% gas and 15% renewables) was 
similarly exposed to the vagaries of MDfE’s increase in environmental regulation. 
Interestingly, AMP had recently announced plans to develop three large-scale wind 
parks in the UK. This additional source of renewable energy generation would allow 
AMP to meet the Renewables Obligation while continuing to benefit from the low-cost 
utilisation of its existing fossil fuel generation capacity. 
A final important consideration for Energize was the emission trading scheme, EU ETS. 
Under the EU ETS, Energize was allocated emission allowances (EUAs). Each EUA 
permitted Energize to emit one ton of carbon. Emissions in excess of this allowance 
were to be purchased through the EU ETS market. In July 2008 the spot price of one 
EUA was around €30 and was forecasted to reach €100 by 2020. As Energize usually 
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exceeded its EUAs, the EU ETS further threatened to increase the costs of the 
company’s carbon-intensive generation portfolio. 
Scrutinising the interactions within and across the network of actors that influenced 
Energize’s attempt to restructure the company in response to climate change, enabled 
me to develop a holistic understanding of the issues I sought to engage with, in terms 
of answering how companies respond to climate change. Indeed, it was clear that, for 
Energize, the business network was a key component to achieve the company’s 
response to climate change, namely establishing itself as a renewables-only energy 
supply company. 
The remainder of this case focuses on this by outlining what triggered Energize’s 
response to climate change, by describing the interactions within and across the 
company’s business network and by reviewing how the outcomes stemming from 
Energize’s response to climate change. The case closes with a brief conclusion. 
5.3.2 Energize’s response to climate change 
With the emergence of climate change on the international political agenda, the 
translation into UK national legislation through the Climate Change Act in 2008 and 
the subsequent strengthening of environmental regulation (Carbon tax and Renewables 
Obligation), Energize became more and more exposed to these legal/regulatory 
pressures that were likely to increase the costs of operating a carbon-intensive energy 
generation portfolio. At the same time, by mid-2014, Energize’s share price had plunged 
to a 20-year low. Under pressure from the company’s shareholders, Energize’s Board 
of Directors summoned CEO, Walter, for an emergency meeting. 
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Walter and the Board of Directors interpreted hitting a 20-year low share price as a 
‘wakeup call’. Indeed, during the meeting, all participants agreed that it was now or 
never to question Energize’s current business activities and finally take the way in 
which climate change has altered the regulatory environment seriously. Walter was 
keen on restructuring Energize to enable meeting the present and future requirements 
of the energy market; or what he called, “The new energy world.” [Walter, Chief Executive 
Officer, Energize]. 
In the same meeting, the Board of Directors tasked Walter to work closely with Ben, 
Energize’s Head of Orientation, to conduct: 
“A comprehensive analysis of the current business activities and structure, the present and future 
requirements of the energy market and – on this basis – an extensive assessment of all options for 
strategic actions.” [John, Board of Directors, Energize] 
Exactly one month later, Walter and Ben presented their findings to Energize’s Board 
of Directors: 
“We realised that there are now two energy worlds that an energy supply company can operate in; 
both, for the moment, are valid.” [Ben, Head of Orientation, Energize] 
These two energy worlds, so the team around Walter and Ben concluded, required the 
emission savings stemming from renewables, on the one hand, and the security, 
reliability and cost-effectiveness of fossil fuel generation, on the other hand. While the 
Board of Directors understood that these two energy worlds will co-exist, at least for 
the time being, Ben explained that both worlds undoubtedly will impose entirely 
different requirements: 
“So when the senior leaders of [Energize] came together we realised that these two future worlds of 
energy aren’t mutually exclusive but the mindset needed to be successful in either one probably was.” 
[Ben, Head of Orientation, Energize] 
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At the time, Energize itself was set up in such a way as to attempt to address the needs 
of both the new and the old energy world. Indeed, over the past decade, Walter had 
approved substantial investments in both renewables (e.g., a £10 billion investment that 
enabled growing its portfolio of renewables tenfold in the previous decade) and fossil 
fuel generation assets (e.g., a £750 million investment that extended the life of a coal-
fired power plant in the previous six years). Energize’s analysis unveiled, however, that 
investments focusing on the new and the old energy world simultaneously would not 
suffice to address the needs of either world. 
As a result, in October 2014, Energize’s Board of Directors announced that, effective 
as of January 2016, the company would spin off its fossil fuel generation assets and 
focus entirely on meeting the needs of the new energy world. To achieve this, Energize 
set itself the stringent target of supplying its customers with energy generated solely 
from renewable sources. Through this action, Walter believed that Energize is “no longer 
burdened by the risks of the old energy world” [Walter, Chief Executive Officer, Energize] such as the 
exposure to the pressures stemming from present and future environmental regulation 
aimed at mitigating global climate change. 
5.3.3 Interactions during Energize’s response to climate change 
Energize’s effort to establish itself as a renewables-only energy supply company was 
embedded in a network of business relationships with the actors introduced above. 




Figure 13: The network affected by Energize's response to climate change
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Throughout the two years of interactions within and across this business network, I focus 
on the five key relationships held by Energize. Delineating the interactions in and around 
these relationships enables me to develop a holistic understanding of how companies 
respond to climate change. 
5.3.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): The MDfE shifts its priority towards the security of 
supply 
The first relationship that affected Energize’s effort to establish itself as a renewables-
only energy supply company was with the MDfE. The MDfE had responded to climate 
change by making it ever more costly to generate energy from fossil fuel sources. Soon, 
Energize and other energy supply companies decommissioned approximately 24 GW of 
fossil fuel generation capacity; equivalent to over one-third of the UK’s total energy 
demand. 
The increase in renewable generation capacity partially compensated the decline in fossil 
fuel generation capacity. Renewables, however, were not able to cover this shortfall in its 
entirety which led to tightening capacity reserve margins of around 5% in late 2014. As 
a result, Mygrid sent a Notice of Inadequate System Margin to the MDfE to highlight that 
the UK’s total energy supply capacity would not suffice to meet peak demand, typically 
occurring during cold and windless days, in the upcoming winters. 
The Secretary of State took this warning seriously as there was nothing worse for her than 
being responsible for a large, country-wide energy blackout. This meant that after years 
of encouraging energy supply companies to decarbonise their energy generation portfolio, 
the MDfE suddenly had to cope with an additional challenge: safeguarding the security 
of supply. Scott, Head of Energy Security at the MDfE, explained that in a matter of weeks 
the department’s priority had shifted towards energy security: 
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“She [the Secretary of the State] is very clear on this point, energy security is her absolute number 1 
priority for the department, and that’s something that the Prime Minister has reinforced as well.” 
[Scott, Head of Energy Security, MDfE] 
Over the past years, the MDfE had created a regulatory framework that simply did not 
incentivise energy supply companies to invest in providing an energy supply capacity 
sufficient to meet the UK's energy demand: 
“There is a significant risk that the market will no longer deliver an adequate level of security of supply 
as it has done historically, principally because potential revenues in the energy-only market may no 
longer incentivise sufficient investment in capacity.” [Report, MDfE] 
Energize itself is the best example of this as it indicates how and why an energy supply 
company would decide to invest in renewable energy generation instead of providing a 
large capacity of fossil fuel generation assets. 
Within months, the Capacity Market Mechanism, a policy to attract private investment in 
reliable generation capacity, was designed and implemented. Under this new regulation, 
energy supply companies would receive payments for safeguarding energy supply during 
times of peak demand. In an attempt to deliver the security of supply at “the best value for 
money” [Scott, Head of Energy Security, MDfE], the MDfE allowed all types of energy generation 
to apply for Secured Capacity Agreements. 
Energize, still experiencing shareholder pressures due to the continuing decline of the 
company's share price, was keen to cash in on its £750 million investment in a coal-fired 
power plant. CEO Walter perceived that generating an additional revenue stream was a 
one-time activity that allowed the company to boost its profitability alongside 
transitioning towards establishing itself as a renewables-only energy supply company. 
Energize therefore prepared and submitted a competitive bid proposing one of its two 
GW coal-fired power plants in North England (sufficient to power two million homes 
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annually) as an asset available for providing a secure and reliable supply of energy in 
return for guaranteed capacity payments. 
5.3.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): Mygrid awarding Energize a Secured Capacity 
Agreement 
The MDfE appointed Mygrid, a multinational energy distribution and transmission 
company with expertise in balancing energy supply and demand in the grid, to deliver the 
Capacity Market mechanism. Within Mygrid, Capacity Market Manager Emma swiftly 
set up a process that allowed procuring sufficient capacity at the lowest possible price. 
In early 2016, just after Energize had officially spun off its fossil fuel generation assets 
into a new company, Emma and her team met with Scott, MDfE's Head of Energy 
Security, to announce the energy supply companies that were successful in securing 
capacity agreements: 
“We managed to secure enough capacity to meet this winter’s needs. We’ve effectively got confidence 
in our capacity procured up until the end of 2020/2021 now.” [Emma, Capacity Market Manager, 
Mygrid] 
She concluded that the Capacity Market mechanism was delivering the results that the 
MDfE was looking for: 
“It gets the right results and ensures that the capacity that’s coming forward will be able to deliver on 
the day. So I think that’s been a great success.” [Emma, Capacity Market Manager, Mygrid] 
In light of the inherent focus on delivering the security of supply at the lowest cost, it was 
largely unsurprising that coal-fired power plants were the big winners of the Capacity 
Market Mechanism. Indeed, over the next four years, energy supply companies were due 




Energize was successful in securing a supply contract for its two GW coal-fired power 
plant. Soon, Energize's coal-fired generation assets, now strengthened by a Secured 
Capacity Agreement, became one of the company’s most essential earnings driver. As 
such, Ben, the Head of Orientation at Energize, indicated that investment in fossil fuel 
generation assets were back on the company's agenda as long as it was for the purpose of 
safeguarding the security of supply: 
“An investment in higher carbon isn't necessarily a good idea unless it is about the security of supply.” 
[Ben, Head of Orientation, Energize] 
5.3.3.3 Relationship 3 (R3): Consumers demanding low energy bills 
The role of end consumers in shaping Energize's attempt to establish itself as a 
renewables-only energy supply company cannot be overlooked. As highlighted in the 
introduction to this case, over the past decade, consumers of energy had become 
increasingly price-sensitive and open to switching their energy suppliers. In fact, the 
MDfE’s 2016 annual Energy Consumption Survey found that the key aspect when 
choosing an energy supplier was the energy price. Adam, Analyst at the MDfE, 
summarised the department's findings: 
“Everybody’s thinking about energy has become so absolutely focused on what the final bill is because 
the argument is that’s the only bit that consumers really care about.” [Adam, Analyst, MDfE] 
The consumer focus on energy prices posed a risk to Energize. It meant that if the 
company's strategy to focus solely on renewables increased the energy prices, then 
consumers were more likely to switch to competitors such as AMP. Ben, Head of 
Orientation at Energize, said that the company's challenge was to ensure that consumer 
bills do not increase while racking up the investments necessary to establish the company 
as a renewables-only provider of energy: 
“Broadly speaking investing in a low carbon kind of portfolio is good [...] but we have to prove the 
benefit to consumers.” [Ben, Head of Orientation, Energize] 
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5.3.3.4 Relationship 4 (R4): Energize and AMP competing for market share 
The increasingly price-sensitive behaviour of consumers outlined above led to price 
competition between Energize and the multinational energy supply company AMP. 
Energize and AMP were battling for market share, which was driven mostly by which 
company could offer the lowest energy price. While the senior leadership team of 
Energize was occupied with restructuring the company, AMP continued to focus on the 
security, reliability and cost-effectiveness of fossil fuel generation assets. 
Simultaneously, AMP only grew the proportion of renewables as part of the company’s 
overall energy mix by as much as needed to meet the quotas set in the Renewables 
Obligation. To do so, in 2014, AMP began with the construction of three large-scale wind 
parks in the UK. This additional source of renewable generation capacity allowed AMP 
to meet the renewables quotas set in the Renewables Obligation. By 2016, the approach 
taken by AMP turned out to be a major price advantage, particularly as the MDfE became 
increasingly concerned about the security of supply. Indeed, AMP’s low-cost utilisation 
of its existing fossil fuel generation capacity translated into a major cost advantage over 
Energize’s renewables-only energy generation portfolio. 
5.3.3.5 Relationship 5 (R5): Purchasing emission allowances under the EU ETS 
The fifth and final relationship that affected Energize’s effort to establish itself as a 
renewables-only provider of energy was with the EU ETS. As outlined in the introduction, 
Energize’s senior leadership team feared that the pressures stemming from environmental 
regulation would make it more and more costly to operate the company’s carbon-
intensive generation portfolio. At the time, CEO Walter perceived that the spot price for 
one EUA would increase far beyond its 2008 levels of around €30. Hence, he supposed 
that operating a carbon-intensive energy generation portfolio would unavoidably hamper 
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Energize’s profitability. By September 2016, however, the price of one EUA had dropped 
to €3.91. Unsurprisingly, CEO Walter concluded that purchasing the emission allowances 
necessary to win further security of supply contracts under the Capacity Market 
Mechanism was permissible to ensure reliable revenue streams. 
5.3.4 The outcome of Energize’s response to climate change 
So far, this case has outlined the five key relationships in relation to Energize’s efforts to 
establish itself as a renewables-only energy supply company. This section now describes 
the outcome stemming from two years of interactions in and around these relationships. 
Effective as of January 2016, CEO Walter relocated all of Energize’s fossil fuel 
generation assets into a new and independently operating company. Energize itself was 
now focusing entirely on sustainable solutions, energy efficiency and, most importantly, 
it generated energy from 100% renewable sources. Although CEO Walter did spin-off 
Energize’s fossil fuel generation assets, he did so by creating a new and independently 
operating energy supply company of which Energize – at least for a few years – continued 
to act as a shareholder. Energize perceived that thereby the company could continue to 
capitalise from the commercial opportunities stemming from the security, reliability and 
cost-effectiveness of fossil fuel generation while establishing itself as a renewables-only 
energy supply company. 
The financial performance of Energize’s renewables business, however, was poor. In the 
2016 financial year, Energize’s revenue had dropped by 11% and this led to a net loss of 
over £14 billion; the biggest loss in the company’s history. CEO Walter largely blamed 




“The conventional energy spinoff […] left deep marks on our balance sheet.” [Walter, Chief Executive 
Officer, Energize] 
Controversially, the newly-created fossil fuel company was striving. The Secured 
Capacity Agreements generated predictable revenue streams from highly profitable, 
mostly written off, fossil fuel generation assets. Furthermore, as the spot price for 
emission allowances had fallen to €3.91, Energize only paid €164 million to purchase 42 
megatons worth of emission allowances. This amount compared to €1.26 billion at the 
2008 spot price of €30 and €4.2 billion at the 2020 forecasted spot price of €100. 
As a result, Energize’s CEO Walter concluded that it would be a financially reasonable 
decision to purchase emissions allowances rather than withholding the company from the 
predictable revenues stemming from running its fossil fuel generation assets. 
Unsurprisingly, the share value of the newly created fossil fuel company skyrocketed 
from €10 in 2016 to almost €28 by October 2017. 
Lastly, in its 2016 annual report, Energize announced that spinning off its fossil fuel 
generation assets had reduced carbon emissions from 95.7 megatons in 2014 to just 5.0 
megatons in 2016; a reduction of 94.8% within just two years. This, however, only 
considered Energize’s core business. Yet, Energize continued to act as a shareholder of 
the newly created fossil fuel generation company. Energize did not acknowledge the 
emissions stemming from the operation of the fossil fuel generation assets that had been 
relocated to the new company. 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
This case examined an energy supply company’s efforts to restructure itself in response 
to climate change. To achieve this, I scrutinised Energize’s interactions in and around 
establishing the company as a renewables-only provider of energy. I concentrated on the 
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five key relationships. This included Energize itself, the MDfE, the energy distribution 
and transmission company Mygrid, both domestic and industrial consumers, Energize’s 
competitor AMP and the as the EU ETS. By delineating these interactions I hope to have 
provided empirical insight that allows a holistic understanding of how companies respond 
to climate change. 
This case links well to the fourth case which scrutinises how an energy supply company 
endeavours to decarbonise its operations by establishing itself as a provider of demand-
side response technology. 
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5.4 Case 4: Vonergy’s efforts to establish itself as a provider 
of demand-side response technology 
The fourth case examines the interactions when the large energy supply company 
Vonergy decided to expand its product portfolio in response to climate change. To 
achieve this, representatives of Vonergy engaged in substantial interactions within and 
across the company’s business network in order to establish the company as a provider 
of demand-side response (DSR) technology. Within Vonergy’s business network, I 
concentrate on seven key actors: Vonergy, the energy supply company itself, the DSR 
technology provider Xidoa, the multinational hospitality company Morhaven 
International, the energy supply company Pantegis, the British distribution network 
operator Gryd, the UK’s Ministerial Department for Energy (MDfE) and the diesel-
power generation company Moggley. 
5.4.1 Introduction to the network actors 
Vonergy is a multinational energy company supplying electricity and gas to 200,000 
British commercial and industrial energy consumers. With over 17,000 employees and 
a total energy generation capacity of 8.2 GW, the company is one of the top 10 energy 
suppliers in the UK. Size notwithstanding, Vonergy represents an interesting research 
case because, despite the fact that the company emitted substantial carbon emissions 
(13.1 megatons in 2014), at the same time, their CEO publicly committed to playing a 
leading role in the UK’s transition towards a low-carbon energy supply system: 
“[We are] committed to the responsible growth of [our] businesses in response to the central 
challenges of the energy transition, combating climate change and making responsible use of natural 
resources.” [Steven, Chief Executive Officer, Vonergy] 
Interestingly, Vonergy intended to achieve this by expanding its product portfolio with 
a technology that offers a considerable emission reduction potential, so-called DSR 
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technology. Through this, Vonergy’s CEO Steven hoped to enable its commercial and 
industrial consumers to mitigate their carbon emissions while also providing them with 
an opportunity to generate a new revenue stream. 
By way of contextual information, DSR technology refers to a broad range of 
technological processes aimed at reducing the consumption of energy when demand is 
at its peak. One such process involves installing grid balancing devices at large 
commercial and industrial energy consumers. In times of peak demand, providers of 
such devices can remotely reduce the energy demand in exchange for a compensation 
fee paid by the grid operator. Grid operators are willing to make these payments because 
of savings stemming from not having to maintain costly reserve energy capacities (e.g., 
fossil fuel power plants). This type of DSR technology enables considerable emission 
reductions and generates a commercial opportunity for large commercial and industrial 
energy consumers. 
Xidoa is one of the UK’s leading DSR aggregators and technology innovators. Founded 
in 2009, the company’s hardware- and software permits to remotely turn down the 
energy consumption of large commercial and industrial energy consumers (e.g., 
hospitals, hotels, manufacturing sites, schools, shopping centres, etc.) by a degree that 
remains unnoticeable. Xidoa’s Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Joe, had 
developed the DSR technology with the vision to provide a cleaner, cheaper and more 
efficient way to balance the electricity grid. Thereby, releasing some of the grid 
congestion pressures created by the intermittency related to the steep increase of 
renewables as part of the UK’s energy mix. 
In addition to Xidoa, the interactions with the multinational hospitality company 
Morhaven International were an important consideration for Vonergy. With over 6,000 
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properties around the world, Morhaven International is not only one of the world’s 
largest hospitality companies, but it also aims at protecting the planet’s natural 
resources. For example, in 2014, Morhaven International’s senior leadership team 
announced the target of reducing the energy consumption of its 40 hotels across the UK 
by 20% by 2020. Through this initiative, Morhaven International sought to mitigate its 
£60 million annual spendings on energy while also contributing to the company’s drive 
for emission savings. Following the successful implementation of DSR technologies in 
its hotels located in the USA, Morhaven International was keen on trialling DSR 
technology at four hotels in London. 
Pantegis is a subsidiary of one of the largest British energy supply companies that have 
specialised in supplying energy to large commercial and industrial energy consumers. 
Pantegis offered its customers reliable and cost-effective energy generated from 
renewable energy sources, as well as services to enable more efficient use of energy and 
control over their energy spending. Most pertinent to this study, however, is the fact 
that Pantegis did not want to take the financial risks associated with developing the 
innovative technologies that would enable delivering such services by itself, and was 
therefore keen on partnering with a DSR technology provider. 
The role of Gryd, a British multinational company managing a part of the UK’s energy 
transmission and distribution network, cannot be ignored. Gryd was responsible for 
ensuring that the balance between energy supply and demand is maintained every 
minute of the year. DSR technologies were seen as a cost-effective and less carbon-
intensive way of balancing grid congestion in times of peak demand; typically occurring 
around 5 pm on a winter weekday. In fact, Gryd estimated that DSR technologies could 
contribute to meeting 5% of peak demand by 2025 which would generate network 
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investment savings of approximately £500 million per year. Unsurprisingly, Gryd was 
keen on promoting DSR technologies in the UK. 
Another important consideration for Vonergy were the interactions with the MDfE; the 
UK’s ministerial department responsible for ensuring a reliable, affordable and low-
carbon supply of energy to British consumers. The MDfE perceived DSR technologies 
as a promising low-carbon solution to address the concerns over the security of supply 
emerging in the winter of 2014. The MDfE, therefore, decided to set up a range of 
initiatives aimed at encouraging the development of innovative energy technologies, 
such as DSR. 
Lastly, the role of Moggley, a developer of fast-ramping small-scale flexible energy 
generation assets, cannot be overlooked. Moggley was directly competing with Xidoa’s 
DSR technology for contracts under the Capacity Market Mechanism. Most pertinent 
to this study, however, is the fact that Moggley was able to offer its capacity of 700 MW 
of diesel-fired power plants as a measure to meet peak demand at a much lower price 
than Xidoa’s DSR technology. 
Scrutinising the interactions within and across the network of actors that affected 
Vonergy’s efforts to expand its product portfolio in response to climate change, enabled 
me to develop a holistic understanding of the issues I sought to engage with, in terms 
of answering how companies respond to climate change. Indeed, it was clear to see that, 
for Vonergy, the business network was a key component to achieve the company’s goal 
of establishing itself as a provider of DSR technology. 
The remainder of this case focuses on this by outlining what triggered Vonergy’s 
response to climate change, by describing the interactions within and across the 
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company’s business network and by reviewing the outcomes stemming from Vonergy’s 
interactions in response to climate change. The case closes with a brief conclusion. 
5.4.2 Vonergy’s response to climate change 
Vonergy’s CEO Steven perceived the contextual changes emanating from climate 
change (e.g., the UK national legislation through the Climate Change Act in 2008, the 
increasing need for innovative technologies that enable the UK’s low-carbon energy 
transition) as an opportunity for responsible growth of Vonergy. In the quest for 
potential products that enabled growing the company while at the same time 
contributing to the UK’s low-carbon energy transition, he soon realised the potential of 
DSR technologies. 
Vonergy’s CEO, Steven, viewed DSR technology as a reliable, low-cost and low-carbon 
solution to the increasing concerns over the security of supply. Furthermore, it also 
represented a new revenue stream for Vonergy’s commercial and industrial customers 
as they would receive payments from the distribution network operator Gryd in return 
for reducing their energy demand for short-periods. In addition, it was a promising new 
business stream for Vonergy as DSR technology providers keep a margin of 30-50% of 
the payments received from the network operator. 
On further analysis, Vonergy’s CEO Steven concluded that the UK market for DSR 
technologies was the most promising DSR market in Europe, forecasted to have a 
potential size of up to 9.8 GW by 2020 and, at least so far, it remained almost untapped. 
In early 2014, therefore, Vonergy announced its decision to establish itself as a provider 
of DSR technology. 
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5.4.3 Interactions during Vonergy’s response to climate change 
Vonergy’s attempt to establish itself as a provider of DSR technology was embedded in 
a network of business relationships with the actors introduced above. Figure 14 shows 




Figure 14: The network affected by Vonergy’s response to climate change
 183 
 
Throughout the two years of interactions within and across this business network, I focus 
on the five key relationships held by Vonergy. Delineating the interactions in and around 
these relationships enables a holistic understanding of how companies respond to climate 
change. 
5.4.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): Collaborating with the DSR technology provider Xidoa 
The first relationship that affected Vonergy’s attempt to establish itself as a provider of 
DSR technology was with Xidoa. Joe, the Co-Founder and CEO of Xidoa, had developed 
the hardware- and software that enables the energy consumption of large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers to be turned down remotely. This type of DSR technology 
provides not only a reliable, low-cost and low-carbon way to manage the balance between 
supply and demand, it also represents a commercial opportunity for large industrial 
energy consumers: 
“We are in an amazing position where our end clients get paid for being more efficient, and it's great 
to be able to do that. Each time we pay a customer it means we've reduced the use of highly polluting 
peak power stations.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Xidoa was struggling to market its DSR technology, however. Xidoa’s CEO Joe said that 
this was largely due to a lack of customer awareness as “no one was doing it” [Joe, Chief 
Executive Officer, Xidoa] as well as the conservative nature of the UK energy sector: 
“People in the world of energy tend to be quite conservative and slow at making decisions. […] They 
are worried about what it will do to their processes, they are worried about the loss of control. We show 
them that it doesn't impact their process and we show them that they always maintain control.” [Joe, 
Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Furthermore, Joe supposed issues regarding the prioritisation of large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers while also viewing their often relatively low energy costs as 
a barrier to market its DSR technology: 
“Beyond that, it is mostly prioritisation. I have a lot of things to do, is this really the one that I'm going 
to dedicate the time to? The best way to convince them is to pay them enough money to do it. Now, if 
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we were obtaining the kind of prices that power stations are getting, then it would be no question that 
we can pay them enough money.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
As a result of these challenges, it took Xidoa over four years (from founding the company 
in 2009 until 2013) to install its DSR technology at 100 large commercial and industrial 
energy consumers. In an effort to access a larger share of the 9.8 GW DSR market in the 
UK, and drive Xidoa’s extensive growth strategy. CEO Joe decided to collaborate with a 
large energy supply company. 
At the same time, Vonergy’s CEO Steven was evaluating strategies to establish Vonergy 
as a provider of DSR technology. His conclusion was to collaborate with an established 
DSR technology provider rather than to develop the technology by itself. Interestingly, 
Steven and Luke, Xidoa Chief Commercial Officer, knew each other as they both 
frequently attended energy industry conferences. Both shared their commitment to 
playing a key role in the UK’s low carbon energy transition: 
“[We] share our commitment to providing flexible and sustainable solutions to the challenges facing 
System Operators.” [Luke, Chief Commercial Officer, Xidoa] 
The potential synergies between the two companies were large. Indeed, Vonergy’s CEO 
Steven understood that Xidoa’s DSR technology was a perfect fit since it would not only 
help its large commercial and industrial consumers to save carbon emissions, it also 
represented a financial opportunity for them. In a follow-up discussion, Xidoa’s CEO Joe 
explained exactly this: 
“Our customers are commercial industrials. They, you know, they care about reducing their emissions 
but at the end of the day they’re doing it because there’s a direct financial benefit; they get paid to do 
it.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Xidoa’s CEO Joe was excited about Vonergy’s interest in working with the company. He 
hoped that this would enable Xidoa to gain market access to Vonergy’s 200,000 British 
commercial and industrial customers; a huge amount compared to Xidoa’s current 
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customer base of 100 large commercial and industrial customers. At the same time, he 
understood that large energy supply companies, such as Vonergy, are not willing to take 
the financial risks associated with developing innovative DSR technologies by 
themselves: 
“You don’t necessarily want utilities to be mad risk takers. You need crazy people like us to invest and 
utilities eventually to buy them.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
In July 2015, Steven, Joe and Luke jointly announced that Vonergy acquired a share of 
Xidoa in an effort to expand their DSR technology business. Vonergy’s CEO Steven 
summarises: 
“[Xidoa’s] customer-friendly solution, real-time metering, technology and automated processes have a 
lot to offer to commercial customers in this respect. We want to be able to continue to offer to our 
customers a wide variety of commercial solutions that work for almost every company under every set 
of circumstances.” [Steven, Chief Executive Officer, Vonergy] 
Luke, Xidoa’s Chief Commercial Officer was similarly excited that the deal had gone 
through: 
“We are very excited to have [Vonergy] on board. We have been working with [Vonergy] over the last 
year to expand our demand response offering across their vast international customer base. We are 
excited to be strengthening our relationship with a global, forward-thinking utility.” [Luke, Chief 
Commercial Officer, Xidoa] 
5.4.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): Partnerships to drive DSR technology business 
Jointly, Vonergy and Xidoa worked closely with the multinational hospitality company 
Morhaven International to establish a case for the commercial and environmental benefits 
stemming from utilising DSR technologies. Specifically, Morhaven International was 
trialling Xidoa’s DSR technology at four hotels in London. Upon successful completion 
of this trial, Morhaven International would expand its engagement by implementing the 
DSR technology in over 40 hotels across the UK. 
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For Morhaven International’s Director of Facilities and Project Management Richard, 
implementing Xidoa’s DSR technology was an opportunity to generate a risk-free 
revenue stream while gaining detailed information about the company’s energy use and 
contributing to its carbon emission reduction goals. What was crucial for Richard, 
however, was the fact that the DSR technology, under no circumstances, has a negative 
impact on hotel guests: 
“No amount of payment from DSR is going to be of value if it has a negative impact on our guests.” 
[Richard, Director Facilities and Project Management, Morhaven International] 
Xidoa’s CEO Joe guaranteed Richard that its DSR technology would, temporarily and 
unnoticeably for hotel guests, turn down non-essential services (e.g., air conditioning 
systems, fridges and ice coolers by no more than 1 °C) when energy demand is at its peak. 
After agreeing to these terms, Xidoa installed its DSR technology at four of Morhaven 
International’s hotels in London. 
In return for trimming the hotels’ energy demand, Xidoa received payments from 
distribution and network operator Gryd and then passed on 70% to Morhaven 
International. Upon completion of a two-month trial period, Richard Morhaven 
International’s Director Facilities and Project Management concluded: 
“We have successfully been able to turn down some of our non-essential systems for up to an hour 
without any negative impact on business operations or customer comfort levels.” [Richard, Director 
Facilities and Project Management, Morhaven International] 
As a result of the successful trial, Vonergy, Xidoa and Morhaven International extended 
their engagement and installed Xidoa’s DSR technology in over 40 hotels across the UK. 
“We can control a large part a lot of their [Morhaven International’s] air conditioning systems across 
multiple hotels. Literally, we’re talking about a change in air temperature of a couple of degrees for 
half an hour to an hour across the 40 hotels in the UK, and it adds up to quite a lot.” [Joe, Chief 
Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
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Indeed, Morhaven International’s Director of Facilities and Project Management Richard 
determined that installing Xidoa’s DSR technology has not only reduced the company’s 
carbon emissions but also generated additional revenue of £100,000. Most importantly 
for Richard, however, was the fact that he achieved all this almost effortlessly and without 
affecting operations or having any negative impact on the comfort of its hotel guests: 
“We’ve had a number of [DSR] calls, but had no negative comments from our guests.” [Richard, 
Director Facilities and Project Management, Morhaven International] 
Morhaven International was not the only large commercial and industrial energy 
consumer that Vonergy and Xidoa interacted with in order to grow its customer base. In 
fact, Vonergy’s CEO Steven suggested partnering with Pantegis, a subsidiary of one of 
the largest British energy supply companies, primarily supplying energy to commercial 
and industrial energy consumers. Pantegis’ Chief Operating Officer, Isaac, was keen on 
working with Vonergy and Xidoa since the company aimed to offer its commercial and 
industrial customers services that enable more efficient use of energy and provide more 
control over their energy spending: 
“We are committed to working in partnership with customers to make energy work for them. We believe 
that a lower carbon UK and being more sustainable are both good for the world and good for business.” 
[Isaac, Chief Operating Officer, Pantegis] 
As Isaac did not want to take the financial risks associated with developing the innovative 
technologies that would enable delivering such services, he decided to work with Vonergy 
and Xidoa. Isaac summarises the benefits of utilising Xidoa’s DSR technology: 
“Our customers will now have the opportunity to financially benefit from changing how they use energy, 
simply and seamlessly. [Xidoa’s] technology is best in class and drives innovation. Together we will 
generate real, additional value for [our] customers and help them to operate more sustainably.” [Isaac, 
Chief Operating Officer, Pantegis] 
While Vonergy’s CEO Steven was satisfied with the successful project with Morhaven 
International and the collaboration with Pantegis, when offering Xidoa’s DSR 
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technology to many of his 200,000 large commercial and industrial consumers, they 
repeatedly raised concerns about the ways in which the DSR technology may impact their 
current processes while also highlighting some financial constraints. 
Indeed, a report on DSR for commercial and industrial energy consumers found that 
exactly this leads to low prioritisation of implementing DSR technologies: 
“Organisations require a financial incentive to change their patterns of electricity consumption and/or 
provide services to the grid. […] Issues include uncertain benefits and the relative smallness of potential 
savings/revenue. For some organisations energy spend is a relatively low overhead and small electricity 
bill savings are therefore unlikely to warrant the time required to engage with DSR.” [Report on DSR 
for industrial energy consumers, Element Energy] 
In an effort to counteract this, Vonergy’s CEO Steven engaged with the distribution and 
network operator Gryd to raise customer awareness about the benefits associated with 
installing DSR technologies. 
5.4.3.3 Relationship 3 (R3): Raising customer awareness through the Power 
Responsive Initiative 
The role of the distribution and network operator Gryd in shaping Vonergy’s efforts to 
establish itself as a provider of DSR technology cannot be ignored. Gryd’s Director of 
UK System Operator, Claire, regarded DSR technology as an opportunity to save 
approximately £500 million in annual network investments. In fact, a study conducted by 
Imperial College London and the University of Cambridge Energy Policy Research 
Group estimated that such savings could be as high as £8.1bn a year by 2030. A key 
barrier to unlocking these savings potential, however, was the lack of customer 
awareness. Claire had therefore set herself the task of raising awareness about the benefits 
of DSR technologies for large commercial and industrial energy consumers. To achieve 
this, Claire started the Power Responsive Initiative: 
“So the evolution of demand-side response, something that we’ve been working hard on […] through 
our campaign called Power Responsive, a collaboration across the industry to really start to create the 
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narrative and the conditions for change around demand-side response.” [Claire, Director of UK System 
Operator, Gryd] 
The Power Responsive Initiative triggered interactions with large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers. This included offering training and running workshops. 
Moreover, Gryd engaged with the Major Energy Users Council, an organisation 
representing industrial, commercial and public energy consumers. Collectively, the 
members of the Major Energy Users Council account for approximately one-quarter of 
the total industrial energy consumption in the UK: 
“This week we launched our collaboration with the Major Energy Users Council where we’ve actually 
issued a guide and a set of educational materials about how businesses can get involved.” [Claire, 
Director of UK System Operator, Gryd] 
Vonergy’s CEO Steven and Xidoa’s CEO Joe welcomed Gryd’s efforts to raise 
awareness. Through this, Joe hoped that they would be able to overcome the lack of 
awareness that acts as a barrier and prevents larger commercial and industrial energy 
consumers from participating in DSR technology programmes: 
“[Gryd] has really stepped up the mark with this as well. They’ve launched their power responsive 
campaign to educate and to really make people aware of the opportunities which we think is terrific.” 
[Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Furthermore, Vonergy’s CEO Steven was keen on optimising the cost-effectiveness of 
Xidoa’s DSR technology and hence attempted to gain financial support through a range 
of initiatives set up by the MDfE in order to encourage the development of innovative 
energy technologies. 
5.4.3.4 Relationship 4 (R4): Gaining financial support from the MDfE 
The MDfE had designed and implemented a set of supportive regulatory mechanisms in 
order to enable further growth of the DSR market in the UK. This included the Energy 
Entrepreneurship Fund (EEF) and the Capacity Market Mechanism. 
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The MDfE set up the EEF to support the development of innovative energy technologies. 
As part of this competitive scheme, Xidoa was awarded a share of the £21 million grant. 
The MDfE’s Head of Electricity Systems Connor perceived that this would help the 
company to make its DSR technology more affordable for large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers. While Vonergy welcomed the financial support, the 
company’s CEO Steven pointed out that drastically reducing costs would only be possible 
when the MDfE would allow DSR technology providers to participate in the Capacity 
Market Mechanism. 
The MDfE had designed the Capacity Market Mechanism with the aim of guaranteeing 
that a sufficient supply of energy is provided in order to meet the future demand. To 
achieve this, the MDfE offered contracts to energy supply companies in exchange for 
guaranteeing the required energy capacity. DSR technologies, however, were not 
included in the initial design of the Capacity Market Mechanism. Connor, Head of 
Electricity Systems at the MDfE, explains: 
“Our view is that in the industrial and commercial sector a lot of the enablers that Government or the 
regulator might put in place are already there.” [Connor, Head of Electricity Systems, MDfE] 
In late 2014, however, the MDfE understood that DSR technologies are a promising low-
carbon solution to address the emerging concerns over the security of supply. The MDfE, 
therefore, agreed to include DSR technologies in the Capacity Market Mechanism; albeit 
under slightly different rules. 
These rules included that DSR technology providers were only allowed to bid for one-
year contracts, compared to three- or 15-year-long contracts for providers of other forms 
of generation capacity (e.g., new construction of fossil fuel-fired power plants). The 
MDfE’s Head of Electricity Systems Connor estimated that they would award at least one 
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GW worth of Capacity Market Mechanism contracts to DSR technology providers. 
Xidoa’s CEO Joe welcomed the MDfE’s decision to include DSR technologies in the 
Capacity Market Mechanism: 
“[The MDfE] seems to understand that successful deployment of DSR technology, in a fair market, has 
the potential to deliver hundreds of millions of pounds to both large and small businesses across the 
country.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
However, he also pointed out the inflexibility of the scheme and highlighted the need to 
continue to ensure that DSR technologies can compete in an enduring market: 
“The rules of how the Capacity Market works are very, very inflexible. And so we had to do an awful a 
lot of work and still have to do an awful a lot of work to get demand response to be able to participate 
in the market that is really being built for generators.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
He perceived that there were peculiar issues related to the design of the Capacity Market 
Mechanism: 
“The Capacity Market is still biased towards traditional generation. [...] I would also point out that [the 
Capacity Market Mechanism] is currently not a ‘level playing field’, and simply subsidises existing 
fossil fuel generation.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Indeed, while the MDfE’s Head of Electricity Systems, Connor, claimed that the Capacity 
Market Mechanism is technology-neutral, the unequal contract length puts DSR 
technology providers at a disadvantage compared to conventional energy generation 
providers. Such one-year contracts mean that Vonergy and Xidoa had to make investment 
decisions on a year-to-year basis, preventing the company from medium/long term 
investment security. 
Interestingly, it was the distribution and network operator Gryd who, on the one hand, 
supported DSR technology providers through the Power Responsive Initiative, but on the 
other hand awarded a majority of contracts to fossil fuel-fired power plants as an outcome 
of its role as the delivery body of the Capacity Market Mechanism. Gryd’s spokeswoman, 
Claudia, explained that while they awarded 450 MW of Capacity Market Mechanism 
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contracts to DSR technology provider (550 MW less than the MDfE’s forecast of 1 GW), 
Gryd did not have the authority to prioritise low-carbon technologies: 
“Contracts are awarded based on capability and price. We cannot discriminate against fuel types 
oﬀered.” [Claudia, Spokeswoman, Gryd] 
As a result, Vonergy’s CEO Steven and Xidoa’s CEO Joe were frustrated and unhappy 
about the large number of subsidies awarded to fossil fuel-fired power station; an energy 
generation technology competing with its low-carbon solution to balance supply and 
demand in the electricity grid: 
“At the same time, [Gryd] has also panicked because their job is to keep the lights on and they have 
been spending hundreds of millions of pounds in subsidising coal-fired power stations. […] But 
completely neglecting more environmentally friendly and more sustainable options.” [Joe, Chief 
Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
The decision of Gryd’s Director of UK System Operator Claire, however, was bound to 
the regulatory methodology set by the MDfE. Hence, Claire had no choice but to award 
the contracts in the way she did. Interestingly, in line with the efforts as part of the Power 
Responsive Initiative, Claire seemed implicit in favour of DSR technologies: 
“Well, first of all, we need a toolkit to balance the system […], that system is changing radically, and 
we need to balance that system efficiently and keep costs low for consumers. We are seeing this growth 
in intermittent renewable generation and that means there’s a growing need for flexibility, agility and 
the need to embrace innovation around that future toolkit.” [Claire, Director of UK System Operator, 
Gryd] 
Nevertheless, providers of fossil fuel-based solutions to meet peak demand, such as 
Moggley, had a major advantage by being able to secure 15-year-long guaranteed 
payments as part of the Capacity Market Mechanism. 
5.4.3.5 Relationship 5 (R5): Competing with fossil fuel-based energy generation 
companies 
The fifth and final relationship that affected Vonergy’s efforts to establish itself as a DSR 
technology provider was with Moggley, a provider of 700 MW fast-ramping small-scale 
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flexible diesel-fired energy generation assets. Just like Vonergy and Xidoa, Moggley 
participated in the Capacity Market Mechanism. Indeed, as a result of the increasingly 
tight capacity reserve margins in the winter of 2014, the MDfE had allowed diesel-power 
generators of under 50 MW to bid for contracts under the Capacity Market Mechanism. 
Moggley secured 15-year-long subsidy contracts to build 22 new diesel-fired power plants 
with a total capacity of 450 MW. Xidoa’s CEO Joe, directly competing with Moggley 
over Capacity Market subsidy contracts, was frustrated: 
“We are not building gas, we are not building clean coal, we are building diesel. It's a fiasco and the 
government won't even admit that this is a mistake. They are more than happy to let these diesel power 
stations get built. We are talking about the most polluting form of power, not the least polluting form of 
power. Diesel is getting build in the UK because of these policy decisions.” [Joe, Chief Executive 
Officer, Xidoa] 
He concluded that the Capacity Market Mechanism is a necessary tool but inherently 
misaligned with the long-term objective of driving the UK’s low-carbon energy 
transition. 
5.4.4 The outcome of Vonergy’s response to climate change 
So far, this case has outlined the five key relationships in relation to Vonergy’s efforts to 
establish itself as a provider of DSR technology in response to climate change. This 
section now describes the outcome stemming from two years of interactions in and around 
these relationships. 
As a result of Vonergy’s and Xidoa’s efforts to grow its DSR business in the UK, the 
company has managed to install DSR technology devices at 700 out of the 200,000 large 
commercial and industrial energy consumers that Vonergy’s supplies. This meant that 200 
MW of energy demand were equipped with Xidoa’s DSR technology. While both 
Vonergy’s CEO Steven and Xidoa’s CEO Joe evaluated this as having achieved some 
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success, the 200 MW represented only 2% of the total DSR market potential of 9.8 GW 
in the UK. 
Xidoa’s CEO Joe said that this was partially due to being slowed down by regulation and 
policy. Particularly the MDfE’s decision to award 15-year-long contracts to diesel-fired 
power plants while only one-year contracts to DSR technology providers had 
disappointed him: 
“We realised that actually, the UK may never work because the government seems to make persistent 
mistakes and then potentially will end up with failing to meet its climate change targets. The contracts 
they give to power stations can be up to 15 years in length. So, once they make the mistake, it could be 
a closed market for 15 years, and so it may never be solved.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Therefore, Vonergy and Xidoa made the decision to focus on other countries in order to 
grow its DSR technology business: 
“We are expanding much faster internationally now. America in general, France, Belgium, Ireland, 
Germany, […] Australia, Korea. There is no shortage of countries where demand response can work, 
but very few countries need it as much as the UK. You know, we don't have many countries that have 
an island running a negative reserve margin. The UK just seems to have made these horrible policy 
decisions, it's not just us saying that it's pretty much across the board, everybody is saying that the 
government messed up.” [Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Interestingly, Vonergy and Xidoa were able to market its DSR technology in France in 
record time. Within only eight months of focusing on the French market, they had 
managed to implement its DSR technology in 70 large commercial and industrial 
consumers; controlling over 75 MW of energy demand. 
Furthermore, in discussions with Xidoa’s CEO Joe, it quickly became clear how 
disappointed he was that his company was only able to mitigate a vanishingly small 
amount of carbon emissions stemming from the consumption of Vonergy’s large 
commercial and industrial energy consumers. In fact, Vonergy’s efforts to establish itself 
as a provider of DSR technology has contributed to decarbonising 200 MW of the UK’s 
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total energy demand of 75.3 GW. To put this into perspective, Vonergy has contributed 
to decarbonise one-tenth of a two GW gas-fired power plant. On average, a two GW gas-
fired power plant generates one megaton of emissions annually; meaning that Vonergy’s 
efforts to establish itself as a provider of DSR technology has decarbonised 0.1 megatons.  
5.4.5 Conclusion 
This case examined an energy supply company’s efforts to expand its product portfolio 
in response to climate change. To achieve this, I scrutinised Vonergy’s interactions in and 
around establishing the company as a provider of DSR technology. I concentrated on the 
five key relationships. This included Vonergy itself, the connected home technology 
provider Xidoa, the multinational hospitality company Morhaven International, the 
energy supply company Pantegis, the British distribution network operator Gryd, the 
MDfE and the diesel-power generation company Moggley. 
The purpose of this case was to develop a holistic understanding of how companies 
respond to climate change. This case, in fact, links well to the fifth case which scrutinises 
how an energy supply company aimed at decarbonising its operation by establishing itself 





5.5 Case 5: Connectica’s efforts to establish itself as a 
provider of connected home technologies 
The fifth and final case examines the interactions when the large energy supply 
company Connectica decided to expand its product portfolio in response to climate 
change. To achieve this, representatives of Connectica engaged in interactions within 
and across the company’s business network in order to establish the company as a 
provider of connected home technologies. Within Connectica’s business network, I 
concentrate on six key actors: Connectica, the energy supply company itself, the 
connected home technology provider Ecovair, the independent research organisation 
Qubeta, domestic energy consumers, the advertising agency Advotis and the UK’s 
Ministerial Department for Energy (MDfE). 
5.5.1 Introduction to the network actors 
Connectica is a British energy company supplying electricity and gas to twelve million 
households in the UK. With over 31,000 employees and a total energy generation 
capacity of 8.6 GW, the company is one of the UK’s biggest energy suppliers. Size 
notwithstanding, Connectica represents an interesting research case because the 
company’s senior leadership team has publicly committed to mitigate the annual carbon 
emissions of 4.4 megatons stemming from its own operation in 2015 as well as help its 
customers to reduce their emissions. 
Interestingly, 90% of Connectica’s carbon emissions were not caused directly by the 
company but when its customers consumed energy. These, so-called Scope 3 carbon 
emissions can be mitigated by reducing the total carbon intensity by revenue (tCO2e/£). 
In 2015, Connectica’s total carbon intensity by revenue was 157 tCO2e/£. What is most 
pertinent to this study, however, is that Connectica intended to mitigate its carbon 
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intensity by revenue by expanding its product portfolio with a technology that offers 
considerable emission reduction potential, so-called connected home technologies. In 
doing so, Connectica’s Head of Environment, Tom, hoped to enable its customers to 
reduce their carbon emissions while also providing them with an opportunity to lower 
their energy bills. 
By way of contextual information, connected home technology refers to a broad range 
of technologies aimed at reducing the consumption of energy through the automation 
of lighting, heating, ventilation and home appliances (e.g., refrigerators, washers, 
dryers, ovens). The connected home technology that Connectica focused on falls into 
the category of smart thermostats. Such devices can be used to control a home’s heating 
by scheduling different room temperatures throughout the day, thereby allowing a 
reduction of carbon emissions and lowers the energy bills of consumers. 
Ecovair is one of the UK’s leading connected home technology innovators. Founded in 
2006, the company’s hardware- and software permits the remote monitoring and 
controlling of the energy consumption of household appliances. Ecovair’s Founder, 
Paul, had developed the technology to help consumers to run their homes more energy 
efficient and through this enable energy savings: 
“[Our smart thermostat] can sit around and say, ‘This person always gets up at half past six in the 
morning, so I need to make sure the house is comfortable then, and they leave the house about 9 am 
so I can start to let the temperature tail off'.” [Paul, Founder, Ecovair] 
What is most pertinent to this study, however, is the fact that Ecovair managed to install 
around 200,000 devices within the first five years of operation (launch of the product in 
2009 until 2014) but its relatively low engineering manpower hindered a steeper growth 




In addition to Ecovair, the interactions with the independent research organisation 
Qubeta were an important consideration for Connectica. Mostly commissioned by 
government departments and private companies, Qubeta has established itself as the 
UK’s leading hub for knowledge in and around household’s energy consumption. 
Nevertheless, Qubeta’s Advisor Michael acknowledged that there is a persistent lack of 
robust evidence about connected home technologies: 
“There is a lack of evidence about whether connected home technologies actually do work and save 
energy, especially in the UK context. There is a bit of evidence in the US, but most of the evidence is 
from the manufacturers themselves. That, of course, is unreliable.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
Furthermore, the role of Connectica’s consumers, whether existing or new ones, cannot 
be ignored. In fact, Connectica’s CEO, Hannah, believed that connected home 
technologies could help to reduce the emissions stemming from domestic heating, 
which is responsible for over 15% of the total energy consumption in the UK. She also 
understood, however, that consumers would only purchase connected home technology 
products when they offered other benefits such as lower energy bills and/or increased 
comfort. Following a comprehensive market analysis, she concluded that by installing 
connected home technologies the average energy consumer could save up to £150 
annually on their energy bills. 
Another important consideration for Connectica were the interactions with the British 
advertising agency Advotis. In 2014, a survey conducted by Advotis suggested that only 
35% of British energy consumers are aware of connected home technologies. 
Connectica and Advotis were keen on counteracting this lack of awareness. 
Lastly, the role of the MDfE, the UK’s ministerial department responsible for the 
provision of adequate, secure, affordable and environmentally friendly energy, cannot 
be overlooked. In fact, the MDfE’s Head of Regulation, Gary, supposed that the 
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department’s goals can be achieved most effectively by improving the energy efficiency 
of domestic households. Therefore, the MDfE established a list of certified technologies 
and designed a set of policies to support energy efficiency technologies (e.g., the 
Boiler+ programme). Connected home technologies, however, were not on the list and 
hence did not receive government support. 
Scrutinising the interactions within and across the network of actors that affected 
Connectica’s efforts to expand its product portfolio in response to climate change, 
enabled me to develop a holistic understanding of the issues I sought to engage with, in 
terms of answering how companies respond to climate change. Indeed, it was clear that, 
for Connectica, the business network was a key component to achieve the company’s 
goal of establishing itself as a provider of connected home technologies. 
The remainder of this case focuses on this by outlining what triggered Connectica’s 
response to climate change, by describing the interactions within and across the 
company’s business network and by reviewing the outcome stemming from 
Connectica’s interactions in response to climate change. The case closes with a brief 
conclusion. 
5.5.2 Connectica’s response to climate change 
Connectica’s conventional energy generation assets had diminished in value following 
the emergence of climate change on the international political agenda, the UK 
government’s efforts to meet its carbon emission reduction targets set in the 2008 
Climate Change Act and the resulting UK legal/regulatory framework in favour of low-
carbon sources of energy. 
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These contextual changes emanating from climate change had partially caused a drop 
in Connectica’s profits from £1.6 billion to just £81 million. To mitigate the company’s 
exposure to strengthened environmental regulation and the diminishing value of its 
conventional generation, Connectica’s Head of Environment, Tom, decided to conduct 
an assessment of the company’s carbon emissions. Interestingly, this assessment 
showed that 90% of the company’s emissions were not produced directly by the 
company but when its customers consumed energy. Tom, therefore believed that 
Connectica’s biggest contribution to mitigating emissions would be to offer its 
customers the tools to reduce their energy consumption: 
“With around 90% of our carbon emissions arising from customer energy consumption, the greatest 
role we can play is to give our customers the products and services they need to reduce their energy 
use and carbon footprint.” [Tom, Head of Environment, Connectica] 
On further analysis on the strategic options to do so, he concluded that connected home 
technologies could enable substantial energy savings and hence not only mitigate 
carbon emissions but also lead to lower energy bills and increased consumer control. 
Indeed, a report published by the MDfE suggested that connected home technologies 
could create a rare win-win situation for energy companies, its customers and the UK 
as a whole: 
“Improving home energy efficiency is a ‘win-win’ for households and the UK as a whole. It enhances 
the UK’s energy security, cuts the carbon emissions from our building stock, and reduces costs–the 
cheapest energy is the energy that we don’t use. From the consumer perspective, the benefits include 
lower energy bills, warmer homes that are more comfortable to live in, and improved wellbeing.” 
[Report on Home energy efficiency and demand reduction, MDfE] 
Connectica’s Commercial Director, Grace, supposed that smart thermostats could be 
particularly important for enabling such a win-win situation: 
“For years we've put up with thermostats we can’t programme, heating empty homes, and paying for 
gas and electricity based on estimates. But technology is changing this. At [Connectica], we’re 
focused on making our customers’ lives a little easier by offering […] smart energy products that 
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help our customers on the things that matter the most to them: control, comfort, convenience and 
costs.” [Grace, Commercial Director, Connectica] 
This triggered Connectica’s senior leadership team’s decision to invest £500 million to 
expand its product portfolio by establishing the company as a provider of connected 
home technologies. 
5.5.3 Interactions during Connectica’s response to climate change 
Connectica’s efforts to establish itself as a provider of connected home technologies 
was embedded in a network of business relationships with the actors introduced above. 




Figure 15: The network affected by Connectica’s response to climate change
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Throughout the two years of interactions within and across this business network, I focus 
on the three key relationships held by Connectica. Delineating the interactions in and 
around these relationships enables a holistic understanding of how companies respond to 
climate change. 
5.5.3.1 Relationship 1 (R1): Acquiring the connected home technology provider 
Ecovair 
The first relationship that affected Connectica’s efforts to establish itself as a provider of 
connected home technologies was with Ecovair. Paul, the Founder of Ecovair, had 
developed smart plugs and a platform (both a mobile app and a physical device) that 
allowed users to remotely monitor and control the energy consumption of household 
appliances. Seeking a steeper growth trajectory than the 40,000 devices they had been 
able to manufacture and install annually in the first five years since the product was 
launched in 2009, Ecovair’s Founder Paul and CEO Charlotte were keen to engage with 
a strategic investor that would not only bring cash but has the infrastructure in place to 
install over one thousand connected home devices daily. 
At the same time, Connectica’s CEO Hannah, Commercial Director Grace and Head of 
Environment Tom were evaluating strategies for expanding their product portfolio with 
connected home technologies. In fact, Connectica’s senior leadership team had both the 
financial resources (the £500 million investment capital set aside for expanding its 
product portfolio) and the infrastructure established through its traditional energy 
business (10,000 well-trained installation engineers). 
Before the team was ready to make a final investment decision, however, they wanted to 
be certain that Ecovair’s connected home technology was actually saving electricity. 
Connectica, therefore, carried out trials with households that already had Ecovair’s 
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connected home technology installed, and hired Qubeta to provide an independent 
assessment of the energy-saving potential of Ecovair’s connected home technology. 
Michael, an Advisor at Qubeta, was tasked with establishing in-depth knowledge, 
providing robust evidence and evaluating the energy-saving potential of Ecovair’s 
connected home technology: 
“We are basically running an independent and robust evaluation of the energy savings borne through 
the device. […] We were basically drawing upon existing data, so gas consumption readings from the 
energy supplier from homes both with and without this device, and running a bunch of energy modelling 
and trying to see if it's true and how much energy the device was saving.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
Interestingly, after three-months of analysing this data, Michael concluded that Ecovair’s 
connected home technology has the ability to generate energy savings of up to 68%. 
Simultaneously, Connectica’s own trials indicated a similarly promising energy-saving 
potential of around 60%. 
As a result of these findings, Connectica’s senior leadership team perceived that the 
energy-saving potential of Ecovair’s connected home technology, combined with the 
synergies stemming from Connectica’s market access and infrastructure, would 
turbocharge the company’s connected home technology business. 
In February 2015, Connectica’s CEO Hannah confirmed that the company had acquired 
Ecovair for £65 million. Ecovair’s CEO Charlotte was excited about the opportunity to 
work with Connectica and described it as an opportunity to contribute to the UK’s low 
carbon energy transition: 
"We are delighted to welcome [Connectica] as a strategic investor and key commercial partner. This is 
a massive opportunity to contribute towards transforming the energy sector by providing easy to use, 
personalised services to customers, enabling them to manage their energy use, save money and reduce 
carbon emissions.” [Charlotte, Chief Executive Officer, Ecovair] 
 205 
 
5.5.3.2 Relationship 2 (R2): Marketing connected home technology products 
Jointly, Connectica and Ecovair worked closely on marketing the connected home 
technology products. To achieve this, Connectica’s Managing Director Alistair engaged 
with the company’s existing and new customers as well as the advertising agency Advotis. 
These interactions were an important consideration for Connectica because they would 
allow installing connected home technology at the scale necessary to establish the 
company as a leading provider of connected home technologies, thereby not only 
recovering the losses stemming from the decreasing value of its conventional generation 
business but also enabling substantial emission reductions. 
In fact, since 90% of Connectica’s emissions are generated when its customers consume 
energy, the role of consumers cannot be overlooked. For its twelve million current 
customers, however, mitigating emissions alone was not sufficient to justify purchasing 
connected home technology for £199 (including installation). 
As a result, Connectica’s Managing Director Alistair quickly altered his marketing pitch 
and focused on the other benefits (e.g., lower energy bills, increased comfort) rather than 
merely the reduction of emissions: 
"We want to make energy-saving as easy as possible for our customers. This is why we continue to offer 
new, smarter ways to help customers take control of their energy usage. [Ecovair]'s innovative product 
portfolio is a great addition to [our] current service offering, and will provide our customers with a new 
range of affordable, easy to use tools to reduce their energy consumption and cut their fuel bills." 
[Alistair, Managing Director, Connectica] 
Interestingly, while it sounds counterintuitive that an energy supply company would be 
interested in reducing its customer’s energy consumption (as this would lead to less 
revenue from energy sales), Connectica’s Commercial Director Grace pointed out that 
the profit margins on pure energy sales are typically very low. Selling connected home 
technologies, on the other hand, was a much more lucrative business. 
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At the same time, Connectica received positive feedback from the consumers that had 
purchased its connected home technology: 88% of consumers using the technology felt 
more in control over their energy consumption, 70% believed that they had saved energy 
and 58% used the app to monitor their energy consumption on a daily basis. Nevertheless, 
Connectica’s Commercial Director Grace supposed that many consumers are too 
disengaged with their energy consumption and hence do not purchase connected home 
technologies: 
“Consumers are disengaged with energy. This lack of engagement between people and energy suppliers 
and their energy bills is a big problem. […] I am recruiting software engineers, user experience 
designers and data scientists from NASA. They are motivated by changing customers’ engagement with 
energy.” [Grace, Commercial Director, Connectica] 
In an attempt to encourage consumers to become more engaged with their energy 
consumption, she tasked the British advertising agency Advotis to design and implement 
an extensive marketing campaign. Amongst other measures, Advotis created a TV 
commercial aimed at raising awareness and improving consumer acceptance of connected 
home technologies. 
5.5.3.3 Relationship 3 (R3): Including connected home technologies in domestic 
energy efficiency policies 
The third and final relationship that affected Connectica’s efforts to establish itself as a 
provider of connected home technologies was in and around the company’s attempt to 
include connected home technologies in domestic energy efficiency policies. To do so, 
Connectica’s senior leadership team engaged with the MDfE and Qubeta. In fact, the 
MDfE had established a list of certified technologies and designed a set of policies to 
support these energy efficiency technologies (e.g., the Boiler+ programme). Connected 
home technologies, however, were not on this list: 
“So, for this kind of heating control technology because the technology is new it doesn't currently exist 
in regulation and testing standards.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
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The MDfE’s Head of Regulation Gary explained that this was due to a shortage of robust 
evidence that proves the energy-savings stemming from connected home technologies. 
Connectica’s senior leadership, however, had just received exactly this evidence from 
Qubeta’s Advisor Michael and happily shared the results with the MDfE. While the 
MDfE’s Head of Regulation Gary was interested and acknowledged that the evidence was 
of a quality and format that could feed into policy discussions, he decided to task Qubeta 
with a study that was explicitly designed to evaluate how connected home technologies 
can be best encouraged through regulation: 
“We want to try and understand how [connected home technologies] are best encouraged through 
regulation as well as protecting the interests of consumers.” [Gary, Head of Regulation, MDfE] 
After lengthy discussions about what kind of evidence the MDfE needs and how this 
evidence then may improve policies, Qubeta’s Advisor Michael began with its 
evaluation. 
Surprisingly, although the initial stages of Qubeta’s analysis suggested that connected 
home technologies can reduce energy consumption, it quickly became clear that the 
technology cannot be computed by the methodology underpinning the governments 
Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP). 
By way of contextual information, the SAP is a British computer tool designed to assess 
the energy and environmental performance of houses. Michael, Advisor at Qubeta, 
provided further insights into the SAP: 
“So, that is basically a very complex and long-standing energy efficiency model which models and 
predicts building energy efficiency. If you put all the data you know into this model, things like the 
building type, the construction and the type of boiler, etc., then you get out of the model some energy 
efficiency rating. This model basically underpins not quite all government energy policy, but it is a huge 
amount of it.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
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This implied, however, that when a technology cannot be computed by the methodology 
underpinning the SAP, then the chances are high that this technology is not going to be 
supported by the MDfE. In fact, Michael found that the SAP cannot compute the energy 
efficiency stemming from connected home technologies: 
“So, one of the problems with [connected home technologies] is that they change the consumption based 
on what the home should be heated to and when. [Connected home technologies] actually turn the 
heating off automatically when people are out of the house. It can also incrementally reduce your 
temperature trying to save energy. And the problem is that the SAP model just cannot compute that, 
sort of like the computer says no.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
While the MDfE, at least theoretically, could support a technology without being included 
in the SAP, Qubeta’s Advisor Michael pointed out that this is a complex process: 
“That is a multi-year process, involving a huge amount of testing which is what we are currently doing 
as part of this trial but it is proving to be very difficult.” [Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
As a result of the insights stemming from Qubeta’s analysis, the MDfE’s Head of 
Regulation Gary concluded that connected home technologies were not to be included in 
the MDfE’s list of certified technologies and hence was not supported through domestic 
energy efficiency policies. 
5.5.4 The outcome of Connectica’s response to climate change 
So far, this case has outlined the three key relationships in relation to Connectica’s efforts 
to establish itself as a provider of connected home technologies. This section now 
describes the outcome stemming from two years of interactions in and around these 
relationships. 
In discussions with Connectica’s senior leadership team, it quickly became clear that the 
decision to expand its product portfolio with connected home technologies was 
dominated by concerns over the ways in which climate change had caused its 
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conventional energy generation assets to diminish in value; leading to a drop in profit 
from £1.6 billion to just £81 million in 2014.  
As a result of Connectica’s efforts to grow its connected home technology business, the 
company has managed to install 660,000 in 2015. In fact, by combining Ecovair’s 
technological expertise with Connectica’s market access and infrastructure, Connectica’s 
senior leadership team established itself as a leading provider of connected home 
technologies in the UK. By selling 660,000 connected home technology products, 
Connectica has enabled considerable emission reductions over the products’ lifetimes.  
5.5.5 Conclusion 
This case examined an energy supply company’s efforts to expand its product portfolio 
in response to climate change. To achieve this, I scrutinised Connectica’s interactions in 
and around establishing the company as a provider of connected home technologies. I 
concentrated on three key relationships Connectica’s, including the connected home 
technology provider Ecovair, the independent research organisation Qubeta, domestic 
energy Consumers, the advertising agency Advotis and the UK’s Ministerial Department 
for Energy (MDfE). The purpose of this case was to develop a holistic understanding of 
how the case company Connectica responded to climate change. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the empirical findings stemming from five in-depth case 
studies of business responses to climate change. The first case provided insights into an 
energy supply company’s efforts to respond to a regulation aimed at mitigating carbon 
emissions. In the second case, I described how another energy supply company aimed at 
decarbonising its gas-fired energy generation assets. The third case described a 
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multinational energy supply company’s efforts to establish itself as a renewables-only 
energy supply company. In the fourth case, I outlined how an energy supply company 
responded to climate change by expanding its product portfolio with demand-side 
response technology. The fifth and final case referred to ways in which an energy supply 
company attempted to realign its business towards connected home technologies. 
In the following chapter, I analyse these five cases based on the initial theoretical structure 
(see Figure 2 on page 45) and the relevant contextual changes outlined in the Context and 
Industry Definition chapter. In this way, I analyse the empirical findings and outline the 
ways in which the insights stemming from these cases contribute to extending the current 
understanding of how companies respond to climate change. 
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6 Analysis and discussion 
In this chapter, I analyse and discuss the empirical findings in light of the initial 
theoretical structure for the study of business responses to climate change (see Figure 2 
on page 45). In doing so, I employ the intellectual lenses established through the 
literature review to explain the empirical findings. Specifically, I provide detailed 
insights that advance our understanding of the theoretically derived cause and effect 
links to answer how companies respond to climate change. 
I begin this chapter with a review of the initial theoretical structure and the research 
questions to remind the reader of the key aspects relevant to the analysis and discussion. 
I then provide an overview of the empirical findings and highlight that all five case 
studies have the commonality of leading to three observed network outcomes. Through 
an iterative systematic combining of the literature, the theory and the juxtaposition of 
theory and empirical findings, I proceed to the development of a novel conceptual 
framework of business responses to climate change. 
To do so, I analyse the empirical findings by dissecting the five empirical cases and 
running them through the initial theoretical structure (see Figure 2 on page 45). Thereby, 
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I analyse the interaction and behaviour within and across the five cases. This involves 
examining the contextual changes that triggered the network tensions and resulted in 
interaction and behaviour within and across business relationships and networks. 
In the subsequent section, I then elucidate how the empirical findings drive the 
theoretical work on organisation and management studies, corporate social 
responsibility, business networks and behavioural science together, in order to build a 
novel conceptual framework (see Figure 16  on page 246) through which I seek to 
explain how companies respond to climate change. I conclude this chapter with a brief 
summary. 
6.1 Review of initial theoretical structure and research 
questions 
The aim of analysing the empirical findings is to explain how and why this study 
provides more detailed insights that advance the theoretically derived cause and effect 
links of how companies respond to climate change. In fact, by setting the empirical 
findings presented in the previous chapter against the organisation and management 
literature on business responses to externally generated pressures in general and to 
climate change specifically as well as the interactional and behavioural insights 
stemming from the network approach and the behavioural science literature, I 
established an initial theoretical structure for the study of business responses to climate 
change. This initial structure was driven from, not just the theoretical understanding of 
the previous literature but also from the case studies themselves. This systematic 
combining, iterative and logical research process allowed me to establish an initial 
theoretical structure that consists of three pillars: 1) Network tensions, 2) Network 
interactions, and 3) Network outcomes. 
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Indeed, when analysing what was happening in each of the empirical cases, I realised 
that the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures emanating from global 
climatic changes had caused network tensions. As a result, the companies initiated 
activities and hence interacted within and across their business networks in order to 
access the necessary resources which were not available in concentrated form but rather 
located within the company’s business relationships and networks. These successive 
interactions commonly resulted in three network outcomes. 
By utilising the initial theoretical structure of network tensions, network interactions 
and network outcomes, I was able to answer the two research questions underpinning 
this study: 
1. How do companies respond to climate change? 
2. How do companies interact and behave within and across their business 
relationships and networks when responding to climate change? 
The first research question focuses on identifying the causal mechanisms that explain 
how companies respond to climate change. The second research question ensures that a 
full view of the interaction behaviour within and across business relationships and 
networks is established. As outlined in the previous section, one of the key arguments 
put forward in this thesis is that the sources that explain how companies respond to 
climate change may be located within the interaction and behaviour in business 
relationships and networks. Collectively, answering these two research questions 
permits the development of a more comprehensive understanding of how companies 
respond to climate change. 
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Driven by the research questions reviewed above, I set the empirical findings stemming 
from the five cases presented in the previous chapter against the initial theoretical 
structure for the study of business responses to climate change (Figure 2 on page 45). 
In doing so, I analyse and discuss the five case studies with regards to 1) the actors 
involved in the focal company’s response to climate change; 2) the outcome stemming 
from the response to climate change; 3) the tension created through the socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic changes emanating from global climatic changes; and 4) 
the interaction and behaviour in and around the company’s business relationships and 
networks. Within and across these four sections of the analysis and discussion, I focus 
on providing more detailed insights that advance the theoretically derived cause and 
effect links that explain how companies respond to climate change. 
Below, I begin the analysis and discussion of my empirical findings by providing an 
overview of the contextual changes that triggered the companies’ responses to climate 
change. 
6.2 Overview of business responses to climate change 
In this section, I analyse and discuss the contextual changes that triggered the business 
responses to climate change in the empirical cases. Interestingly, in each of the five case 
studies, prior to the focal companies’ response to climate change, all were characterised 
by emitting a considerable amount of carbon (between 4.4 and 42.0 megatons annually), 
which was mostly because of a large proportion of fuel-based energy generation assets. 
What came through when analysing the empirical findings is that the emergence of 
climate change had brought about a variation in socio-cultural (i.e., a shift towards more 
sustainable forms of living, working and consuming), legal/regulatory (i.e., policies and 
regulations to promote decarbonisation of the economy) and economic (i.e., more costly 
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to run a carbon-intensive business) values, norms and rules, which acted as a stimulus 
for the case companies to respond to climate change. 
In the third case, for example, this is vividly illustrated by the case company Energize 
commitment to restructuring its energy generation portfolio with the aim of establishing 
itself as a renewables-only energy supply company. Similarly, in the second, fourth and 
fifth case, the focal companies decided to implement changes to mitigate carbon 
emissions. Conversely, in the first case, the response to climate change seemed to be 
purely triggered by a legal/regulatory pressure that required the company to install 
energy efficiency measures in domestic households. 
Collectively, the five empirical cases indicate that the case companies responded to 
climate change as a result of either socio-cultural, legal/regulatory or economic 
pressures which were generated externally to the company. Interestingly, while, on the 
one hand, the empirical findings suggest that the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and 
economic pressures drive companies towards responding to climate change, on the other 
hand, simultaneously operating pressures are demanding companies to operate as cost-
effectively as possible. In fact, Shevchenko et al. (2016) would term this a paradox 
ingrained in the behaviour of external stakeholders (in this study evident through the 
socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures) who are pressuring companies 
to respond to climate change but, at the same time, allowing these companies to delay 
doing so by demanding a cost-effective approach. Indeed, a similar congruence of 
behaviour appears to be underpinning the empirical findings of this study. 
In an attempt to highlight how this paradox occurred in each of the five cases 
underpinning this study, I provide broadly representative quotes and examples in Table 
9 below. Collectively, these quotes and examples show how the socio-cultural, 
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legal/regulatory and economic pressures triggered the business responses to climate 
change in the most effective manner. 
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 Socio-cultural Legal/regulatory Economic 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
“It has to be affordable for consumers because they 
are dependent on the electricity.” [Julia, Energy 
Policy Manager, Utiliko] 
The ECO scheme was introduced; requiring all energy 
supply companies with more than 250,000 
customers to install energy efficiency measures in 
low-income and harder-to-treat properties. 
Collectively, these measures were to generate 
carbon emission lifetime savings of 28 megatons. 
Energy supply companies with less than 250,000 
customers were not obliged to comply with the ECO 
scheme. Soon, they were able to offer 20% lower 
energy prices than Utiliko. 
Case 2: 
Olectra 
“While a lot of people now are definitely aware of 
climate change in such a way that they understand 
that particularly in the energy sector we are in a 
transition and there are costs associated with 
transitioning into a decarbonised system.” [Adam, 
Head of Wholesale Policy, Olectra] 
The MDfE announced the CCS commercialisation 
competition. The private company that was able to 
demonstrate the commercial and technical viability 
of deploying CCS technology in the UK would be 
awarded up to £1 billion to support the actual 
construction of the project. 
Competing energy supply companies do not attempt to 
decarbonise its fossil fuel-fired power plants. 
Case 3: 
Energize  
“Everybody’s thinking about energy has become so 
absolutely focused on what the final bill is because 
the argument is that’s the only bit that consumers 
really care about.” [Adam, Analyst, MDfE] 
“She [The Secretary of the State] is very clear on this 
point, energy security is her absolute number 1 
priority for the department, and that’s something 
that the Prime Minister has reinforced as well.” 
[Scott, Head of Energy Security, MDfE] 
“There is a significant risk that the market will no 
longer deliver an adequate level of security of 
supply as it has done historically, principally 
because potential revenues in the energy-only 
market may no longer incentivise sufficient 
investment in capacity.” [Report, MDfE] 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
Increasing pressures on companies to act “in 
response to the central challenges of the energy 
transition, combating climate change and making 
responsible use of natural resources.” [Steven, 
CEO, Vonergy] 
The Energy Entrepreneurship Fund (EEF) and the 
Capacity Market Mechanism as a set of supportive 
regulatory mechanisms in order to enable further 
growth of the DSR market in the UK. 
Grid operators are willing to make these payments 
because of savings stemming from not having to 
maintain costly reserve energy capacities (e.g., 
fossil fuel power plants). 
Case 5: 
Connectica 
“At [Connectica], we’re focused on making our 
customers’ lives a little easier by offering […] 
smart energy products that help our customers on 
the things that matter the most to them: control, 
comfort, convenience and costs.” [Grace, 
Commercial Director, Connectica] 
Connected home technology cannot be computed by 
the methodology underpinning the governments 
Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP). Hence, 
connected home technologies did not receive 
regulatory support. 
The decision to establish itself as a provider of 
connected home technologies was dominated by 
concerns over the ways in which climate change had 
caused its conventional energy generation assets to 
diminish in value; leading to a drop in profit from 
£1.6 billion to just £81 million in 2014. 
Table 9: Socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures in response to climate change 
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As illustrated by the quotes and examples in Table 9 above, the contextual changes at 
the socio-cultural level triggered the case companies to decarbonise their energy 
generation portfolio as cost-effectively as possible. In fact, while the values, norms and 
rules of the society (which are ultimately the case companies’ customers) appeared to 
be more aware of climate change and that decarbonising the economy and particularly 
the energy supply system is required, at the same time, the socio-cultural pressures 
demanded affordable energy prices and did not seem to be willing to bear the costs 
associated with transitioning towards a low-carbon energy supply system. 
These empirical findings are in line with previous research on socio-cultural pressures 
which were found to act as both drivers of and barriers to business responses to climate 
change (e.g., Adger et al., 2009; Leiserowitz, 2006; Shevchenko et al., 2016). The 
present research shows that socio-cultural pressures are a double-edged sword in the 
sense that they trigger business responses to climate change but, at the same time, pose 
a financial constraint on doing so as the socio-cultural actors (i.e., customers, taxpayers) 
are not willing to bear the costs associated with moving towards a low-carbon energy 
supply system. What appears to underpin this behaviour of society is the so-called 
attitude-behaviour gap (e.g., Öberseder et al., 2011; Caruana et al., 2016). In other 
words, very few consumers are actually translating their concerns about environmental 
problems such as climate change into actual purchasing behaviours. As a result, this 
study concludes that business responses to climate change are triggered by socio-
cultural pressures but, at the same time, limited by the extent to which consumer’s value 
and financially reward such activities. 
Furthermore, the previous literature claims that the emerging legal/regulatory pressures 
encourage businesses to decarbonise their operations (e.g., Bansal and Roth, 2000; 
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Banerjee et al., 2003; Veal and Mouzas, 2010). While the empirical findings of this 
study confirm this, it seems that the legal/regulatory pressures on companies are relative 
to other concerns of policymakers. In the context of the energy sector, this is 
exemplified by the government priority of safeguarding the security of supply and 
maintaining the affordability of energy. For example, in case three, it is evident that the 
changes in the legal/regulatory pressures have driven the company to establish itself as 
a provider of 100% renewable energy, but at the same time, the legal/regulatory 
pressures focused on the need to maintain a secure supply of electricity, which was 
challenged by decommissioning the stable supply inherent in fossil fuel-based energy 
generation assets. As a result, the legal/regulatory pressures were altered. The present 
research, therefore, suggests that the legal/regulatory pressures act as a driver of 
business responses to climate change but are constrained by the priority on the security 
of supply and/or energy affordability. This, in turn, explains why the legal/regulatory 
demands to mitigate emissions may often be patchy and inconsistent. A similar 
congruence of thinking was put forward in earlier research by Wittneben (2009), 
Keohane and Victor (2011) and Okereke et al. (2012). 
Moreover, the empirical findings of this study show that climate change has, indeed, 
brought about a variety of economic pressures and opportunities. Commercialising such 
opportunities, however, frequently requires high upfront capital investments that may 
hamper short-term profitability. As illustrated in the first and second case, companies 
that are not making these investments today obtain a competitive advantage in the short-
term. These insights advance the established thinking that economic pressures are a key 
driver of business responses to climate change (e.g., Cordano, 1993; Bansal and Roth, 
2000; Kolk and Levy, 2001). In fact, this confirms that addressing climate change 
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competes with the business focus on short-term profitability as identified in the 
literature review (e.g., Wright and Nyberg, 2017). This behaviour, as demonstrated in 
Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons, may explain why emissions in the atmosphere 
continue to rise. In other words, in the short-term, for each individual company, it is in 
their own best interest to grow their business and neglect the need to decarbonise as it 
will weaken the company’s competitiveness. 
The overview of the contextual changes that triggered the case companies’ responses to 
climate change, however, does not fully explain how the case companies interacted and 
behaved in response to climate change. To shed light on this question, in the next 
section, I dissect the five empirical cases and analyse them along with the initial 
theoretical structure as established in the literature review (Figure 2 on page 45). In 
doing so, I integrate all sections of the theory, the empirical findings and the contextual 
changes for the analysis of the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and 
networks when responding to climate change. 
6.3 Analysis of interaction and behaviour in business 
networks when responding to climate change 
This section analyses and discusses the interaction and behaviour within and across the 
networks of business relationships that were formed in each of the five empirical cases. 
I employ the initial theoretical structure in and around the network tensions, network 
interactions and network outcomes. Interestingly, what came through when analysing 
the data is that network tensions, as the first pillar of the initial theoretical structure, are 




Interestingly, what was evident in the five empirical cases is that the contextual changes 
emanating from climate change triggered network level activities because in the short-
term these contextual changes caused some kind of discontinuity in the business 
networks. In fact, the source of network tensions appeared to be a mismatch between 
current operations and the emerging socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures. Therefore, I begin with analysing and discussing these network tensions. 
6.3.1 Network tensions 
This section discusses the network tensions that the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and 
economic pressures have brought about. More specifically, network tensions refer to 
the discontinuity in the business network originating from the misalignment of business 
operations and the need for change stemming from the contextual changes. In other 
words, the tensions between what the previous literature describes as the focus on short-
term profitability and the emerging need to respond to change (Okereke et al., 2012; 
Wright and Nyberg, 2017). Analysing the network tensions that the contextual changes 
emanating from climate change (socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic) is 
important to understand how companies interact and ultimately respond to climate 
change. 
Demonstrated across all five cases of business responses to climate change, the present 
study identifies a tension between the established activities and resources that a network 
actor possesses (current operations) and the activities and resources required to address 
climate change (need for change). Current operations refers to assessing the validity and 
value of business resources in light of the emerging contextual changes. In the second 
case, for example, the case company explicitly stated that their core business is in and 
around the supply of energy and that the company is not a manufacturer of carbon 
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reduction technologies. Nonetheless, it was an innovative carbon reduction technology 
(Carbon Capture and Storage) that the company required in order to achieve their 
chosen strategy in response to the contextual changes, i.e. retrofitting one of the 
company’s gas-fired power plants with CCS technology. 
The need for change, on the other hand, refers to the ways in which the socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures demand companies to decarbonise their 
operations. In each of the five empirical cases, the companies seemed committed as 
long as they perceived that a decarbonised energy supply system is beneficial for their 
business. As illustrated in the third case, for example, investing in carbon-intensive 
projects was not permissible, unless when it was about safeguarding the security of 
supply. 
In an effort to further illuminate how the tension between current operations and the 
need for change played out across the five empirical cases, I provide broadly 
representative quotes from each case in Table 10 below. Collectively, these quotes show 










Case Current operations Need for change 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
 “The ECO has moved more and more 
towards the priority group customers. So, 
these customers that haven't the money to 
contribute, so we're having to fund up to a 
hundred per cent of these measures.” 
[Lucy, Development Manager, Utiliko] 
“[Brixwell Council] obviously has 
knowledge of the properties and the areas 
that can help with planning measures such 
as solid wall insulation.” [Lucy, Business 
Development Manager, Utiliko]  
Case 2: 
Olectra 
 “A successful scheme at [Yankee] could 
pave the way for massive investment in 
carbon capture and storage in the UK 
[and] with thousands of gas-fired power 
plants around the world, there could be a 
huge demand for the technology 
overseas.” [Kevin, Carbon Capture and 
Storage Manager, PlentiOil] 
“We’re not a technology manufacturer, 
we’re a utility so you know we rely on 
others to produce things like technology 
and innovate.” [Simon, Business 
Development Manager, Olectra]  
Case 3: 
Energize  
 [John, Board of Directors, Energize] “An 
investment in higher carbon isn't 
necessarily a good idea unless it is about 
the security of supply.” [Ben, Head of 
Orientation, Energize] 
“A comprehensive analysis of the current 
business activities and structure, the 
present and future requirements of the 
energy market and – on this basis – an 
extensive assessment of all options for 
strategic actions.”  
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
 “We are committed to working in 
partnership with customers to make 
energy work for them. We believe that a 
lower carbon UK and being more 
sustainable are both good for the world 
and good for business.” [Isaac, Chief 
Operating Officer, Pantegis] 
“We want to be able to continue to offer to 
our customers a wide variety of 
commercial solutions that work for almost 
every company under every set of 
circumstances.” [Steven, Chief Executive 
Officer, Vonergy]  
Case 5: 
Connectica 
 “With around 90% of our carbon emissions 
arising from customer energy 
consumption, the greatest role we can play 
is to give our customers the products and 
services they need to reduce their energy 
use and carbon footprint.” [Tom, Head of 
Environment, Connectica] 
“At [Connectica], we’re focused on making 
our customers’ lives a little easier by 
offering […] smart energy products that 
help our customers on the things that 
matter the most to them: control, comfort, 
convenience and costs.” [Grace, 
Commercial Director, Connectica]  
Table 10: Network tensions in response to climate change 
Interestingly, previous research suggests that the business tension brought about by 
climate change is between short-term profitability and meaningfully mitigating carbon 
emissions (Okereke et al., 2012; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). The empirical findings of 
this study, however, suggest that it is rather between meaningfully mitigating emissions 
and the established activities as well as resources that a company possesses. 
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What is most pertinent to this study, however, is that despite the lack of resources, all 
five case companies attempted to change their business operations profoundly. In the 
third case, for example, the case company, historically driven by fossil fuel-based 
energy generation, devoted itself to become a provider of renewables-only energy. As 
identified earlier in this chapter, however, the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and 
economic pressures required this to be done in the most effective manner. Interestingly, 
what came through when analysing the five empirical cases is that the case companies 
attempted to achieve effectiveness by engaging within and across their business 
relationships and networks. 
In fact, all of the case companies interacted within and across their business 
relationships and networks in order to access the resources and mobilise the activities 
that were not aligned with their current operations but were required to respond to 
climate change. 
6.3.2 Network interactions 
This section identifies the network interactions between network actors, their resources 
and activities. In other words, network interactions capture the network-level activities 
aimed at accessing resources to address the network tensions. To do so, actors interact 
within and across their business relationships and networks. Scrutinising the ways in 
which actors initiate activities to access the resources required to respond to climate 
change is important as it may reveal the mechanisms ingrained in the process of 
interaction that may enhance the understanding of business responses to climate change. 
Prior to dissecting the specific network interaction, it is essential to identify the network 
actors involved in five empirical cases. This becomes particularly pertinent when 
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recalling the network approach that is underpinning the present research. Indeed, the 
network approach required going beyond the conventional thought of island-like 
businesses and take entire business networks as the unit of analysis. This approach 
seemed particularly relevant to the study of business responses to climate change as the 
sheer scale of mounting a response to climate change is likely to go far beyond the 
capacity of an individual company (Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Ferraro et al., 2015). 
Largely unsurprisingly, and endorsing the utilisation of the network approach, in each 
of the five empirical cases, the focal company engaged with a multitude of network 
actors (on average more than seven actors per response to climate change). In the first 
case, for example, the network of actors involved in the business response to climate 
change comprised eight key actors. Similarly, the second, third, fourth and fifth case 
involved nine, six, seven and six network actors respectively. These included energy 
supply companies, energy services/technology providers, energy consumers, national 
governments, local authorities, industry associations and others. 
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2 2 2 3 1 AMP; Connectica; Energize; Moggley; 
Olectra; Pantegis; PlentiOil; The Energy 
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1  1 1 2 Advotis; EU ETS; Morhaven International; 
Thameswide; Qubeta 
Total network actors 8 9 6 7 6  
Table 11: Network actors involved in business responses to climate change 
As highlighted in Table 11 above, the present research provides empirical evidence that 
shows the variety of actors involved in business responses to climate change. In this 
study, this included seven different types of actors. 
The first type of actor involved are energy supply companies and their competitors. In 
all five cases, this included the energy supply companies that initiated the efforts to 
address the contextual changes (Connectica, Energize, Olectra, Utiliko, Vonergy). In 
case one to four, at least one additional energy supply company was either collaborating 
or competing with the focal company (AMP, Moggley, Pantegis, PlentiOil, The Energy 
Bjird). For example, in the second case, the multinational oil and gas company PlentiOil 
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was closely collaborating with the energy supply company Olectra in order to retrofit a 
gas-fired power plant located with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology. On 
the other hand, in the third case, the multinational energy supply company AMP was 
directly competing for customers with the case company Energize. 
The second type of actor were energy services and technology providers. On the one 
hand, these included energy services providers like the French project support company 
as well as oil and gas infrastructure specialist Projexon, the British energy consulting 
company Advantegis, or the British energy service company specialised in subsea and 
pipeline engineering work Planwey. On the other hand, this included energy technology 
providers such as the DSR technology provider Xidoa or the connected home 
technology provider Ecovair. In fact, the present research indicates that energy supply 
companies engage with energy services and technology providers to respond to climate 
change as effectively as possible. This was vividly illustrated in the fourth and fifth 
case, as the focal companies opted to acquire a low-carbon energy technology provider 
instead of investing in costly R&D to develop the technology by themselves, thereby, 
outsourcing the initial risks to other network actors. 
The third type of actor identified in this study are consumers. Consumers seem to play 
an important role in business responses to climate change since they demand a low-
carbon energy supply system but are not willing to bear much of the costs associated 
with this transition. Here, the empirical evidence presented in cases one, three and five 
suggests that either domestic and/or commercial/industrial consumers affected the way 
in which the focal company responded to climate change. 
The fourth type of actor involved in all five cases of business responses to climate 
change are departments of national governments. In fact, the UK’s Ministerial 
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Department for Energy (MDfE) directly shaped the business responses to climate 
change by designing and implementing a legal/regulatory framework to which the 
companies had to react. In the second case, this also included House Windsor, a British 
governmental department responsible for the UK’s public finance and economic policy. 
Additionally, the five cases suggest that local authorities are the fifth type of actor 
involved in business responses to climate change. Particularly in case one and two, the 
local authorities of Ablefield Council and Brixwell Council impacted the way in which 
the focal company responded to climate change. In these cases, the local authorities 
possessed vital insights that would permit achieving the focal companies’ response to 
climate change more effectively (e.g., information about households eligible for the 
ECO scheme). Furthermore, local authorities were responsible for issuing planning 
permissions required for large-scale construction work such as retrofitting a gas-fired 
power plant with CCS technology (Case 2). 
The sixth type of actor involved in the business responses to climate change were 
industry associations. In the first case, the energy industry associations Exxelo UK 
played an important role in establishing industry positions on the key energy policies 
(such as the ECO). 
The seventh and final type of actor involved in the five business responses to climate 
change are other actors such as an international hospitality company, a research 
organisation, an advertising agency and a social housing association. These actors had 
a large variety of roles such as providing robust data about households’ energy 
consumption, trialling the commercial benefits of low-carbon technologies as well as 
designing and implementing marketing campaigns to raise awareness. 
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Collectively, these seven types of actors comprised the network actors involved in 
business responses to climate change. This study, therefore, shows that business 
responses to externally generated involve a multitude of network actors. As such, the 
present research raises doubts about the existing organisation and management research 
on business responses to climate change because such efforts are commonly 
conceptualised as atomistic and isolated activities of individual companies (e.g., Kolk 
and Levy, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2003; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Margolick and Russell, 
2004; Jones and Levy, 2007; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; Shevchenko et al., 2016; 
Wright and Nyberg, 2017). 
Throughout the literature review, I have pointed out that the organisation and 
management literature of touching upon business responses to climate change 
commonly disregard that companies are embedded in wider networks of continuous 
business and non-business exchange relationships (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; 
Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004). As this 
study shows, the contrary appears to be the case: Companies interact with other actors 
to access the resources necessary to respond to climate change in the most effective 
manner (as demanded by socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures). This 
is largely because the respective network actors possess at least one resource required 
to achieve the strategy in response to climate change. This has been evident across all 
of the five cases underpinning this study. 
The finding that companies interact in response to climate change is valuable but invites 
a deeper exploration of the specific network interactions. I argue that it is only through 
this vital step that the observed network outcomes can be explained.  
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What came through when analysing the specific network interactions, was that such 
interactions appeared to be driven by activities aimed at resource rationalisation and 
resource expansion. Resource rationalisation refers to the ways in which network actors 
attempt to safeguard the established network position, assets, profitability and other 
valuable possessions. Unsurprisingly, responding to climate change had brought about 
was driven by effectiveness as network actors had to ensure that their activities were 
beneficial to the company’s customers. Although this underpinned the network 
interaction across all cases, it was particularly strong in the third case. Here, the 
company was very clear that investing in a low-carbon energy generation portfolio was 
the preferred option as long as it bore benefits to the customers (e.g., maintaining low 
energy prices). 
Resource expansion, on the other hand, refers to the ways in which network actors 
attempt to mobilise network resources and activities to alter their network position. All 
of the case companies interacted comprehensively with other network actors in order to 
expand their resource pool. These efforts seemed to be driven by cost-effectiveness 
since the focal actors perceived that they could achieve their response to climate change 
at the smallest cost when mobilising network resources. This argument, claiming that 
businesses engage in network interaction when they perceive that value can be created, 
either directly or indirectly, is in line with the extent IMP literature (e.g., Ritter et al., 
2004; Mouzas and Ford, 2009). 
In fact, a key cause of this appeared to be the case that companies were concerned about 
the uncertain future benefits and the large upfront capital investments necessary to 
respond to climate change. Across all five empirical cases, it is evident that the 
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companies had to make a considerable investment in order to achieve the response 
strategies. 
Table 12 below illustrates the network interaction based upon activities aimed at 
resource rationalisation and resource expansion by providing broadly representative 
quotes for each of the five cases. 
Case Resource rationalisation Resource expansion 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
“We are just always driven to deliver as cost-
effectively as possible.” [Lucy, Business 
Development Manager, Utiliko] 
Thameswide, Brixwell Council and Isotec 
viewed the ECO scheme as a big 
opportunity and were seeking to benefit 
from Utiliko’s obligation to retrofit low-
income homes and harder-to-treat 
properties with solid wall insulation. 
Case 2: 
Olectra 
“The high cost of developing innovative, 
first-of-a-kind projects like [Yankee] 
CCS, need strong governmental support – 
as illustrated by the gradual development 
of other energy technologies in the past –. 
In the absence of the Competition and 
potential funding, we reluctantly 
concluded that there is no longer a future 
for the [Yankee] project in the near term.” 
[Joint statement by Olectra and PlentiOil] 
“I think the problem we have at the moment 
is that we are trying to pretend that we can 
finance the expensive demonstration 
phase by some promise of jam tomorrow 
and the golden megawatt hour that is 
suddenly going to shower great wealth 
upon whoever actually gets there, but as 
with CCS that just doesn’t work, we need 
to find a way of providing the upfront 
capital support to make that work.” 




“Broadly speaking investing in a low carbon 
kind of portfolio is good [...] but we have 
to prove the benefit to consumers.” [Ben, 
Head of Orientation, Energize] 
“The conventional energy spinoff […] left 
deep marks on our balance sheet.” 
[Walter, CEO, Energize] 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
“Contracts are awarded based on capability 
and price. We cannot discriminate against 
fuel type’s oﬀered.” [Claudia, 
Spokeswoman, Gryd] 
“Our customers are commercial industrials. 
They, you know, they care about reducing 
their emissions but at the end of the day 
they’re doing it because there’s a direct 
financial benefit; they get paid to do it.” 
[Joe, Chief Executive Officer, Xidoa] 
Case 5: 
Connectica 
“This is a massive opportunity to contribute 
towards transforming the energy sector by 
providing easy to use, personalised 
services to customers, enabling them to 
manage their energy use, save money and 
reduce carbon emissions.” [Charlotte, 
Chief Executive Officer, Ecovair] 
“That is a multi-year process, involving a 
huge amount of testing which is what we 
are currently doing as part of this trial but 
it is proving to be very difficult.” 
[Michael, Advisor, Qubeta] 
 




Interestingly, when analysing the case data on the network interaction in light of the 
behavioural sciences literature, it became clear that a set of behaviours may underpin 
the resource rationalisation and resource expansion activities. This includes 1) Frames 
and reference points, 2) Loss aversion and the fixed-resource pie, and 3) Herd 
behaviour. I now turn my attention to analysing and discussing each of the behaviours 
evident in this study. 
6.3.2.1 Frames and reference points 
The first set of behaviours identified when analysing the network interaction across all 
five cases is related to frames and reference points. Frames and reference points refer 
to the risk-averse behaviour of actors and the tendency to weigh responses to climate 
change against reference points. 
In all five cases, it was either the legal/regulatory pressures (Case 1, 2 and 3) or the 
economic opportunity (Case 4 and 5) that acted as a frame for the activities made by the 
network actors. These frames were presented in a loss- or gain-oriented manner. In the 
first and third case, the respective legal/regulatory pressures (ECO scheme and 
Renewables Obligation) were framed in a loss-oriented manner (a fine for non-
compliance). In the second, fourth and fifth case, the legal/regulatory pressures (CCS 
Commercialisation Competition) and the economic opportunities (high margins and 
new revenue streams) were framed in a gain-oriented manner (financial benefits from 
compliance or proactivity). 
Interestingly, whether or not a decision was framed in a loss- or gain-oriented manner 
did not seem to impact the ways in which companies behaved. In fact, in all five cases, 
the network interaction was characterised and driven by risk-aversion. Astonishingly, 
this finding contradicts the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who 
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suggested that only positively framed decisions, i.e. the gains that can be obtained when 
addressing a problem, prompt risk-averse behaviour. Negatively framed decisions, i.e. 
what can be lost when not addressing a problem, on the other hand, would prompt risk-
seeking behaviour (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Furthermore, the legal/regulatory pressures or economic opportunities acted as 
reference points for the network interaction. In fact, in all five cases, the case company’s 
responses to climate change were relative to these reference points. In the first case, for 
example, this meant that the business response to climate change was relative to the 
ECO scheme. Similar behaviour occurred in the fourth and fifth case where the 
companies’ efforts in response to climate change were relative to the economic 
opportunity. As a result of these diverging reference points held by network actors 
rather than just the single aim of reducing carbon emissions may explain the differing 
behaviour of actors within the respective networks. This finding advances previous 
research conducted by Veal and Mouzas (2010) who, based on the prior work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tenbrunsel et al. (2000), found that companies take 
the emerging rules and regulations as a frame for thinking about their action in response 
to climate change. 
In summary, this study finds that network interactions in response to climate change are 
based upon diverging frames and reference points held by the network actors. Table 13 
provides illustrative examples of how the network interactions were based on differing 





Case Frames Reference points 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
The ECO scheme presented a choice framed 
in a loss-oriented manner (a fine of up to 
£590 million). Even compliance with the 
ECO was a loss for Utiliko, however, at 
lower costs. This prompted risk-averse 
network behaviour. 
The ECO scheme acted as a reference point 
for network behaviour. The efforts to 
mitigate the carbon emissions stemming 
from its consumers were relative to the 
ECO scheme (e.g., focus on addressing 
fuel poverty and reducing carbon 




The CCS commercialisation competition 
represented a choice framed in a gain-
oriented manner (a potential support of up 
to £1 billion for demonstrating the 
commercial and technical viability of 
CCS retrofit). This prompted risk-seeking 
network behaviour at first but transitioned 
back to risk-averse network behaviour 
once the opportunity for gain vanished. 
The CCS Commercialisation Competition 
and EU ETS acted as reference points. 
The network behaviour was relative to the 
requirements set under the CCS 
competition. The price of purchasing the 
potentially saved emissions allowances 




The Renewables Obligation represented a 
choice framed in a loss-oriented manner 
(a fine of up to £45 per MWh for non-
compliance). This prompted risk-averse 
network behaviour. 
The Renewables Obligation and EU ETS 
acted as reference points for network 
behaviour. Energize’s response to climate 
change was relative to regulation. 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
The commercial opportunity of DSR 
technology presented a choice framed in a 
gain-oriented manner (high margins and 
new revenue stream). This prompted risk-
averse network behaviour. 
The commercial opportunity of DSR 
technology acted as a reference point for 
network behaviour. The efforts to mitigate 
carbon emissions stemming from the 
application of DSR technology was 
relative to the commercial opportunity 




The commercial opportunity of connected 
home technologies represented a choice 
framed in a gain-oriented manner (high 
margins and new revenue stream). This 
promoted risk-averse network behaviour. 
The commercial opportunity of connected 
home technologies acted as a reference 
point for network behaviour. The efforts 
to mitigate carbon emissions stemming 
from the application of connected home 
technologies was relative to the 
commercial opportunity (e.g., focus on 
new revenues from customers). 
Table 13: Frames and reference points in network interactions 
Based on the empirical insights in and around these illustrative examples and in light of 
the previous literature I conclude that the wide range of frames and reference points of 
network actors brings about diverging network interactions when responding to climate 
change. In fact, what became evident when analysing the empirical findings is that in 
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each of the cases the network interactions were characterised by risk-aversion and the 
tendency to weigh responses to climate change against frames and reference points. 
Furthermore, the network interactions seemed to be driven by loss aversion and the 
belief in a fixed-resource pie. 
6.3.2.2 Loss aversion and the fixed-resource pie 
The second set of behaviours identified when analysing the network interactions across 
all five cases is related to loss aversion and the fixed-resource pie. These refer to the 
loss-averse network interaction of actors and the belief in a fixed-resource pie. 
In all five cases, the network interaction seemed to be characterised by loss-aversion. 
In fact, as soon as the focal actors realised that the loss of resources was a possibility, 
the company adjusted its response to climate change as such that activities aimed at 
mitigating carbon emissions were reduced. This played out similarly in all five cases. 
In the first case, for example, as soon as the actors realised that it was impossible to 
comply with the ECO scheme within the allocated costs, their interaction turned towards 
requesting an alteration of the policy. Thereby, attempting to safeguard profitability by 
minimising the costs of responding to legal/regulatory changes resulting from the 
emergence of global climatic changes. In the same way, in the third case, the network 
interaction was rooted in not missing a commercial opportunity along with the transition 
towards a renewables-only energy supply, or in other words, maximising profitability 
by running a two GW coal-fired power plant. The network interaction of actors, 
therefore, appeared to be characterised by loss aversion since the network actors had 
the tendency to prefer avoiding a loss by keeping their current resources rather than 
bearing the risk of losing resources in the process of responding to climate change. As 
suggested by previous research (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1991) this behaviour is rooted in the belief that the 
competitiveness nature of the business environment will eventually eliminate actors that 
operate inefficiently. 
This is further amplified by the behavioural bias of perceiving the world and its 
resources as limited (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000). In fact, this congruence of thinking, 
evident across all cases, prompted network interactions based upon a lose-lose or win-
lose frames. As a result, the network actors opted for protecting their resources and 
rationalising activities rather than putting the company at risk when responding to 
climate change. Interestingly, it did not seem to matter whether a decision was based 
upon a lose-lose or a win-lose frame. The default always appeared to be to protect the 
company from losing their current network position and customer base rather than 
exposing the company to the risks associated with responding to climate change. In the 
third case, for example, the commercial benefits related to the case company’s move 
towards renewables were incremental and put the company at risk of losing their current 
network position. This prompted network interactions based on a win-lose frame in 
which defending the current resources and rationalising activities were the preferred 
actions. 
As a result of the network interaction in and around loss aversion and the fixed-resource 
pie, actors opted for defending their existing resources and rationalising their activities 
when responding to climate change rather than striving for the incremental benefits 
stemming from a radical alteration of resources as required for an immediate response 
to climate change. Table 14 provides broadly illustrative examples of the network 




Case Loss aversion Fixed-resource pie 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
Utiliko’s response suggests that network 
behaviour was driven by loss-aversion. As 
soon as the actors realised that it was 
impossible to respond to the ECO scheme 
within the set cost-structure, they 
requested an alteration of the policy. 
Profitability was thereby safeguarded and 
the costs of responding to regulation were 
reduced. 
The benefits of responding to the ECO 
scheme were incremental and did not 
outweigh the associated costs. This 
prompted network behaviour based on a 
lose-lose frame. Here, Utiliko chose to opt 
for the lesser evil (responding at lowest-
possible costs) and thereby protecting 
their network position rather than 
exposing the company to the risks 
associated with extensive spending on 
responding to climate change. 
Case 2: 
Olectra 
Olectra’s response suggests that network 
behaviour was driven by loss-aversion. As 
soon as the loss of resources was a 
possibility (e.g., loss of financial support 
when the MDfE cancelled the CCS 
competition), the company rendered its 
response to climate change. 
The benefits of decarbonising its Yankee 
gas-fired power plant (one megaton fewer 
carbon emissions) were incremental and 
did not outweigh the upfront investment. 
This prompted network behaviour based 
on a win-lose frame. Olectra chose to 
protect themselves rather than putting the 




Energize’s response was driven by ensuring 
profitability (e.g., running a two GW coal-
fired power plant). The network 
behaviour was rooted in loss-aversion (not 
missing a commercial opportunity along 
with the transition towards a renewables-
only energy supply). 
The commercial benefits stemming from 
Energize’s move towards renewables 
were incremental and put the company at 
risk of losing customers. This prompted 
network behaviour based on a win-lose 
frame in which resource rationalisation 
was the preferred action. 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
Vonergy’s response suggests that network 
behaviour was driven by loss-aversion. As 
soon as the actors realised that it was 
costly to gain a significant traction for 
DSR in the UK, they decided to focus on 
other countries (e.g., France). 
The benefits of establishing itself as a 
provider of DSR technology were 
incremental (low carbon emissions 
reduction and low commercial benefits). 
This prompted network behaviour based 
on a win-lose frame and individuals 
choose to protect the company rather than 
putting it at risk. 
Case 5: 
Connectica 
Connectica’s response was driven by 
ensuring profitability (e.g., a revenue of 
£660 million). The network behaviour 
appeared to be rooted in loss-aversion (not 
missing the commercial opportunities 
stemming from its traditional carbon-
intensive business). 
The benefits of establishing itself as a 
provider of connected home technologies 
were considerable (a zero-carbon 
intensity revenue of £660 million in 2015) 
but the carbon-intensive business 
remained profitable. This prompted 
network behaviour based on a win-lose 
frame and individuals choose to protect 
the company rather than putting it at risk. 
Table 14: Loss aversion and the fixed-resource pie in network interactions
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6.3.2.3 Herd behaviour 
The third and final set of behaviours identified when analysing the network interactions 
across all five cases is related to herd behaviour. These refer to the ways in which actors 
engage in response to climate change that are akin to other actors in their business 
network rather than opting for isolated action. 
In all five cases, the network interactions were characterised by forming and acting as 
a herd. In other words, the network actors made their decisions relative to how other 
network actors behaved. In the first case, for example, the case company decided to 
request a revision of the ECO scheme because compliance was costly and some of the 
other network actors were not exposed to the external legal/regulatory pressure. The 
network actors that were required to respond to the ECO scheme jumped on the 
bandwagon and also requested an alteration. Similarly, in the fourth case, the case 
company may have taken the decision to reduce their effort to establish itself as a 
provider of DSR technology in the UK because other network actors continued to make 
profits with diesel-fired power plants. 
As suggested by previous research (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978; Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 
1995, 2000; Mouzas and Ford, 2011) in these herd-like network interactions, the 
network actors acted akin when their intrinsic values and beliefs were similar. 
Collectively, such herds of actors had the chance to alter the contextual changes 
resulting from the emergence of climate change, such as legal/regulatory 
decarbonisation targets. In the second case, for example, the two focal companies acted 
like as a collective when withdrawing their commitment to retrofit a gas-fired power 
plant with CCS technology. In line with this, and predominantly a result of similar 
intrinsic values and beliefs, the network actors in the first case requested alterations to 
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the ECO scheme. This led to a revision of the carbon emission saving targets. The herd 
behaviour has thereby been able to render the contextual changes resulting from global 
climatic changes. 
Interestingly, while the network actors intrinsically seemed to strive to control the 
interactions in their business relationships and networks, in practice, this rarely 
happened. As a result the networks in each of the cases appeared to operate as a “self-
organizing system” (Ritter et al., 2004, p.175) in which no individual actor could 
choose, develop, manage and control networks with the purpose of enhancing their own 
performance because this was always dependent on the respective activities and 
resources of counterparts. This does not imply, however, that herd behaviour always 
reduces the magnitude of the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic changes 
resulting from climate change. Interestingly, in the fourth and fifth case, the network 
actors acted as a collective when attempting to raise awareness about DSR technologies 
in the UK. This brought about network interactions that encouraged legal/regulatory 
changes.  
Interestingly, these empirical findings in and around herd behaviour provide evidence 
that individual actors in business relationships and networks have the tendency to act as 
a collective and akin to other network actors. As previously found by Mouzas and Ford 
(2011) network actors may act alike and form herds based on joint understandings of a 
problem. This study enhances Mouzas and Ford’s (2011) finding as such that herding 
behaviour appears to underpin business responses to climate change. 
Table 15 provides broadly illustrative examples of network interactions based on herd 
behaviour in each of the five cases. 
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Case Herd behaviour 
Case 1: 
Utiliko 
Utiliko decided to request a revision of the ECO scheme because their response 
was costlier than anticipated and other network actors, such as small energy 
supply companies, were not required to comply. The other BIG 6 energy supply 
companies jumped on the bandwagon and also requested an alteration. This led 
to a 25% lower carbon emission saving targets. Thereby, the herd behaviour has 
altered the legal/regulatory pressure at the contextual level. 
Case 2: 
Olectra 
Olectra and PlentiOil acted as a collective when cancelling their efforts to retrofit 
the Yankee gas-fired power plant with CCS technology. Olectra and PlentiOil 
have taken the decision to halt their effort to retrofit the Yankee gas-fired power 




The network welcomed the Capacity Market Mechanisms as a commercial 
opportunity along with the transition towards a low-carbon energy supply 
system. One of the reasons that explain Energize’s decision to participate in the 
Capacity Market Mechanism was that its competitor AMP participated as well. 
Combined with the competitiveness, drive for lower prices and the risk of losing 
their network position this prompted herd-like network behaviour. 
Case 4: 
Vonergy 
Vonergy may have taken the decision to reduce their effort to establish itself as a 
provider of DSR technology in the UK because Moggley continued to make 




One of the reasons that may explain Connectica’s decision to continue operating 
its fossil fuel-based generation assets is that its competitors continued to make 
profits despite their carbon intensity. This suggests herd-like network 
behaviour. 
Table 15: Herd behaviour in network interactions 
Based on the empirical insights in and around these illustrative examples and in light of 
the previous literature I conclude that herd behaviour was a considerable determinant 
of network interactions. What became evident when analysing the behaviour in 
networks in each of the cases is that actors engaged in responses to climate change that 
were akin to other network actors rather than opting for isolated action. 
Interestingly, I observed three network outcomes that appeared to stem from the 
business responses to climate change. In fact, what became evident when dissecting the 
five case studies is that the explanations of how companies respond to climate change 
are to be found at the network level; the unit of analysis that has received little attention 
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by previous research on how companies respond to climate change. In an attempt to 
illuminate this further, I commence by describing the observed network outcomes. 
6.3.3 Discharging, protecting and herding as outcomes of business 
responses to climate change 
What came through when analysing the five empirical cases in light of the previous 
literature on business responses to externally generated pressures in general and to 
climate change specifically, the network approach and the behavioural science literature 
is that the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks seem to 
bring about three network outcomes. In fact, I observed three broad categories of 
network outcomes: 1) companies were discharging their responsibility by passing the 
impact to others, 2) companies were protecting their resources and rationalising 
activities rather than bearing risks of change, and 3) companies were forming herds, i.e. 
acting akin to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than operating 
in isolation (herding). I now pay closer attention to each of these three network 
outcomes. 
6.3.3.1 Network outcome I: Discharging 
The first network outcome discharging relates to individual actors’ discharging their 
responsibility by passing the impact to others. In the empirical findings of this study, 
the network outcome discharging was observed and illustrated by the risk-aversion of 
actors and the tendency to weigh responses to climate change against reference points. 
In the first case, for example, the ECO scheme presented a choice framed in a loss-
oriented manner (a fine of up to £590 million). Even compliance with the ECO was a 
loss for the case company Utiliko, although at lower costs. As a result, the ECO scheme 
acted as a reference point for the company’s response to the legal/regulatory pressure 
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emanating from climate change. The efforts to mitigate the carbon emissions stemming 
from its consumers were, therefore, relative to the ECO scheme (e.g., focus on 
addressing fuel poverty and reducing carbon emissions) and not based upon absolute 
effectiveness. Similarly, in the fifth case, the case company Connectica responded to 
climate change as they supposed a commercial opportunity in connected home 
technologies. Doing so, however, was relative to the commercial opportunity (e.g., 
focus on new revenues from customers). Interestingly, across all five cases, the network 
outcome stemming from the responses to climate change was manifested in the 
discharging of the business effects on the natural environment rather than entirely 
eliminating it. In other words, the network outcome of discharging is based on actors’ 
incrementally offsetting emissions (through compliance and relative effectiveness) 
rather than radically eliminating them (through proactivity and absolute effectiveness). 
6.3.3.2 Network outcome II: Protecting 
The second network outcome protecting relates to individual actors defending their 
resources and rationalising activities rather than bearing risks of change. Here, the 
analysis of the five cases of business responses to climate change suggests that the loss-
aversion of actors and the belief of a fixed-resource pie caused actors to safeguard their 
existing resources in response to climate change (limiting risk of losing customers and 
the current network position) rather than opting for the incremental benefits stemming 
from a profound alteration of resources as required for an immediate response to climate 
change (uncertainty of future benefits). In the third case, for example, the response to 
climate change was driven by maximising profitability (e.g., running a two GW coal-
fired power plant) owing to loss-aversion (not missing a commercial opportunity along 
the transition towards a renewables-only energy supply), whereas the commercial 
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benefits from Energize’s radical move towards renewables were incremental and put 
the company at risk of losing customers and their established network position. 
Similarly, in the fifth case, the benefits of establishing the company as a provider of 
connected home technologies and completely neglecting the established fossil fuel-
based business were not attractive. In other words, all five cases companies opted for 
protecting the resources and rationalising activities rather than bearing risks of change. 
6.3.3.3 Network outcome III: Herding 
The third network outcome herding relates to individual actors acting akin to other 
actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than operating in isolation. In fact, 
the empirical findings of this study show that actors form herds to engage in responses 
to climate change that are akin to other actors in their business network rather than 
opting for isolated action. Furthermore, it appears that the decisions being taken by other 
actors in the network may impact on the ability to respond to climate change. 
Collectively, network actors have the potential to block or lobby against or encourage 
national environmental regulation. For example, in the fourth case, the case company 
Vonergy may have taken the decision to halt their effort to establish itself as a provider 
of DSR technology in the UK because the competing energy supply company Moggley 
continued to make profits with diesel-fired power plants. Similarly, in the first case, 
Utiliko decided to request a revision of the ECO scheme because compliance was costly 
and small energy supply companies were not required to comply. As a collective, the 
network actors requested an alteration to the legal/regulatory pressure. 
Table 16 below summaries the finding related to the three network outcomes by 
explaining and illustrating my observations in each of the five case studies. 
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Network outcomes Observation Explanation 
Discharging Network actors tend to 
discharge their 
responsibility by 
passing the impact to 
others. 
The risk-aversion of actors and the 
tendency to weigh responses to climate 
change against reference points seems 
to cause actors to opt for offsetting 
carbon emissions incrementally 
(through compliance and relative 
effectiveness) rather than radically 
eliminating them (through proactivity 
and absolute effectiveness). 
Protecting Network actors tend to 
defend their resources 
and rationalising 
activities rather than 
bearing risks of 
change. 
The loss-aversion of actors and the belief 
of a fixed-resource pie appear to cause 
actors to safeguard their existing 
resources in response to climate change 
(limiting risk of losing customers and 
network positions) rather than opting 
for the incremental benefits stemming 
from a profound alteration of resources 
as required for a radical response 
strategy (uncertainty of future 
benefits). 
Herding Network actors tend to 
form herds and act 
akin to other actors 
with similar intrinsic 
values and beliefs 
rather than operating in 
isolation. 
Actors seem to engage in responses to 
climate change that are akin to other 
actors in their business network rather 
than opting for isolated action. 
Collectively, network actors have the 
potential to block or lobby against or 
encourage legal/regulatory pressures. 
Table 16: Discharging, protecting and herding as network outcomes 
Collectively, the insights stemming from setting the five empirical cases against the 
initial theoretical structure in and around the network tensions, network interactions and 
network outcomes discharging, protecting and herding provided a more fine-grained 
explanation of why these three network outcomes emerged. Based on the understanding 
established in this section (i.e., contextual changes triggered network tensions and 
network interactions which lead to specific network outcomes), in the next section, I 
propose a novel conceptual framework of business responses to climate change. 
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6.4 A conceptual framework of business responses to climate 
change 
In the final section of the analysis chapter, I bring together the insights stemming from 
the preceding discussion and in light of the previous literature on externally generated 
pressures in general and to climate change specifically, business networks and 
behavioural science, I build a novel conceptual framework through which I seek to 
explain how companies respond to climate change. 
In the subsequent discussion, I pursue to explain how the findings illustrated through 
the key components of the conceptual framework translate into theoretical 
contributions. By referring to the empirical findings in and around the five cases of 
business responses to climate change, I elucidate 1) the contribution to the literature 
when taking a network view of a focal company’s response to climate change and 2) 
the contribution to understanding of how actors interact and behave in business 
relationships and networks. These theoretical contributions emerged from and are 
guided by the proposed conceptual framework of business responses to climate change 





Figure 16: A conceptual framework of business responses to climate change
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6.4.1 A network approach to business responses to climate change 
The empirical findings of this study provide illustrations and evidence that the 
explanation of business responses to climate change may be found within the business 
relationships and networks. In fact, based on the empirical findings of this study it seems 
likely that the process of responding to climate change almost always triggers 
interactions within and across business networks. While some of the literature has 
implicitly acknowledged degrees of interaction (e.g., Kolk and Pinkse, 2005), scholars 
have not determined such interactions as an explanatory variable of responses to climate 
change. 
Adopting a network approach in this study, therefore, has shown that business responses 
to climate change are not isolated activities of individual actors, but instead are the 
outcome of a complex process that involves multiple actors, their activities and 
resources. By depicting such interactions and behaviours within and across business 
networks, the present research seeks to make a contribution to the study of business 
responses to climate change. 
In the following four sections, I elucidate how the findings stemming from each stage 
of the conceptual framework (illustrated in Figure 16 on page 246) have allowed me to 
make theoretical contributions. 
6.4.1.1 Contextual changes 
The first theoretical contribution stemming from this study refers to the contextual 
changes that generate pressures in response to global climatic changes. This study finds 
that three types of pressures are dominant: 1) socio-cultural, 2) legal/regulatory, and 3) 
economic. In fact, the socio-cultural pressures originating from evolving social 
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structures, changing rules of behaviour and shifting value systems, the legal/regulatory 
pressures emanating from alterations in rules, adjustments of policies and modifications 
to legislation and the economic pressures due to economic developments in relevant 
sectors and fields of activity, have demanded the case companies to change their current 
pattern of behaviour. This finding is largely in line with previous research conducted by 
Cordano (1993), Bansal and Roth (2000), Kolk and Levy (2001), Banerjee et al. (2003), 
Leiserowitz (2006), Adger et al. (2009), Wittneben (2009), Veal and Mouzas (2010), 
Keohane and Victor (2011), Okereke et al. (2012) and Shevchenko et al. (2016). Indeed, 
similarly to the existing literature, this study finds that these contextual changes may 
act as a stimulus for change. 
As illustrated by the three arrows going from the externally generated pressures on the 
left to the tensions within the network (Figure 16 on page 246), the socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures seem to bring about a disparity between current 
operations and the need to change. In the next section, I review the network tension 
related findings in light of the previous literature. 
6.4.1.2 Network tensions 
This study finds that network tensions are brought about through change stimuli related 
to the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures. More specifically, 
network tensions may result from the misalignment of current operations and the need 
for change. In the literature on climate change, this tension has been described as one 
between short-term profitability and the emerging need to do something meaningful 
about climate change (Okereke et al., 2012; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). 
Richly demonstrated across all five empirical cases of business responses to climate 
change, this study finds that it is rather a tension between the established activities and 
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resources that an actor possesses (current business operations) and the activities and 
resources required to address the emerging contextual changes (need for change). In 
other words, companies tended to re-assess the validity and value of current operations 
in light of the evolving socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures. In the 
second case, for example, the case company explicitly stated that their core business is 
in and around the supply of energy and that responding to the contextual changes would 
require the skills and expertise of a carbon reduction technology manufacturer. Such 
needs for change meant that the case companies had to interpret, define and understand 
the actors, activities and resources necessary to respond to climate change. 
This study suggests that these network tensions, triggered by the contextual changes, 
acted as a stimulus for network interactions. As highlighted by the arrow between the 
network tension and network interaction in the conceptual framework (Figure 16 on 
page 246), the tension between current operations and the need for change causes actors 
to interact within and across their business relationships and networks. In fact, all of the 
case companies interacted within and across their business relationships and networks 
in order to mobilise the activities and access the resources that were not aligned with 
their current operations but were required to mitigate the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory 
and economic pressures. 
In the next section, I seek to demonstrate how this study’s insights on network 
interactions contribute to the literature. 
6.4.1.3 Network interactions 
This study finds that the network interactions are a key determinant of the outcomes 
stemming from business responses to climate change. Hereby, this study enhances the 
current literature on response strategies to climate change (e.g., Levy and Kolk, 2002; 
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Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Hoffman, 2005; Jones and Levy, 2007; Ihlen, 2009; Wittneben 
and Kiyar, 2009; Okereke and Russel, 2010; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; Shevchenko 
et al., 2016; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). In fact, taking the network into account when 
analysing the business responses to climate change showed that actors form a network, 
structure and perform activities in order to exchange, access and mobilise resources 
embedded in the network. In other words, companies interact with other actors because 
they depend on the resources of other companies to respond to climate change. Across 
all five empirical cases, this study has highlighted that other network actors possessed 
at least one resource required to respond. This finding is in line with the established 
thinking of business network scholars such as Ritter et al. (2004), Mouzas and Ford 
(2009), Veal and Mouzas (2010) and Finke et al. (2016).  
The empirical findings suggest that through the network interactions companies aim at 
rationalising and expanding their resource pool. Resource rationalisation refers to the 
ways in which network actors attempt to safeguard and defend the established resources. 
For example, in this study actors’ initiated efforts to minimise the risk of hampering 
short-term profitability arising from responding to climate change aimed at carbon 
emission reduction. In fact, responding to climate change was almost always driven by 
cost-effectiveness since network actors had to ensure that their activities were beneficial 
to the company’s customers. Although this was underpinning the network interaction 
across all cases, it was particularly strong in the third case. Here, the company was very 
clear that investing in a low-carbon energy generation portfolio is the preferred option 
as long as it bore benefits to the customers (e.g., maintaining low energy prices). 
Resource expansion, on the other hand, refers to the ways in which network actors 
attempt to mobilise network resources and activities to extend their resource pool. In 
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fact, all of the case companies interacted heavily with other network actors in order to 
expand their resource pool. These efforts were driven by cost-effectiveness since the 
focal actors perceived that they could achieve their response to climate change at the 
smallest cost when interacting to mobilise network resources. This finding is in line 
with the argument that businesses engage in network interaction when they perceive 
that value can be created, either directly or indirectly, as established by Ritter et al. 
(2004) as well as Mouzas and Ford (2009). 
Interestingly, what came through when analysing the empirical findings is that the 
network interactions may be related to specific behavioural patterns. Due to the 
significance of this finding, I have dedicated a section on the behavioural underpinning 
of network interactions towards the end of this chapter. 
In the next section, I highlight how the three observed network outcomes contribute to 
our understanding of business responses to climate change. 
6.4.1.4 Network outcomes 
This study advances the literature on network outcomes by identifying three outcomes 
stemming from business responses to climate change. Previous research on network 
outcomes is rare, vividly illustrated by Ford and Mouzas (2007, p.8) stating that there 
is “sheer unknowability of effects and outcomes in a network”. By depicting the 
observed network outcomes this study contribution opening the ‘black box’ of unknown 
effects and outcomes in a network. Indeed, this study finds that the outcomes stemming 
from business responses to climate change are companies 1) discharging their 
responsibility by passing the impact to others, 2) protecting their resources and 
rationalising activities rather than bearing risks of change, and 3) forming herds and 
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acting as a collective and akin to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs 
rather than operating in isolation. 
The network outcome, discharging, relates to firms discharging to their responsibility 
by passing the impact to others. Evident across all five cases, the network outcome 
discharging seemed to be driven by the risk-aversion of actors (frames) and the 
tendency to weigh responses to climate change against reference points that guided the 
network interactions. In the fifth case, for example, the case company Connectica 
responded to climate change because they perceived a commercial opportunity in 
connected home technologies. The efforts to mitigate carbon emissions stemming from 
the application of connected home technologies, however, was relative to the 
commercial opportunity (e.g., focus on new revenues from customers) and not based 
upon absolute effectiveness. 
Interestingly, across all five cases, the network outcome discharging stemming from 
the responses to climate change was manifested in the compensation of the business 
effects rather than entirely eliminating it. 
The network outcome, protecting, relates to defending resources and rationalising 
activities rather than bearing risks of change. As vividly illustrated in all five cases, the 
network outcome, protecting, appeared to be driven by the loss-aversion of actors and 
the actors’ belief in a fixed-resource pie. In the third case, for example, the response to 
climate change was driven by maximising profitability (e.g., running a two GW coal-
fired power plant) due in loss-aversion (not missing a commercial opportunity along 
with the transition towards a renewables-only energy supply). The commercial benefits 
from Energize’s radical move towards renewables were incremental, however, and put 
the company at risk of losing its established position. Interestingly, as a result, the actors 
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tended to safeguard their existing resources in response to climate change (limiting the 
risk of losing its established position) rather than opting for the incremental benefits 
stemming from a profound alteration of resources. 
The network outcome, herding, relates to actors forming herds, acting as a collective 
and akin to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than operating in 
isolation. Evident across all five cases, the network outcome, herding, seemed to be 
driven by the herd behaviour of actors in network interactions. In the first case, for 
example, the case company Utiliko decided to request a revision of the ECO scheme 
because compliance was costly and small energy supply companies were not required 
to comply. The other BIG 6 energy supply companies ‘jumped on the bandwagon’ and 
also requested an alteration. As a result of similar intrinsic values and beliefs, Utiliko, 
Exxelo UK and other energy supply companies requested alterations to the ECO 
scheme. 
In turn, these network outcomes may act as a stimulus for changes at the contextual 
level. In fact, as highlighted by the arrow in the bottom right corner of the conceptual 
framework (Figure 16 on page 246), the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures may be altered by the network outcomes that stem from the initial response 
to climate change. The stages of the proposed conceptual framework (contextual 
changes, network tensions, network interactions and network outcomes) are therefore 
not linear but mutually reinforce one another across the entire framework. 
I have attempted to illustrate how this circular, non-linear flow appeared in each of the 
five empirical cases and along with the conceptual framework in Figure 17 on page 254. 
In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how the business responses to climate change played 




Figure 17: Business responses to climate change over time 
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Based on the insights stemming from the five empirical cases and in light of the previous 
literature on business responses to climate change, business networks and behavioural 
science, it is plausible to infer that the three observed network outcomes of discharging, 
protecting and herding, and the mechanism that enables them to emerge (i.e., the 
externally generated pressures that triggered network tensions and the behaviour within 
and across the network interactions) explains business responses to climate change more 
fully. In fact, these findings have shown that through adopting a network approach a lot 
can be learnt about a focal company’s response to climate change. 
In the next section, I specifically highlight how the findings of this study advance our 
understanding of how actors interact and behave in business relationships and networks. 
6.4.2 Interaction and behaviour in business networks 
The empirical findings of this study provide new evidence of interaction and behaviour 
in business networks. On the one hand, this study shows that the contextual changes in 
response to climate change may cause a considerable amount of change within a business 
network. Hereby, contradicting previous business marketing research suggesting that 
business networks are relatively stable due to deep processes and pattern across actors, 
activities and resources (e.g., Harrison and Easton, 2002). On the other hand, the present 
research highlights the behavioural underpinnings of network interactions which 
confirms and advances previous work done by Veal and Mouzas (2010). In the next two 
sections, I focus on how this study contributes to our understanding of how actors interact 
and behave in business relationships and networks. To do so, I refer to the dynamics 
between stability and change in business networks as well as the behavioural 
underpinnings of network interactions. 
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6.4.2.1 Dynamics between stability and change in business networks 
The dynamics between stability and change represents a prominent stream of research 
within the business marketing literature. It is commonly argued that business networks 
are comparably stable due to a deep process and pattern “that drives actors to minimise 
the impact of externally imposed changes” (Harrison and Easton, 2002, p.551). 
Interestingly, the findings of this study contradict this claim. Across all of the five 
empirical cases of business responses to climate change, a considerable amount of change 
occurred. It seemed that as a result of the contextual changes (socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures), previous activities proven to successfully 
operate and survive (Håkansson, 1992) were no longer perceived as guaranteeing such 
success and survival. 
Interestingly, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), two scholars outside the business marketing 
domain, have previously claimed that alterations to a regulatory framework frequently 
leads to companies changing their current pattern of behaviour. Similarly, the present 
study finds that the contextual changes (socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures) may cause a change of network processes and patterns. In other words, 
contextual changes threaten the network “pattern that represents the perceived best way 
of operating at the current time” (Harrison and Easton, 2002, p.551). Hence, network 
actors are required to adjust existing and develop new patterns of behaviour in response 
to contextual changes. However, as the success of new ways of working remains 
unknown, business networks appear to undergo a process of trial and error through 
interactions between actors, activities and resources. Ultimately leading to a considerable 
amount of change in business networks. As such, this study contradicts the notion that 
business networks are relatively stable (e.g., Håkansson, 1992; Harrison and Easton, 
2002). At least when responding to climate change the contrary appears to be the case. 
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In the next section, I focus on the specific behavioural underpinnings that seem to drive 
much of the network interactions. 
6.4.2.2 Behavioural underpinnings of network interactions 
When analysing the case data on the network interactions, it appeared that a set of 
behaviours underpins the network interactions. In fact, in congruence with previous 
theoretical developments in the behavioural sciences literature (e.g., Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Sebenius, 1983, 1995; Lax and Sebenius, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991; Kahneman et al., 1991; Hampson, 1995; Tenbrunsel et al., 2000), in the present 
study a set of behaviours seemed to guide the network interactions. These are 1) Frames 
and reference points; 2) Loss aversion and the belief in a fixed-resource pie, and 3) Herd 
behaviour. 
The first set of business behaviours identified when analysing the network interactions 
across all five cases is related to frames and reference points. Frames and reference points 
refer to the risk-averse behaviour of actors and the tendency to weigh responses to climate 
change against reference points. Interestingly, in all five cases, it was either the 
legal/regulatory pressures (Case 1, 2 and 3) or the economic pressure (Case 4 and 5) that 
acted as a frame for the decisions made by the network actors. These frames were 
presented in a loss- or gain-oriented manner. In the first and third case, the respective 
legal/regulatory pressures (ECO scheme and Renewables Obligation) were framed in a 
loss-oriented manner (a fine for non-compliance). In the second, fourth and fifth case, the 
legal/regulatory pressures (CCS commercialisation competition) and the economic 
pressures (high margins and new revenue streams) were framed in a gain-oriented manner 
(financial benefits from compliance or proactivity). 
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These legal/regulatory or economic pressures acted as reference points for the network 
interactions. In fact, in all five cases, the case company’s efforts to respond to climate 
change were relative to these reference points. In the first case, for example, this meant 
that the emission reductions were relative to the ECO scheme. Similar behaviour occurred 
in the fourth and fifth case since the case companies’ efforts to mitigate carbon emissions 
were relative to economic opportunities. Hereby, this study supports previous work of  
Veal and Mouzas (2010) who, based on the prior work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and Tenbrunsel et al. (2000), found that companies take the emerging rules and 
regulations as a frame for thinking about their action in response to climate change. 
The second set of behaviours identified when analysing the network interactions across 
all five cases is related to loss aversion and the belief in a fixed-resource pie. In all five 
cases, the network interactions were characterised by loss-aversion. In fact, as soon as the 
focal actors realised that the loss of resources was a possibility, the company altered its 
activities aimed at responding to climate change. This played out similarly in all five cases 
and was further amplified by the behavioural bias of perceiving the world and its 
resources as limited. In fact, this congruence of thinking, evident across all cases, 
prompted network interactions based upon a lose-lose or win-lose frame. As a result, the 
network actors opted for protecting their resources and rationalising activities rather than 
bearing risks of change. Hereby, this study confirms previous findings on behaviour in 
response to climate change being driven by concerns over the scarcity of resources and 
the basic human belief of a fixed-resource pool (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000). 
The third set of behaviours identified when analysing the network interactions across all 
five cases is related to herd behaviour. These refer to the ways in which actors engage in 
responses to climate change that are akin to other actors in their business network rather 
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than opting for isolated action. Interestingly, across all five cases, the network interactions 
seemed to be characterised by acting as a herd. In other words, the network actors made 
their decisions relative to how other network actors behaved. In line with previous 
research (e.g., Sebenius, 1983; Veal and Mouzas, 2010), these herd-like network 
interactions led to coalitional behaviour. Across all five empirical cases, the network 
actors acted as a coalition when their intrinsic values and beliefs were similar. Therefore, 
this study confirms Mouzas and Ford’s (2011) finding that herd behaviour may 
characterise activities when addressing a business problem. 
Having analysed, discussed and highlighted the theoretical contributions stemming from 
the empirical findings, I have provided a more comprehensive understanding of business 
responses to climate change as well as the enhanced the business marketing literature on 
how actors interact and behave in business relationships and networks. 
In the subsequent section, I close this chapter with a brief summary. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used the theoretical underpinnings (see Chapter 2) to analyse the 
empirical evidence presented in the five cases (see Chapter 5) on how companies respond 
to climate change. In doing so, I have provided detailed insights that advance our 
understanding of how companies interacting in business networks responded to climate 
change. 
In the next chapter, I draw conclusions from the analysis and discussions chapter in 
particular, and my thesis as a whole. As such, I provide a summary of the findings and 
outline the specific theoretical contributions and implications. Furthermore, I elucidate 
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the implications that my thesis has for managers and policymakers and the limitations. I 




7 Conclusions, contributions 
and implications 
This chapter outlines the conclusions, contributions and implications that can be drawn 
from this study. I begin by providing a summary of the findings that ultimately serve as 
an explanation of how companies respond to climate change. I then discuss the theoretical 
implications stemming from the original insights in relation to adopting a network 
approach to the study of business responses to climate change as well as the interaction 
and behaviour in business relationships and networks. Furthermore, I highlight the 
implications for managers and policymakers and acknowledge some limitations of this 
study. I close this chapter by suggesting promising paths for future research in this area. 
7.1 Summary of findings: How companies respond to climate 
change 
The findings of this study offer some original insights in relation to the interaction and 
behaviour in business relationships and networks that provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of how companies respond to climate change.  
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In fact, the present study suggests that interactions in business relationships and networks 
are stimulated by contextual changes, driven by sets of behaviours and cause a 
considerable amount of change within and across a business network. Moreover, what 
came through when analysing the empirical evidence in light of the previous literature is 
that business responses to climate change can only be explained adequately when taking 
a network approach (as established in Figure 16: A conceptual framework of business 
responses to climate change on page 246). 
In an attempt to synthesise the findings stemming from this study, I make and discuss five 
findings (F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5), which can broadly be described as the conclusions of this 
study. 
The first finding relates to the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures at 
the contextual level and their effects on companies: 
F1. Socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures at the contextual level 
trigger business responses to climate change by creating a tension between the current 
business resources and activities (current operations) and the business resources and 
activities required to react to the contextual changes (need for change). 
This study identified that the variation in contextual level values, norms and rules (socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures) acts as the primary stimulus for 
businesses to respond to climate change. It appears that business responses to climate 
change are triggered by the tension brought about by the combination of 1) socio-cultural 
(e.g., increasing consumer demand for environmentally-friendly products and sustainable 
business operations), 2) legal/regulatory (e.g., strengthened environmental regulation and 
standards) and 3) economic (e.g., increasing demand for low-carbon products and 
services) pressures that have emerged as a result of global climatic changes. 
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The contextual changes, therefore, create a dissonance between the needs emanating from 
the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures, and the existing business 
patterns. Interestingly, while the findings presented in this study show that the emerging 
socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures prompt business responses to 
climate change, the present research also suggests that these very same aspects demand 
companies do so as effectively as possible. 
It seems that the socio-cultural demands, for example, are a double-edged sword in the 
sense that they pressure companies to alter their current resources and activities but, at 
the same time, pose a constraint on business responses to climate change as the socio-
cultural actors (i.e., customers, taxpayers) do not seem to be willing to bear the costs 
associated with responding to climate change. This leads to the conclusion that business 
responses to climate change are triggered by socio-cultural pressures but, at the same 
time, limited by the extent to which consumer’s value and financially reward such 
responses. 
Although the legal/regulatory pressures may act as a driver of business responses to 
climate change, they also appear to be constrained by the other competing priorities of 
national governments. In this study, this was vividly exemplified in an alteration of the 
legal/regulatory pressures when concerns about the affordability and/or the security of 
energy supply were raised. In fact, other priorities of national governments may interfere 
with business responses to climate change. In the first case, for example, the 
government’s focus on addressing fuel poverty may have been flawed, since it was 
forcing companies into focusing on harder-to-treat properties, which may not have been 
the ideal strategy in response to climate change. 
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Collectively, this suggests that the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures require companies to respond to climate change as effectively as possible. In an 
attempt to do so, companies interact within and across their business relationships and 
networks. Indeed, this would seem to link well with the second finding. 
The second finding relates to the business responses to addressing the tensions brought 
about by the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures at the contextual 
level: 
F2. Business responses to climate change involve a multitude of network actors that 
interact with one another in order to access the resources and activities required to 
respond to climate change. 
The findings of this study show that business responses to climate change involve a 
multitude of network actors (on average more than seven actors per response to climate 
change). It appears that the network actors interact with other actors to access the 
resources and activities necessary to respond to climate change. 
This is because the network actors (such as energy supply companies, energy 
services/technology providers, energy consumers, national governments, local 
authorities, industry associations and others) possess at least one resource required to 
respond to climate change. This leads to the conclusion that network actors interact with 
one another to address the tensions brought about by the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory 
and economic pressures. In turn, this links well with the third finding. 
The third finding relates to the interactions in business relationships and networks that 
are aimed at addressing the tension brought about by the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory 
and economic pressures at the contextual level: 
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F3. The network interactions in response to climate change are based upon activities 
aimed at resource rationalisation and resource expansion. 
This study identified that the network interactions in response to climate change are based 
upon activities aimed at resource rationalisation and resource expansion. Resource 
rationalisation refers to the ways in which network actors attempt to defend and safeguard 
the established network position, assets, profitability and other valuable possessions. 
Unsurprisingly, responding to the contextual level pressures that climate change had 
brought about was driven by cost-effectiveness since network actors had to ensure that 
their activities were beneficial to the company’s customers. Although this underpinned 
the network interaction across all cases, it was particularly strong in the third case. Here, 
the company was very clear that investing in a low-carbon energy generation portfolio 
was the preferred option as long as it bore benefits to the customers (e.g., maintaining 
low energy prices). 
Resource expansion, on the other hand, refers to the ways in which network actors attempt 
to mobilise network resources and activities to alter their network position. All of the case 
companies interacted heavily with other network actors in order to expand their resource 
pool. These efforts were driven by effectiveness since the focal actors perceived that they 
could achieve their response to climate change most effectively when interacting to 
mobilise network resources. The argument that businesses engage in network interaction 
when they perceive that value can be created, either directly or indirectly, is in line with 
the established business marketing literature (e.g., Ritter et al., 2004; Mouzas and Ford, 
2009). 
Interestingly, such behaviour in and around network interactions seemed to be driven by 
three sets of business behaviours that may explain the observed network outcomes of 
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discharging, protecting and herding and, hence, ultimately explain business responses to 
climate change. This links well to the fourth finding. 
The fourth finding relates to three sets of business behaviours that appear to guide the 
interaction in business relationships and networks and their effects on business responses 
to climate change: 
F4. The network interactions are guided by three sets of business behaviours – 1) 
Frames and reference points; 2) Loss aversion and a fixed-resource pie; and 3) Herd 
behaviour – that may bring about the observed network outcomes. 
The first set of business behaviours identified in this study are frames and reference 
points. Frames and reference points refer to the risk-averse behaviour of actors and the 
tendency to weigh responses to climate change against reference points. In all five cases, 
it was either the legal/regulatory demand (Case 1, 2 and 3) or the economic opportunity 
(Case 4 and 5) that acted as a frame for the decisions made by the network actors. These 
frames were presented in a loss- or gain-oriented manner. In the first and third case, the 
respective legal/regulatory demands (ECO scheme and Renewables Obligation) were 
framed in a loss-oriented manner (a fine for non-compliance). In the second, fourth and 
fifth case, the legal/regulatory demand (CCS commercialisation competition) and the 
economic opportunities (high margins and new revenue streams) were framed in a gain-
oriented manner (financial benefits from compliance or proactivity). 
Interestingly, this study shows that whether or not a decision is framed in a loss- or gain-
oriented manner does not seem to affect the ways in which companies behave. In all five 
cases, the network interaction was characterised and driven by risk-aversion. 
Astonishingly, this finding contradicts the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) who suggested that only positively framed decisions, i.e. the gains that can be 
 267 
 
obtained when addressing a problem, prompt risk-averse behaviour. Negatively framed 
decisions, i.e. what can be lost when not addressing a problem, on the other hand, would 
prompt risk-seeking behaviour (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Furthermore, the legal/regulatory or economic pressures acted as reference points for the 
network interactions. This study shows that companies’ efforts in response to climate 
change are relative to these reference points. In the first case, for example, the company’s 
response was relative to the ECO scheme. Similar behaviour occurred in the fourth and 
fifth cases since the case companies’ efforts to respond to climate change were relative to 
the economic opportunity. This finding confirms the previous research of  Veal and 
Mouzas (2010) who, based on the prior work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
Tenbrunsel et al. (2000), found that companies take the emerging rules and regulations as 
a frame for thinking about their action in response to climate change. 
The second set of behaviours identified in this study are loss-aversion and a fixed-
resource pie. These refer to the loss-averse behaviour of actors and the belief in a fixed-
resource pie. Loss-aversion in network interactions was vividly illustrated in all five 
cases. In fact, as soon as the case companies realised that the loss of resources was a 
possibility, the actors rendered their response to climate change. This appeared to be 
further amplified by the behavioural bias of perceiving the world and its resources as 
limited. This congruence of thinking, evident across all cases, prompted network 
interactions based upon a lose-lose or win-lose frame. As a result, the network actors 
opted to safeguard their current network position rather than bearing the risks of change. 
The third set of behaviours identified in this study is herd behaviour. This refers to the 
ways in which actors form and act as a herd and therefore engage in responses to climate 
change that are akin to other actors in their business network. As a result, the network 
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actors made their decisions relative to how other network actors behaved. In the first case, 
for example, the case company decided to request a revision of the ECO scheme because 
compliance other network actors were not required to comply. Interestingly, previous 
research (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978; Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 1995, 2000; Mouzas and 
Ford, 2011) found that in these herd-like network interactions, the network actors act akin 
when their intrinsic values and beliefs were similar. A similar congruence of behaviour 
was evident in this study. In the second case, for example, the two focal companies acted 
like a herd when cancelling their efforts to retrofit a gas-fired power plant with CCS 
technology. 
In summary, it seems plausible to infer that antecedents related to these three sets of 
business behaviours explain more fully how companies respond to climate change. In 
fact, the findings of this study suggest that the three sets of business behaviours ingrained 
in the interaction in networks may explain the observed network outcomes of 
discharging, protecting and herding, which ultimately characterise the business responses 
to climate change. This links well to the fifth finding. 
The fifth and final finding relates to the network outcomes stemming from the interaction 
in business relationships and networks: 
F5. Discharging, protecting and herding are observed network outcomes stemming 
from the interaction in business relationships and networks. 
This study observed three network outcomes that stem from the interaction in business 
relationships and networks: 1) Discharging, 2) Protecting, and 3) Herding. The first 
network outcome, discharging, relates to companies discharging their responsibility by 
passing the impact to others. The network outcome discharging was observable in all five 
cases. The efforts to discharge the business effects on the natural environment rather than 
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eliminating it very much appeared to be a result of the risk-aversion of actors (frames) 
and the tendency to weigh responses to climate change against reference points that 
guided much of the interaction in business relationships and networks. 
The second network outcome, protecting, relates to companies defending their resources 
and rationalising activities rather than bearing risks of change. As illustrated in all five 
cases, the observed network outcome of protecting seemed to be a result of the loss-
aversion of actors and the belief in a fixed-resource pie that underpinned the interaction 
in business relationships and networks. This study, therefore, suggests that the loss-averse 
network behaviour of actors and the belief of a fixed-resource pie causes network actors 
to safeguard their existing resources (limiting the risk of losing customers and altering 
the network position) rather than opting for the incremental benefits stemming from a 
profound alteration of resources in response to climate change. 
The third and final network outcome, herding, relates to companies forming herds and 
acting akin to other actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than operating 
in isolation. This study, therefore, shows that herding is the outcome of the herd behaviour 
that causes the network actors to engage in activities that are akin to other actors in their 
business network rather than opting for isolated action. 
Based on the insights stemming from the five empirical cases and in light of the previous 
literature on climate change, business networks and behavioural science, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the three observed network outcomes of discharging, 
protecting and herding, and the interaction in networks that cause them, may provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to climate change. 
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These outcomes, so the findings presented in this study show, have an effect on the socio-
cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures at the contextual level. In other words, 
the network outcomes may act as a stimulus for changes at the contextual level. It appears 
therefore that the components of the proposed conceptual framework of business 
responses to climate change, implicitly introduced throughout the five findings, are not 
linear but mutually reinforce one another across the entire framework. 
Collectively, these five findings comprise novel empirical insights along each of the 
pillars (contextual change, network tensions, network interactions and network outcomes) 
of the proposed conceptual framework of business responses to climate change (see 
Figure 16 on page 246). 
Having synthesised the conclusions stemming from this study, in the next section, I 
discuss the theoretical contributions and implications that can be drawn from the five 
findings outlined above and the study as a whole. 
7.2 Theoretical contributions and implications 
The findings presented in this study make several contributions to the existing literature 
and have important implications for research in this area. Derived from the empirical 
examination of business responses to climate change and in light of previous literature, 
the conceptual framework of business responses to climate change advances theory by 
making two primary and one secondary theoretical contribution. 
The first primary theoretical contribution of this study is to challenge the idea that 
companies respond to climate change individually. In fact, this study fundamentally 
rejects the organisation and management conceptualisation of business responses to 
climate change as atomistic and isolated activities of individual companies (e.g., Kolk 
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and Levy, 2001; Banerjee et al., 2003; Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Margolick and Russell, 
2004; Jones and Levy, 2007; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012; Shevchenko et al., 2016; 
Wright and Nyberg, 2017). As a result of adopting the network approach, the present 
research provides new evidence suggesting that business responses to climate change 
actually involve a multitude of network actors that interact with one another in order to 
access the resources and mobilise the activities required to respond to climate change. As 
such, this study raises doubts about the existing organisation and management research 
on business responses to climate change. 
The second primary theoretical contribution of this study is to advance the IMP 
understanding of the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks. 
This study contributes to opening the frequently ‘black boxed’ processes of interaction 
and behaviour. In doing so, this study proposes a novel understanding of network 
interaction and behaviour based on a set of integrated components. This includes 
contextual change (socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures), network 
tensions, network interactions (guided by three sets of behaviours) and the network 
outcomes (discharging, protecting and herding) that reinforce one another. Hereby, this 
study responds to the calls for research on interaction and behaviour in business networks 
made by prominent IMP scholars such as Ford and Håkansson (2006), Guercini et al. 
(2014), La Rocca et al. (2017) as well as Håkansson and Snehota (2017). 
Having broadly introduced the theoretical contributions of my study, I now dig deeper 
into each theoretical contribution and also highlight a secondary contribution to the 
behavioural science literature. In an attempt to do this, I further illuminate and specify 
how the findings presented in this study permit making these contributions to the existing 
literature and advance theory. Therefore, I now set the findings of this study against the 
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organisation and management literature on business responses to climate change, the 
interactional and behavioural insights stemming from the network approach and the 
behavioural science literature. 
7.2.1 A network approach to business responses to climate change 
This study shows that the current organisation and management theories that have been 
employed to define and explain business responses to climate change are limited by the 
assumption that business responses to climate change are an outcome of atomistic and 
isolated activities of individual companies. Such conceptualisations have been made by 
prominent scholars in the field of organisation and management studies, including Kolk 
and Levy (2001), Banerjee et al. (2003), Kolk and Pinkse (2004), Margolick and Russell 
(2004), Jones and Levy (2007), Slawinski and Bansal (2012), Shevchenko et al. (2016) 
and Wright and Nyberg (2017). While this limited understanding of business responses 
to climate change has been criticised previously (see, for example, Wittneben et al., 
2012), this study provides new evidence that such critiques are justified. 
Indeed, by taking the IMP’s network approach as a novel theoretical lens for the study of 
business responses to climate change, this study challenges the organisation and 
management theories. As result of the network approach’s inherent emphasises that 
companies are embedded in wider networks of continuous business and non-business 
exchange relationships (Easton and Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; 
Håkansson and Ford, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004), this study unveils the problematic 
conceptualisation and conventional thought of businesses as operating in isolation and 
thereby this study poes the need to examine the interconnectedness of businesses within 
wider networks of relationships when examining business responses to climate change. 
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Such examinations appear intuitively appealing and worthwhile considering the fact that 
the mere scale of mounting a response to climate change goes far beyond the capacity of 
an individual company (Veal and Mouzas, 2010; Ferraro et al., 2015). In line with this 
thinking, this study highlights that business responses to climate change can only derive 
from the combination and application of resources and activities located within and across 
the relationships and networks of companies. 
The findings presented in this study provide evidence that it is only by analysing the 
interaction and behaviour in networks that the reasons that explain how companies 
respond to climate change can be identified. In fact, what emanated from the study is that 
network interaction is guided by three sets of behaviours, which ultimately cause three 
network outcomes. 
Collectively, these three sets of business behaviours bring about three network outcomes 
of 1) discharging (companies discharge their responsibility by passing the impact to 
others), 2) protecting (companies defend their resources and rationalising activities rather 
than bearing risks of change), and 3) herding (companies form herds and act akin to other 
actors with similar intrinsic values and beliefs rather than operating in isolation).  
Hereby, this study has also extended the understanding of the frequently ‘black boxed’ 
processes of interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks. Based on 
the conceptual framework of business responses to climate change, this study contains 
important theoretical contributions and implications for the business marketing literature 




7.2.2 Interaction and behaviour in business networks 
As outlined above, this particular study has permitted the development of what can be 
termed a novel conceptual framework of business responses to climate change. As shown 
in Figure 16 on page 246, this conceptual framework is based upon a set of integrated 
components: 1) Contextual change, 2) Network tensions, 3) Network interactions, and 4) 
Network outcomes. This conceptual framework advances the IMP literature by providing 
a systematic explanation of the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and 
networks, thereby counteracting the lack of understanding about how actors interact and 
behave within and across business networks (Ford and Håkansson, 2006; Guercini et al., 
2014; La Rocca et al., 2017). 
In an effort to further illuminate how the novel conceptual framework of business 
responses to climate change advances the IMP literature, I have structured the remainder 
of this section along with the set of components that comprise the proposed conceptual 
framework of business responses to climate change. 
7.2.2.1 Contextual change 
Contextual change refers to the variation in context-level values, norms and rules that 
may act as a stimulus for business responses to climate change. This includes socio-
cultural (evolving social structures, rules of behaviour and/or value systems), 
legal/regulatory (alterations in rules, policies and legislation that are affecting the 
business activities and resources) and economic pressures (ongoing economic 
development in relevant sectors and fields of activity). The socio-cultural, 
legal/regulatory and economic pressures discussed in this study were built upon previous 
work by Cordano (1993), Bansal and Roth (2000), Kolk and Levy (2001), Banerjee et al. 
(2003), Leiserowitz (2006), Adger et al. (2009), Wittneben (2009), Veal and Mouzas 
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(2010), Keohane and Victor (2011), Okereke et al. (2012) and Shevchenko et al. (2016). 
Bringing together the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures under the 
umbrella term of contextual changes was useful since it permitted a wider perspective on 
the drivers that prompt business responses to climate change. 
This present study identified that alterations at the contextual level trigger business 
responses to climate change by creating a tension between the resources and activities 
that a company possesses (current operations) and the activities and resources required to 
respond to climate change (need for change). Largely in line with previous research, this 
study shows that the emerging socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures, 
on the one hand, prompt business responses to climate change, but that these very same 
aspects demand companies do so as effectively as possible (e.g., Adger et al., 2009; 
Shevchenko et al., 2016). 
Socio-cultural pressures, for example, limit business responses to climate change by the 
extent to which consumer’s value and financially reward such responses (Adger et al., 
2009). Similarly, as previously suggested by Wittneben (2009), Keohane and Victor 
(2011) and Okereke et al. (2012) legal/regulatory pressures act as a driver of business 
responses to climate change but appear to be constrained by other priorities of national 
governments (in this study this was the security of supply and energy affordability). 
Furthermore, the findings presented in this study confirm the established thinking that 
economic pressures act as a key driver of business responses to climate change (e.g., 
Cordano, 1993; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2001). Interestingly, this study 
shows that the evolving socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic pressures cause a 
discontinuity between the needs emanating from the socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and 
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economic pressures, and the existing business resources and activities. In the next section, 
I focus on what I have termed as network tensions. 
7.2.2.2 Network tensions 
Network tensions, as the second component of the proposed conceptual framework of 
business responses to climate change, refers to tensions resulting from the misalignment 
of current operations and the need for change. Current operations relates to assessing the 
validity and value of business resources in light of the evolving contextual changes. The 
need for change, on the other hand, relates to the ways of interpreting, defining and 
understanding the contextual change and emerging pressures. For example, grasping the 
implications, needs and requirements of the new environmental legislation. The network 
tensions-related aspects of the proposed conceptual framework were predominantly 
derived from existing knowledge established by Okereke et al. (2012) and Wright and 
Nyberg (2017). 
The previous research suggests that the business tensions brought about by climate 
change are between short-term profitability and mitigating emissions (Okereke et al., 
2012; Wright and Nyberg, 2017). While antecedents of short-term profitability might 
have played a role, this study finds that the primary network tension is between 
responding to the emerging pressures and the established resources and activities that a 
company possesses. Indeed, in each of the five cases underpinning this study, the network 
actors clearly preferred to focus on their current resources and activities, or in other words 
what their specific expertise is (e.g., the supply of energy), rather than undergoing the 
process of developing the technologies necessary to respond to climate change (e.g., CCS 
technology). In an effort to do so, companies interact within and across their business 
relationships and networks to access the resources and mobilise the activities that are 
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required to respond to climate change. This confirms that responding to climate change 
goes far beyond the capacity of an individual company as suggested by the previous 
research of Veal and Mouzas (2010) and Ferraro et al. (2015). 
7.2.2.3 Network interactions 
Network interactions, as the third component of the proposed conceptual framework of 
business responses to climate change, refers to the network-level activities aimed at 
accessing the resources needed to address the network tensions. This study suggests that 
there are two enactments of network interaction. Firstly, resource rationalisation, which 
relates to safeguarding an established network position, assets, profitability and other 
valuable possessions. Secondly, resource expansion, which relates to mobilising network 
resources and activities to alter network position and assets. The network interactions-
related aspects discussed in this study were mostly built upon previous work by Ritter et 
al. (2004), Mouzas and Ford (2009), Veal and Mouzas (2010), Ansari et al. (2013) and 
Finke et al. (2016). 
With regards to resource rationalisation activities, the current research demonstrates that 
network interaction in response to the evolving contextual level pressures was driven by 
effectiveness since network actors had to ensure that their activities were beneficial to the 
company’s customers, thereby confirming the well-established IMP claim that businesses 
engage in network interaction when they perceive that value can be created (e.g., Ritter 
et al., 2004; Mouzas and Ford, 2009). 
Furthermore, the findings presented in this study suggest that companies interacted 
heavily with other network actors in order to expand their resource pool. These efforts 
were driven by effectiveness since the focal actors perceived that they could achieve their 
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response to climate change most effectively when mobilising network resources and 
activities. 
When analysing the case data on the network interactions, it appeared that a set of 
behaviours underpins the network interactions. In fact, in congruence with previous 
theoretical developments in the behavioural sciences literature (e.g., Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Sebenius, 1983, 1995; Lax and Sebenius, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991; Kahneman et al., 1991; Hampson, 1995; Tenbrunsel et al., 2000), in the present 
study a set of behaviours seemed to guide the network interactions. These are 1) Frames 
and reference points; 2) Loss aversion and the belief in a fixed-resource pie, and 3) Herd 
behaviour. 
As suggested prior, the first set of behaviours identified in this study are frames and 
reference points. Frames and reference points relate to the risk-averse behaviour of actors 
and the tendency to weigh responses to climate change against reference points. 
Interestingly, the findings of this study suggest that the frame of a decision (loss- or gain-
oriented) does not seem to affect the ways in which companies behave. In fact, both loss- 
and gain-oriented decisions brought about network interaction characterised and driven 
by risk-aversion. This finding contradicts that only positively framed decisions, i.e. the 
gains that can be obtained when addressing a problem, prompt risk-averse behaviour. 
Negatively framed decisions, i.e. what can be lost when not addressing a problem, on the 
other hand, would prompt risk-seeking behaviour (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Additionally, this study finds that the legal/regulatory or economic pressures act as 
reference points for network interactions. Indeed, the case companies’ efforts in response 
to climate change were relative to reference points. This finding supports previous 
research of  Veal and Mouzas (2010) who, based on the prior work of Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979) and Tenbrunsel et al. (2000), suggested that companies take the emerging 
rules and regulations as a frame for thinking about their action in response to climate 
change. 
As I have discussed, the second set of behaviours identified in this study are loss aversion 
and the belief in a fixed-resource pie. Firstly, the network interaction was characterised 
by loss-aversion. This was evident since as soon as the focal actors realised that the loss 
of resources was a possibility, the companies rendered their activities aimed at responding 
to climate change. This played out similarly in all five cases. In the first case, for example, 
as soon as the actors realised that it was impossible to cost-effectively comply with the 
ECO scheme, they requested an alteration of the policy, hoping to safeguard profitability 
by minimising the costs of compliance with the legal/regulatory pressure. 
In the same way, in the third case, the network interaction was rooted in not missing a 
commercial opportunity during the transition towards a renewables-only energy supply, 
or in other words, maximising profitability by running a two GW coal-fired power plant. 
The network interaction of actors was therefore characterised by loss aversion since the 
network actors had the tendency to prefer avoiding a loss and keep their current resources 
rather than risk losing resources. Hereby, this study confirms previous findings on 
behaviour in response to climate change being driven by concerns over the scarcity of 
resources and the basic human belief of a fixed-resource pool (e.g., Bazerman et al., 
2000). 
Moreover, the network interactions examined in this study were characterised by herd 
behaviour. This was evident since the network actors engaged in responses to climate 
change that were akin to other actors in their business network, rather than opting for 
individual, isolated activities. Thereby, this study suggests that individual actors in 
 280 
 
business relationships and networks have the tendency to act akin to others around them. 
In other words, the network actors made their decisions relative to how other network 
actors behaved. In line with previous research (e.g., Sebenius, 1983; Veal and Mouzas, 
2010), these herd-like network interactions led to coalitional behaviour. Across all five 
empirical cases, the network actors acted as a coalition when their intrinsic values and 
beliefs were similar. Therefore, this confirms Mouzas and Ford’s (2011) finding that herd 
behaviour may characterise activities when addressing a business problem. 
Collectively, these three sets of behaviours that appear to guide the network interactions 
may bring about the three network outcomes of discharging, protecting and herding. This 
is the focus of the next section. 
7.2.2.4 Network outcomes 
Network outcomes, as the fourth and final component of the proposed conceptual 
framework of business responses to climate change, refers to the final result stemming 
from network-level activities aimed at mitigating the network tensions. More specifically, 
I observed three network outcomes: 1) companies discharge their responsibility by 
passing the impact to others (discharging), 2) companies defend their resources and 
rationalise their business activities rather than bearing the risks of change (protecting), 
and 3) companies form herds and act akin to other actors with similar intrinsic values and 
beliefs rather than operating in isolation (herding). 
Interestingly, this study shows that the network outcomes may, in turn, act as a stimulus 
for changes at the contextual level. Therefore, the components of the proposed conceptual 
framework of business responses to climate change (contextual change, network tensions, 
network interactions and network outcomes) are not linear but mutually reinforce one 
another across the entire framework. 
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Collectively, the conceptual framework of business responses to climate change advances 
the IMP literature by not only providing a systematic explanation of the interaction and 
behaviour in business relationships and networks but also suggesting a considerable 
amount of change as an outcome of business responses to climate change. In fact, in this 
study, it seemed that as a result of the contextual changes (socio-cultural, legal/regulatory 
and economic pressures), previous activities proven to successfully operate and survive 
(Håkansson, 1992) were no longer perceived as guaranteeing such success and survival. 
Hereby, contradicting the common argument that business networks are comparably 
stable due to a deep process and pattern “that drives actors to minimise the impact of 
externally imposed changes” (Harrison and Easton, 2002, p.551). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), two scholars outside the business marketing literature, have 
previously suggested that changes to a regulatory framework frequently stimulates 
alterations to companies’ current pattern of behaviour. In line with this, the present study 
finds that the contextual changes (socio-cultural, legal/regulatory and economic 
pressures) may cause a considerable amount of change in network processes and patterns. 
In doing so, business networks appear to undergo a process of trial and error through 
interactions between actors, activities and resources. Ultimately leading to a considerable 
amount of change in business networks in response to response to climate change. As 
such, this study contradicts the notion that business networks are relatively stable (e.g., 
Håkansson, 1992; Harrison and Easton, 2002). 
Through the findings on interaction and behaviour in business relationships and networks, 
this study makes a strong theoretical contribution to the development of the business 




7.2.3 Extending the behavioural sciences literature 
Based on the insights on the interaction and behaviour in business relationships and 
networks, this study makes a secondary theoretical contribution to the behavioural 
sciences literature. Indeed, by showing how behaviours play out within a ‘real-life’ 
business situation, this research counteracts the lack of empirical evidence that 
characterises much of the behavioural sciences literature. This empirical gap in the 
existing literature has been highlighted by Marewski et al. (2010), Kelman (2011) and 
Ferraro (2016). 
This study advances the behavioural sciences literature by showing that the behaviour 
underpinning the decision making when companies respond to climate change is based 
upon three sets of business behaviours: 1) Frames and reference points; 2) Loss aversion 
and the belief in a fixed-resource pie; and 3) Herd behaviour. 
Collectively, the insights on the interaction and behaviour in networks show how 
behaviours occur within a ‘real-life’ business situation. Interestingly, it appears that 
Ferraro’s (2016) hypothesised explanation of how behaviours play out in the context of 
business responses to climate change does not hold true in the empirical world. Indeed, 
the findings presented in this study show that the behaviour in networks is guided by three 
sets of business behaviours. Accordingly, study suggests that the three fundamental 
changes that are occurring when examining the behaviour of companies rather than 
individuals (profit maximisation versus utility maximisation, the competitive 
environment and group versus individual; Ferraro, 2016), do not eliminate behavioural 
deficiencies. 
In the next section, I discuss the implications for managers and policymakers that can be 
drawn from the primary and secondary theoretical contributions outlined above. 
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7.3 Implications for managers and policymakers 
The findings of this study contain several important implications for managers and 
policymakers. These implications derived from deliberately taking an empirical approach 
to the research objectives. This was largely due to the aim of providing real answers that 
may contribute to addressing global climate change. From the outset, I was certain that – 
notwithstanding the importance of advancing theory – contributing to the global response 
to climate change is only possible when managers and policymakers can learn from this 
study. 
In this study, I have argued that organisation and management scholars could and indeed 
should broaden their unit of analysis to account for the fact that business responses to 
climate change involve a multitude of network actors that interact with one another in 
order to access the resources necessary to respond to climate change. Likewise, when 
designing business responses to climate change managers and policymakers must take 
the ways in which companies are embedded in wider networks of continuous business 
and non-business exchange relationships into consideration. As shown in this study, it is 
only when moving to the network as the unit of analysis that the dynamics between actors, 
activities and resources when responding to climate change come to the fore. Especially, 
the three sets of business behaviours that appear to guide the network interactions and 
ultimately lead to the network outcomes of discharging, protecting and herding contain 
significant implications for managers and policymakers. 
From the perspective of policymakers interested in designing and implementing a 
legal/regulatory framework in response to climate change, the findings presented in this 
study suggest the need to strengthen the legal/regulatory demands for carbon emission 
reductions. By introducing both loss- and gain-oriented rules and regulations, 
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policymakers may be able to alter the frames and reference points that businesses utilise 
to establish their responses to climate change. When designing new rules and regulations, 
policymakers’ could ultimately aim to encourage business responses to climate change 
based on proactivity and absolute effectiveness. It seems likely that this can be achieved 
when actively involving all network actors in the design of the legal/regulatory 
framework. In this process, network actors could highlight the policy support mechanisms 
needed to foster proactivity and absolute effectiveness of their responses to climate 
change. 
Furthermore, this study shows that managers can gain benefits from being open to 
discussing the design of a legal/regulatory framework that encourages business responses 
to climate change. This permits managers to shape new rules and regulations that enable 
safeguarding the effectiveness of transitioning towards a low-carbon economy by creating 
economic opportunities along the way. Such a mutually constructive approach by both 
managers and policymakers could contribute to a more stable legal/regulatory framework 
in response to climate change. 
Moreover, from the perspective of policymakers that seek to establish a legal/regulatory 
framework in response to climate change, the present research suggests designing a 
legal/regulatory framework that ensures that companies can obtain immediate benefits 
from reducing their response to climate change. This could, for example, be achieved by 
providing tax incentives, interest-free credits and insurance mechanisms for the large 
upfront investments made in response to climate change. Policymakers could thereby help 
to mitigate behavioural aspects such as loss aversion or the belief of a fixed-resource pie. 
In addition, from the perspective of policymakers, this study suggests designing a 
legal/regulatory framework that encourages entire herds of actors to respond to climate 
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change. In the present research, business responses to climate change were partially 
related to the ability of some network actors to make profits when operating diesel-fired 
power plants. It seems likely that network actors will opt for decarbonising their 
operations when policymakers provide a stable legal/regulatory framework that creates 
economic opportunities in line with responding to climate change. 
Having discussed the managerial and policy implications stemming from the findings 
presented in this study, in the next section, I outline the limitations of this study and 
propose promising paths for future research. 
7.4 Limitations and directions for future research 
This thesis lays the ground for future work on what might emerge as a research stream 
called the ’behavioural network approach’. Emanating from the theoretical gaps opened 
by this study, the behavioural network approach could evolve around an integration of 
the IMP’s network approach and the behavioural sciences. This would permit a more 
thorough study of behavioural strategies and decisions. In fact, organisation and 
management scholars have started to investigate behavioural strategies (e.g., Lovallo and 
Sibony, 2010; Powell et al., 2011; Greve, 2013), which aim to “strengthen the empirical 
integrity and practical usefulness of strategy theory by grounding strategic management 
in realistic assumptions about human cognition” (Powell et al., 2011, p.1369). As it 
stands, however, the behavioural strategy research community does not recognise the 
need to adopt a network approach. Hence, these studies are commonly based on single 
firms. In the context of business responses to climate change, this thesis has shown how 
critical it is to move beyond the individual company to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding. It seems likely that a similar move would significantly enhance the 
understanding of behavioural strategies and decisions in companies. 
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Furthermore, some of the limitations of the conceptual framework (Figure 16 on page 
246) presented in this study may help to suggest additional promising paths for future 
research on the behaviour in networks and the empirical phenomenon of business 
responses to climate change. 
Firstly, this study has drawn upon the IMP’s network approach and the behavioural 
sciences literature to explain the empirical findings. Despite the prominence of such 
theories, other concepts and theories may advance the proposed conceptual framework. 
For example, utilising sense-making theory and institutional theory appears promising. 
The sense-making theory could provide additional insights into the process of attributing 
meaning to network behaviour, as well as the reactions and re-reactions from other 
network actors, their respective attribution of meaning and its outcomes (e.g., Weick, 
1979, 1993 1995). Related IMP concepts such as ‘network theories’ (e.g., Johanson and 
Mattsson, 1985, 1992), ‘network pictures’ (e.g., Ford et al., 2003; Henneberg et al., 2006) 
and ‘network graffiti’ (Hopkinson, 2015) may further illuminate the attribution of 
meaning that may underpin the identified behaviours in networks. 
Further theoretical development may employ institutional theory. This literature could 
help to unravel the institutional logics, complexity and ambiguity in which the network 
behaviour occurs (e.g., North, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011; Quattrone, 2015). In 
particular, the work of Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Quattrone (2015) could help to 
advance the conceptual framework presented in this study by explaining network 
behaviour that seeks to alter the prevailing institutional logics and exploit institutional 
resources and contradictions; this has been vividly illustrated in the first and fourth 
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empirical case of this study. Collectively, these theories seem to be promising avenues to 
build upon and advance the groundwork on the behaviour in networks laid in this study.  
Secondly, this study has been based upon data source material drawn from semi-
structured interviews and supplementary documentation. There is a potential to 
complement these data sources with direct observations. Participatory action research and 
other forms of ethnographic inquiry may permit gathering such data (e.g., Mueller et al., 
2013; Pressey et al., 2014). It is likely that this would provide rich data about network 
interaction and behaviour in action that is not mediated by the interviewee’s memory of 
the events. Future research could, therefore, test the findings made in the present study 
and possibly further illuminate the non-conscious behavioural patterns that guide the 
interaction and behaviour in networks. 
Thirdly, the geographical, industrial and environmental scope of this research could be 
extended. Having examined five cases of business responses to climate change within a 
single industry in a single country, future research could strengthen the robustness of the 
findings presented in this study by examining other countries and additional industries in 
light of different externally generated pressures. For example, it would be interesting to 
learn how the interaction and behaviour in business networks play out in less mature 
transitions towards a low-carbon economy and institutional contexts (e.g., China). 
Furthermore, fruitful insights might be stemming from industries such as agriculture, 
transportation, tourism and fast fashion (e.g., Zara). 
Moreover, the applicability of this study could be widened by examining business 
responses to other environmental concerns. Alongside climate change, other 
environmental challenges have developed faster than anticipated (Whiteman et al., 2013). 
It would be interesting to advance the conceptual framework presented in this study by 
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examining business responses to the loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, increasing 
phosphorus and nitrogen loads, lack of global freshwater supply and rising chemical 
pollution (see for example: Westley and Vredenburg, 1997; Sharma and Nguan, 1999; 
Nilsson and Persson, 2012). Understanding the network interaction and behaviour in and 
around these environmental challenges could help to advance the findings presented in 
this study. 
Collectively, the insights stemming from the proposed pathways for future research will 
help to widen the applicability and robustness of the conceptual framework of business 
responses to climate change and improve our understanding of interaction and behaviour 
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Appendix 1: Sample participant recruitment email 





I am a PhD student at Lancaster University who is investigating business relationships 
when collectively crafting climate change mitigation strategies. I am particularly 
interested in how public and private actors in the energy sector collaborate. Therefore, 
I was pleased to hear about the several public-private collaborations during the 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar “Next steps 
for UK domestic energy efficiency policy” on Thursday, 28th April 2016. 
 
Now, I was wondering if you would be able to give me some additional information 
about your interaction with private companies or public actors when aiming to reduce 
carbon emissions? This could either be via phone or in person and would not take longer 
than 30 minutes. I would very much appreciate your input and I will certainly share my 
findings with you once the study is completed. 
 
If this sounds interesting to you and you are happy to participate, then would you be so 
kind as to let me know your availability during the next days/weeks. 
 






Lancaster University Management School 
Charles Carter Building, Room D44b 








Appendix 2: Sample of descriptive codes (Case 2) 
E_c2_2008_UK Energy Act 2008 creates a regulatory framework 
E_c2_2009_Government intention to implement CCS projects 
E_c2_2009_Increases carbon reduction targets 
E_c2_2009_Outlines interest and expertise in CCS development 
E_c2_2010_03_Government announces funding of FEED studies 
E_c2_2010_CCC shows that the UK needs to decarbonise power by 2030 to meet 2050 targets 
E_c2_2010_Energy Act 2010 introduces financial incentive for CCS 
E_c2_2010_Government ensures that funding will be provided for project demonstration 
E_c2_2010_Links between CCS and EPS 
E_c2_2010_Importance of gas in decarbonising 
E_c2_2010_Raises the issue of renewables intermittency 
E_c2_2010_UK Energy Act 2010 introduces CCS incentives 
E_c2_2011_09_Barriers to CCS deployment 
E_c2_2011_09_Resource commitment 
E_c2_2011_09_Strategy 
E_c2_2011_Estimates show that 20/30 GW of fossil fuel generation need to be fitted with CCS 
to meet targets 
E_c2_2011_Government acknowledges that gas will play an important role in the future energy 
mix 
E_c2_2011_Idea is to bury carbon under the seabed 
E_c2_2011_Agree on working on CCS Project 
E_c2_2011_Raises concerns over ambiguity regarding CCS policy 
E_c2_2011_The potential of CCS 
E_c2_2011_WWF Scotland acknowledges the potential of CCS 
E_c2_2012_03_Stimulate investment in UK energy infrastructure 
E_c2_2012_07_Approval for CCS project 
E_c2_2012_08_Urges government to take decisive action on CCS technology 
E_c2_2013_03_20_Government announces preferred bidders 
E_c2_2013_03_20_Government announces preferred bidders for the CCS projects 
E_c2_2013_07_Proceed without EU funding 
E_c2_2013_CCS development now could deliver low carbon electricity cheaper by 2020 
E_c2_2013_CCSA praises government and asks to ensure funding of 1bn 
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E_c2_2013_Including gas CCS in the competition 
E_c2_2013_EPS and CCS 
E_c2_2013_Government decides to move forward with two CCS projects 
E_c2_2013_Importance of CCS to the UK 
E_c2_2013_Progress update on CCS Commercialisation Programme 
E_c2_2013_Closer to the depleted reservoir in the North Sea 
E_c2_2013_Statement of interest in developing CCS 
E_c2_2014_02_24_Government signs contract 
E_c2_2014_02_CCS as a tool to mitigate climate change 
E_c2_2014_02_CCS as an important step to make gas even cleaner 
E_c2_2014_02_CCS technology and renewables intermittency 
E_c2_2014_02_FEED expected to continue until 2015 
E_c2_2014_02_Government acknowledges that without CCS it will be costly to meet climate 
targets 
E_c2_2014_02_Government needs to secure innovative projects 
E_c2_2014_02_Government spends 100m on the design phase of two projects 
E_c2_2014_02_New CCGT plants incompatible with climate targets without CCS technology 
E_c2_2014_02_CCS plans get approved by government 
E_c2_2014_02_CCs project expected to be up and running by 2019 
E_c2_2014_02_Signs contract with government 
E_c2_2014_02_States that CCS could reiterate UK leadership in tackling climate change 
E_c2_2014_02_Storage capacity 
E_c2_2014_03_CCS has the potential to reduce gas-related emissions by 90% 
E_c2_2014_04_CCS is expensive 
E_c2_2014_04_Gas as the world’s most dominant fuel by 2050 
E_c2_2014_04_Gas has half as much carbon as coal 
E_c2_2014_06_Ongoing support from the government 
E_c2_2014_06_Shows that technology is feasible 
E_c2_2014_06_Significant amount of infrastructure is already in place 
E_c2_2014_07_Advantages of CCS 
E_c2_2014_07_CCS project in Canada 
E_c2_2014_08_Employment during construction phase 
E_c2_2014_08_Individually proven technologies that need to be put together 
E_c2_2014_08_Locals excited about Peterhead plans 
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E_c2_2014_08_Could pave the way for massive investment in CCS 
E_c2_2014_08_Potential demand for technology from overseas 
E_c2_2014_08_The North Sea as a huge resource for storing carbon 
E_c2_2014_11_CCS could generate 6.5bn annually and cut decarbonisation costs 
E_c2_2014_11_CCS factsheet 
E_c2_2014_11_IPCC praises CCS technology 
E_c2_2014_12_Loses at capacity market auction 
E_c2_2014_12_Only wins few contracts in the capacity auction for 2018-19 
E_c2_2014_CCS technology needed to tackle Climate Change 
E_c2_2014_External examiners approve capability of storing carbon 
E_c2_2014_Government award contract to gas-CCS project 
E_c2_2014_Government role in CCS 
E_c2_2014_Deliver project management during FEED phase 
E_c2_2014_Leading generator of renewables 
E_c2_2014_Work on CCS 
E_c2_2015_05_CCS projects as a sign of government’s commitment to decarbonise 
E_c2_2015_05_Save 10-15m tons of carbon 
E_c2_2015_06_04_Receives back up gas supply contract 
E_c2_2015_06_Council approves CCS planning application 
E_c2_2015_06_CCS encourages burning further carbon 
E_c2_2015_06_Critiques argue that CCS encourages burning more fossil fuels 
E_c2_2015_06_Driving CCS down the cost curve 
E_c2_2015_06_How CCS works 
E_c2_2015_06_Final decision whether bids are attractive 
E_c2_2015_06_Offshore and onshore Environmental Impact Assessment 
E_c2_2015_06_CCS can capture 1m tonnes annually for 10-15 years 
E_c2_2015_06_Put priority on developing CCS 
E_c2_2015_06_Starting construction depends on positive investment decision 
E_c2_2015_06_Summary of CCS technology 
E_c2_2015_07_CCS buys time to get entirely rid of fossil fuels 
E_c2_2015_07_Fossil fuel firms have an interest in developing CCS to keep burning carbon 
E_c2_2015_09_Effort to develop CCS 
E_c2_2015_09_Verified as suitable for safe carbon storage 
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E_c2_2015_09_Requirement of more CCS projects to reach net zero emissions 
E_c2_2015_09_Only takes the project forward when the government commits to funding 
E_c2_2015_10_Achieving carbon budget only possible with low carbon sources 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Cancellation described as extremely damaging 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Cancellation not in the long-term interest of the UK 
E_c2_2015_11_25_CCS cancellation as an example of how climate policy should not be executed 
E_c2_2015_11_25_CCS crucial for a diverse energy mix 
E_c2_2015_11_25_CCS is crucial for cost-effective decarbonisation 
E_c2_2015_11_25_For many industry CCS is the only option to cut emissions 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Government decision makes it almost impossible to meet carbon budgets 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Government manifesto on CCS 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Government reset of energy policy inconsistent with CCS competition 
cancellation 
E_c2_2015_11_25_Greenpeace states the severe consequences of cancelling the CCS 
competition 
E_c2_2015_11_25_IPCC on CCS 
E_c2_2015_11_25_CCS Project is now dead 
E_c2_2015_11_25_UK Committee on Climate Change on CCS 
E_c2_2015_11_25_UK government cancels CCS competition 
E_c2_2015_11_Coal to be replaced by gas 
E_c2_2015_11_Gas struggles to secure contracts under capacity market 
E_c2_2015_11_UK electricity supply must be virtually carbon-free by 2030 
E_c2_2015_11_UK energy secretary is backing gas and nuclear 
E_c2_2015_25_11_Government decides to not take CCS competition forward 
E_c2_2015_Cancellation will delay demonstration of CCS process on CCGT 
E_c2_2015_CCS is already being used around the world 
E_c2_2015_History of CCS 
E_c2_2015_Persuading people takes time 
E_c2_2015_CCS Project 
E_c2_2015_Reducing follow-on project costs by a third 
E_c2_2016_01_31_CCS still has a long-term role to play in the UK 
E_c2_2016_01_31_UK government spent GBP28m 




E_c2_2016_02_10_Cancellation has put back the project by at least 5 years 
E_c2_2016_02_10_Companies heard about the cancellation in the news 
E_c2_2016_02_10_Failure to develop CCS is bad for business and environment 
E_c2_2016_02_10_UK policy to replace coal with gas 
E_c2_2016_02_Challenges of meeting the Climate Change Act target without CCS 
E_c2_2016_05_18_New EU fund could breathe life into UK CCS 
E_c2_2016_06_CCS lessons learned 
E_c2_2016_12_15_Lack of government support 
E_c2_2016_Government working on ways to decarbonise companies 
E_c2_2016_Big difference between having CCS and not 
E_c2_2016_Bizarre decision to abandon the CCS competition 
E_c2_2016_By 2030 concern about climate change may have intensified enormously 
E_c2_2016_Cancellation may have delayed roll-out of CCS by a decade 
E_c2_2016_Carbon tax helped to decarbonise 
E_c2_2016_Carbon tax not used to ensure carbon reduction 
E_c2_2016_CCS as a technology that balances renewables intermittency 
E_c2_2016_CCS can contribute to reducing the cost of the transition 
E_c2_2016_CCS crucial for the transition towards low carbon 
E_c2_2016_CCS had a tricky time because of government 
E_c2_2016_CCS key because of negative emissions 
E_c2_2016_CCS Project cancellation impact 
E_c2_2016_CCS required to meet net zero emissions 
E_C2_2016_CCS technology is absolutely essential 
E_c2_2016_CCS the only technology to decarbonise gas emissions 
E_c2_2016_Challenges beyond getting the technology right 
E_c2_2016_Collaboration makes something possible that wasn't possible before 
E_c2_2016_Collaboration on innovation 
E_c2_2016_Commerical scale demonstration of CCS is key 
E_c2_2016_Costs of CCS cancellation 
E_c2_2016_Decarbonisation is a huge challenge across all sector 
E_c2_2016_Deployment at scale is crucial 
E_c2_2016_Economics of CCS don't work out 
E_c2_2016_Energy efficiency measures lose out because of opportunity cost 
 328 
 
E_c2_2016_Energy innovation is key 
E_c2_2016_Energy innovation acuter than ever 
E_c2_2016_Energy transition is huge and has to happen quickly 
E_c2_2016_Energy transition towards low carbon challenges traditional approaches to security 
of supply 
E_c2_2016_Exciting growth in decarbonisation 
E_c2_2016_Existing relationships as a start for interaction 
E_c2_2016_Explanation of the CCS Project 
E_c2_2016_Getting the technology right isn't enough 
E_c2_2016_Government acknowledges tough decision on CCS 
E_c2_2016_Government funded FEED phase of CCS 
E_c2_2016_Government lacks technical expertise 
E_c2_2016_Government not able to meet carbon budget by 2020 
E_c2_2016_Government policy and sense of urgency hinder collaboration 
E_c2_2016_Government with a strategic role in investment stimulation 
E_c2_2016_How to align incentives to do something about climate change 
E_c2_2016_Increased cost of decarbonisation without CCS 
E_c2_2016_Inertia of big companies makes it difficult to quickly change direction 
E_c2_2016_Innovation drag issue 
E_c2_2016_Institutional barriers preventing innovation to break through 
E_c2_2016_It would be crazy to believe that one company can do the energy transition alone 
E_c2_2016_Lack of government direction is an issue for the industry and investors 
E_c2_2016_Lack of upfront capital support to make CCS work 
E_c2_2016_Losing the flexibility and storage inherent in fossil fuel generation 
E_c2_2016_Market mechanisms give price incentive but are too uncertain to base decision upon 
it 
E_c2_2016_More resources than ever before 
E_c2_2016_Partnerships are good but bear risks 
E_c2_2016_Would have been the world's first commercial-scale demonstration of CCS 
E_c2_2016_Public needs to be made aware of the costs associated with the low carbon transition 
E_c2_2016_Renewables Obligation on Suppliers forces them to source from renewables 
E_c2_2016_Response to climate change driven by the government but delivered by industry 
E_c2_2016_Risk of retrospective changes to policy 
E_c2_2016_Concluded that there is no longer a future for CCS 
 329 
 
E_c2_2016_Focuses on energy efficiency measures 
E_c2_2016_Disappointed about cancellation 
E_c2_2016_Impact on UK CCS industry 
E_c2_2016_CCS needs to come down the cost curve 
E_c2_2016_Remains committed to CCS 
E_c2_2016_Interact with the government to influence policies 
E_c2_2016_Would respond to climate change alone unless they lack a resource 
E_c2_2016_Challenges of setting up new partnerships 
E_c2_2016_Acknowledges that markets fail to deliver sufficient decarbonisation 
E_c2_2016_A partnership organisation 
E_c2_2016_A utility, not a technology provider 
E_c2_2016_Government intervention is a good way of innovating 
E_c2_2016_Channels of interaction with government 
E_c2_2016_Generation portfolio 
E_c2_2016_Interact when they lack a resource 
E_c2_2016_Interaction with government 
E_c2_2016_On flip-flopping of government policies 
E_c2_2016_On the issue with the energy trilemma 
E_c2_2016_The opportunity cost issue 
E_c2_2016_Response to climate change based on commercial opportunities 
E_c2_2016_Responsibility in the CCS Project 
E_c2_2016_Sees policies and auction outcomes to make sense of government direction 
E_c2_2016_View of the CCS project 
E_c2_2016_Strong signals that government favours markets and competition 
E_c2_2016_The advantage of negative emissions technology 
E_c2_2016_The carbon text clarification 
E_c2_2016_The costs of a decarbonised energy system 
E_c2_2016_The immense costs of CCS 
E_c2_2016_The importance of CCS 
E_c2_2016_The issue of low carbon innovation 
E_c2_2016_The risk of investing in new technologies 
E_c2_2016_Top down drive towards decarbonisation 
E_c2_2016_UK energy system undergoes a transition towards low carbon 
 330 
 
E_c2_2016_UK is a significant net importer of energy 
E_c2_2016_Unsuccessful CCS competition 
E_c2_2016_Utilities are changing shape in the front of our eyes 
E_c2_2016_Very long-term investments in energy 
E_c2_2016_Without CCS the use of nuclear is inevitable 
E_c2_2017_01_20_DECC wasn't clear about the budget from the start 
E_c2_2017_01_20_Disagreement in government led to CCS cancellation 
E_c2_2017_01_Cancellation ended 10 years of work 
E_c2_2017_01_Costs of CCS with government support 
E_c2_2017_01_Government support is needed for big projects 
E_c2_2017_01_Lack of consensus that supports CCS technology 
E_c2_2017_02_Announces to investigate the future of the site 
E_c2_2017_08_UK electricity and gas consumption summary 
E_c2_2017_CCS competition facts 
E_c2_2017_Definition of CCS 
E_c2_2017_Government explains reasons for cancelling the second competition 
E_c2_2017_Government on second CCS competition 
E_c2_2017_Government on the role of CCS in decarbonising the energy system 
E_c2_2017_Government view on CCS 
E_c2_2017_Lessons learned from the CCS competition 
 331 
 
Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 332 
 
 
 
 333 
 
 
 
 334 
 
 
 
